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ABSTRACT
RESPONSIBILITY AND CRITICAL THEORY: RESPONDING TO SUFFERING
AFTER AUSCHWITZ
MAY 2004
ANTONIO Y. VAZQUEZ-ARROYO, B.A. UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
In contemporary theoretical discourse the concept of responsibility is often found in the
intersection of attempts to rethink ethics of difference, enlightened notions of human
agency, as well as questions of accountability. This dissertation complicates the terms of
these discussions by exploring the meaning and implications of theorizing responsibility
politically. In doing so, this study disentangles the question of responsibility from
formulations that privilege accountability and from those associated with deconstructive
and ontological paradigms. Accordingly, I formulate a critical theory of responsibility
that without ceasing to be material and critical and without erasing the “subject,” is
responsive to claims of Identity/Difference, otherness, and suffering captures the political
dimension of these questions. Responsibility is thus partly redefined as the need to
politically respond to a certain predicament both as an individual as a member of
different collectivities, face the burdens of acting collectively, and assume the obligations
involved as a collected collectivity that is vigilant in relation to the forms of power it
generates, as well as of its uses. Stated differently, rather than to approach responsibility
only from an ontological, or “analytical” outlook, I propose to look at political
viii
responsibility from the perspective of critical theory by considering the historical
experience of genocide in the aftermath of Auschwitz.
In its conceptual aspect, this dissertation combines careful interpretative work on
major political thinkers in the twentieth-century with a critical engagement with the
works of anthropologists, historians, literary critics, and philosophers. Chapters on the
Hegelian-Marxist tradition, Adorno’s dialectical-constellational critical theory, the Great
War and the political theory of catastrophe, on the dialectic of enlightenment and its
entanglement with late modem despotism and the historical coupling of violence and
civilization, the critical import of historicism for a ethico-political historical
consciousness, and universal history, frame the bulk of the dissertation. These chapters
aim at constituting what Theodor W. Adorno, following Walter Benjamin, called a
“constellation” of concepts and narratives that seek to illustrate the complexities of
theorizing responsibility politically, without aiming at exhausting the question.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The interpretation of given reality and its
abolition are connected to each other, not, of
course, in the sense that reality is negated in the
concept, but that out of the construction of a
configuration of reality the demand for its real
change always follows promptly.
Theodor W. Adorno
Our predicament we are nowadays told is one of loss: the loss of the idea of reason as a
privileged transcendent standpoint; the loss of an alternative system to capitalism; the
loss of the socialist dream, as it became a catastrophe embodied in the so-called real
socialist countries of the former Soviet bloc; the loss of human lives at the hand of
genocidal wars and atomic weapons; for American liberals, the loss of innocence, first
during the sixties and again with the recent loss of human life, along with a loss of a
sense of security and invulnerability in the aftermath of 1 1 September 2001; and the loss
of the idea of linear historical progress. 1 And yet most of these losses are not such - as
Freud in his essay “Mourning and Melancholia” suggested, sometimes the lost object was
never there, and still one can lose what one never had. 2 But others losses are real. And in
some cases these lead to a condition of grief and eventual working through - which we
are also told are “resourcefs] for politics” - especially while facing human losses that are
largely due to human catastrophes, such as terrorism (Statist and non-Statist) and
1
For a recent statement, see Wendy Brown, Politics Out ofHistory (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001). Cf. Sheldon S. Wolin, “Political Theory: From Vocation to Invocation,” in Vocations of Political
Theory
,
ed. Jason Frank and John Tambomino (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2000),
5ff. Also cf. Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out ofOur Ancient History (London: Blackwell, 1992), the
essays collected in Judaism and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and especially Mourning Becomes
the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in Standard Edition ofthe Complete Psychological Works
ofSigmund Freud, Volume 14, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001).
1
genocide. (And in instances like these one often has to mourn a loss without bodies,
hence the centrality of memorial and monuments to “unknown” soldiers.) But
irrespective of which ones of the aforementioned are losses and which are not, what is
striking is that for the most part this predicament of “loss” has not led to a critical
reckoning with recent history, nor to a nuanced understanding of the socio-historical,
cultural, and political configurations that have led to the passing of emancipatory ideals
in the twentieth century - let alone to cast the experience of loss politically. To be sure,
valiant efforts have been made in this direction, but often falling into an ahistorical
ontological path that, even while ostensibly meant to be political, ends up positing what
after the Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas has been called a “new ethics” that stands as
a contrast to the indictment against reason, or “the metaphysical Western tradition,” for
its role in the concretization of some of these human-made losses. These efforts have
little tolerance for equivocations when it comes to “reason.” An ironic stand for those that
are thrilled in highlighting the fragility, contingency, and non-sovereign character of
human agency but wind up in a paradoxical predicament of “despairing rationalism
without reason . 3 This is a predicament of antinomies and theoretical stalemates that is
sometimes confused with aporetic thinking.
When facing loss, I shall argue, it becomes more imperative for critical thinking
to recast itself in self-reflective ways. Loss need not lead to the abandonment of critical
thinking, or reason, and of the utopian aspirations that arguably miscarried. Instead,
3
Archetypical here is the recent work of Judith Butler on “Ethical Violence.” See her essays, “Global
Violence, Sexual Politics” in Queer Ideas: The David R. Kessler Lectures in Lesbian and Gays Studies,
The Center for Lesbian and Gay Studies, CUNY (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of
New York, 2003), and its expanded version “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” in Studies in Gender and
Sexuality 4 (January 2003): 9-37. For Rose’s characterization, see Mourning Becomes the Law, 1-14. See
also Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 1-32, 37-51.
2
critical thinking needs to reassess these utopian ideals in light of their concrete
articulations, in their institutional embodiments, in order to fulfill one of the tasks of
critique: to re-cogmze the mutual mediation of the utopian ideal, in its immanence, and
the concrete-historical juncture in which it took, form and its simultaneous implication in
both freedom and unfreedom. This last task is dialectically rendered as discerning the
identity and lack of identity of the ideal of freedom and emancipation with the institutions
that claim to embody these ideals. Reason is ambiguous, but it is also “relational,
responsive, and reconstructive.”4 In other words, only in its concrete historical
articulations is reason exclusionary, instrumental, and monotheistic. But reason is also the
ground of critical theory. As such, it is dialectical and equivocal, and yet also
emancipatory. In Adorno’s critical theory, it is reason that precisely allows for a
comprehension of the institutional mediations of its ideal, as well as to immanently
criticize these for their lack of identity with the ideal they portend. This, in turn, might
yield to what Adorno referred to as the transcendence moment of thinking.
Concepts, as Adorno suggested more than once, are historically situated. Along
these lines Adorno formulated his powerful critique of both Heideggerian neologisms - a
critique that I would like to suggest equally applies to modern-day Heideggerians - and
the historical abstractions of positivism and its contemporary surrogates. Both
progressive and regressive tendencies dialectically coexist in tension in distinct historical
formulations of a concept. Adorno demonstrated this as early as the essay “The Idea of
Natural History,” where the dialectic between nature and history is initially formulated as
the dialectic in which history is to be comprehended and criticized as nature, while nature
4
Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 4-5.
3
IS to be apprehended as historical, again later in the entwinement of myth and
enlightenment in the Dialectic of Enlightenment
,
and still later in his reflections on
progress and on “subject and object .” 5 The concept “reason” does not constitutes an
exception to this dialectic. Or as critical theorist Susan Buck-Morss has recently put it in
relation to the utopian hopes animating the twentieth century “dreamworld” of mass
utopia in its different eastern and western variants: “There is no reason to believe that
those utopian hopes caused history to go wrong, and every reason, based on the evidence
of the abuses of power that propelled history forward, to believe the opposite .”6 It is by
rescuing the utopian ideal animating this experience that one can critically discern how
freedom entered into complicity with unfreedom, equality with inequality, emancipation
with domination. But to retrieve this utopian moment requires a critical epistemology: a
critical theory that immanently discerns the moment of transcendence from the
perspective of the historical concreteness of its objects, where losses are pondered as
mediated. Buck-Morss captures this element in Dreamworld and Catastrophe when she
argues for the juxtaposition of images and concrete fragments of the past and interprets
these as “dream images” that embody past experiences and aspirations that could lead to
the rescuing of the utopian ideal that animated past experience in order to redeem it.
5
Theodor W. Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History,” Telos 60 (Summer 1984): 111-24; Dialectic of
Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. G. S. Noerr and trans. Edmund Jephcott (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2002); “Progress” and “On Subject and Object,” in Critical Models:
Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). I
interpret these dialectical notions at some length throughout this dissertation.
6
Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 68.
4
Loss can only be critically worked through, rather than acted out, by means of an
“inaugurated rather than aberrated mourning.”7 Gillian Rose puts it well when she sees it
as a question of nsking to “know, misknow, and yet grow”; that is, to re-cognize
learning, growth and knowledge as fallible and precarious but risk-able.” In contrast to
the new ethics of passivity, this involves the “constant risk of positing and failing and
positing again [which Rose calls] ‘activity beyond activity’, to cover the ethical nature of
the description, and to distinguish it from the Levinasian ‘passivity beyond passivity’, the
idea of ethics as the ego-less substitution of one for ‘the other’.”8 An account that is
crucial to formulate a critical theory of responsibility that is at once ethical and political.
One that avoids abstract openness to “the other” and that seeks to centrality of political
action for its concrete realization. That is, to think of this question politically involves
reclaiming the category of the democratic citizen. One that not only acts collectively but
thinks about its predicament from the perspective of a collective identity, and how that
identity is either enacted and compromised by the actions done in its name. I shall return
to this question at the end of this introduction.
In contrast, in the contemporary theoretical scene there is a lessening of critical
thinking, or the amelioration of its goals and scope. Perhaps more significantly
especially coming from the precincts of what in the USA passes as “critical theory” - is
how the terms of discussion are increasingly confined to the discursive field of liberalism.
From such diverse figures as Jurgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, and William Connolly,
7
See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, chap. 12, and Mourning Becomes the Law, chaps. 3, 5. Cf. Dominick
La Capra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), and
History and Memory After Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
8
See Rose, The Broken Middle, 308-10 and Mourning Becomes the Law, 13-14, 121-23. See also Rose’s
Love 's Work: A Reckoning with Life (New York: Schocken, 1995).
5
liberal-democratic ideology constraints the horizons of thinking. (If one where to judge
by academic publishers, “critical theory” is a rather vibrant field, even if the status of the
cntical in many of these works more than begs the question.) At the verge of the new
century (periodizations are equivocal) 9 what Rose accurately stated in the period
immediately following “the velvet revolutions” found little resonance: “All the debates,
all the antinomies of modem state and society addressed since Hobbes, Smith, and
Rousseau, have been re-opened as well as the opportunity to resume examination of the
connection between liberalism and Fascism from which post-war state-Socialism has
proved such a dangerous distraction.” 10 Yet, as with her important contributions to
dialectical and critical theory in particular, and to political theorizing in general, these
questions have been mostly neglected in contemporary theoretical discourse. Rose’s
invocation, however, not only suggests an alert vigilance to what Adomo once called the
fascist elements of liberal democracy, but also an invocation for a series of reflections on
the antinomies of the modem age, antinomies that pervade the predicament we inhabit
and tortuously navigate. Some of these are nowhere more evident than in the aftermath of
1 1 September 2001: nowadays, repression of dissent inside has increasingly constituted a
state of exception equivalent to the zones of war outside, thus conflating the two, as the
fascist moment of liberal democracy unfolds, and as questions of sovereignty, reason of
state, collective responsibility, and freedom, reemerge.
The conditions of domination and human suffering that led to the emergence of
movements of contestation, to the utopian dreams, have changed in their configurations,
9
See Eric Hobsbawm’s interview with Antonio Polito, On the Edge of the New Century (New York: The
New Press, 2000).
10
See Rose, The Broken Middle, xi.
6
but have hardly disappeared. Indeed, in light of the complexities of our current political
condition, the way loss is pondered and reflected on foreshadows the possibilities to
adequately respond to it. Accordingly, critical questions come into play: What is the
political import of the ways that loss is pondered by the discourse of “mourning”? In
which narrative does one render them, both in their universal and particular, local and
global, manifestations? How does one confront loss and render it in a narrative that
comprehensively apprehends the new forms of global capital, and the ostensibly
emergent global public sphere, one whose forces are immanent, albeit deeply mediated? 11
These are pressing questions that command attention to the often neglected, albeit
always presupposed, historical dimension of critical thinking. Stated differently, there is a
great deal of critical import in Fredric Jameson’s dictum: “Always historicize!” 12 Once
the present predicament of mourning is historicized, one realizes that, after all, a
“sensibility of decadence, nostalgia, and loss” is not necessarily a historical novelty: these
elements have been historically brought up under the spell of fin de siecle proclamations,
and mentalities, and these are frequently permeated by this sensibility. Yet, in its previous
historical incarnations, especially in the most recent European ancestor, the aftermath of
the Victorian era in the European nineteenth century, this sensibility was accompanied by
an “upsurge of renewal and rejuvenation.” In open contrast to its predecessor, our present
intellectual culture is one of despair. Writing in the aftermath of the genocidal twentieth
11
See Susan Buck-Morss’s “A Global Public Sphere?” Radical Philosophy 1 1 1 (January/ February 2002).
See also Buck-Morss, Thinking Past Terror (London: Verso, 2003). Like Buck-Morss, on this last question
I am also in critical dialogue with Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt Empire (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2000). For a critique of Empire
,
in which I spell out some of my disagreements with their
argument, see my review-essay “Recasting the Left at the End of History,” Polity XXXIV (Summer 2002).
12
See Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). See also his
recent reflections in A Singular Modernity (London and New York: Verso, 2002).
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century it is perhaps impossible for it to be otherwise, even if most of us only know of
these catastrophes vicariously
.
13
Or so we are often told. In the words of a prominent
cultural critic, for instance, the short twentieth century “was simultaneously a century of
mdescnptible catastrophes and of ferocious hopes, and often times the utopian ideals
animating the hopes ended up legitimizing some dictatorship of the future (the pure race,
the classless society, the pacified consumer paradise), turning a blind eye to persecution
and mass destruction, voracious exploitation of resources and the environment,
migrations and dislocations of whole populations to an extent the world had never
witnessed before .” 14 And once again, a critical analysis of the entwinement of freedom
and unfreedom in these concrete historical experiences is everything but present in
analyses like this, which invoke history abstractly. In contrast, once such a reckoning is
done, some of the oppositions are cast in a different light: perhaps socialism failed not
because the socialist idea was deeply flawed and totalitarianism was present in embryonic
form; perhaps instead, as Susan Buck-Morss has recently argued, it failed because it
mimicked capitalism too much . 15 Even so, the abstract conflation of these processes with
the ideals of freedom involved in them, has led to an increasingly chastened conception
of both theory and politics that seeks refuge within the confines of liberal democratic
discourse while positing a purified ontology of politics. Hence, the increasing popularity
13 On this point see James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary
Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). See also Young, The Texture ofMemory
Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Cf. Barbie Zelizer,
Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through The Camera Eye (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1998).
14
See the reflections found in Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Making Time in a Culture ofAmnesia
(New York and London: Routledge, 1995).
15
See Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe.
8
Of discourses of mourning and remembrance firmly anchored in an apolitical
understanding of the past. And yet, after the end of such a century the antinomies and
paradoxes of modem life are far from being resolved, or settled. The history of the
twentieth-century is far more complex than these commonplace narratives allow. And
yet, what comes from the precincts of contemporary theory is the call for a new ethics
that is articulated by means of the language of ontology, difference, and identity.
As it is probably evident by now, one of goals of this dissertation is to argue that
within the context of our current condition it is crucial to theorize, politically, the need to
recast critical theory in its universal and particular dimensions and thus retrieve its
epistemological import in order to formulate a critical theory that is at once
comprehensive and particular, and thus bring together its critical import with the political
aspiration of democracy, the latter divorced from its contemporary coupling with
liberalism. In this vein, it formulates a conception of critical theory that seeks to
comprehensively devise patterns of commonality and solidarity that may allow thinking,
action, and contestation, while facing a predicament of suffering and losses that are often
articulated within the coordinates of difference and particularity; a predicament in which
formidable adversaries, such as capitalism, which is the most powerful moving force the
globe has thus far witnessed, readily figures. (Judging from Anglo-American political
theory, one would not guess that there is such a thing as neoliberalism, which is arguably
“the most universal ideology in world history.” 16) Ours is a predicament in which the
economic, the cultural and the political are deeply entwined - and to discern their mutual
16
Perry Anderson stands out as offering sobering reflections on this regard. See, for instance, Anderson,
“Confronting Defeat,” London Review of Books , 17 October 2002, 15; “Renewals” New Left Review 1
(Jan/Feb 2000), 1 Iff; “Force and Consent,” New Left Review (September/October 2002) 9ff. See also, The
Origins ofPostmodernity (London and New York: Verso, 1998).
9
mediations, I shall argue, a comprehensive critical theory is indispensable, otherwise
questions of responsibility and politics remains at an abstract and ahistorical level. And
the last two coalesce too easily with the abstract tendencies of a colonizing discourse of
liberal democracy. For in relation to the intersection of the economic and the political in
our current planetary quandary there is much sense in Perry Anderson’s observation:
nowadays, Liberal democracy has spread by force of economic example, or pressure
not by moral upheaval or social mobilization; and as it has done so, its substance has
tended to dwindle, both in its homelands and its new territories, as falling rates of voter
participation and mounting popular apathy set in .” 17 Furthermore, given how the new
configurations of power that are intrinsic to capitalism and its imperatives are consonant
with difference, locality, and fragmentation, as well as with post-modem liberalisms,
critical theory needs to reclaim its comprehensive dimension and articulate the need for a
politics of democratic contestation that is disentangled from liberalism, or at least a
rendering that is not as one-sided as contemporary liberal democracy is - where the
liberal takes precedence and the democratic is an expendable coda. Also, as the sense of
the universality of the problems afflicting the present becomes more and more
discemable, one has to wonder about the effectiveness of relying solely on the politics of
fragmentation and particularity, while dogmatically rejecting their global, and therefore,
in the present context, universal dimensions.
Yet the higher stakes of thinking about these questions politically reside in
invoking a sense of commonality, which once again is often presupposed by zealous
discourses of difference, particularity, and otherness, but is seldom if ever acknowledged.
l7
See Anderson, The Origins ofPostmodernity, 1 14. Also see Anderson, “Internationalism: A Breviary,’’
New Left Review 14 (Mar/Apr 2002), 22.
10
Sheldon S. Wolin compelling^ spells out this problem in terms of the politics of
multiculturahsm and difference at the national level in a rendering that resonates with the
problems at hand here. “This impasse is one to which the politics of difference and the
ideology of multiculturahsm have contributed by rendering suspect the language and
possibilities of collectivity, common action, and shared purpose. And yet the politics of
difference is compelled to appeal, either tacitly or explicitly, to presupposition of
commonality: to judges that will equitably enforce the laws; to teachers who will
sympathetically portray cultures other than their own; to social workers who will
continue to assist the poor, the people of color, the addicted, and the abused; and to
politicians who still work to reform deep-seated, structural injustices. Those appeals
presuppose some culture of commonality, democratic in its practice, capable of
respecting differences and responding to their grievances and needs, and, above all, a
notion of membership that is centered without monopolizing loyalties .” 18 In the meantime
the language of the political, participation, education in power by sharing it, and
commonality are often ruled out in advance without any consideration to their historical
significance in struggles for power and equality . 19 Instead, these are frequently
anachronistically re-emplotted .
20
Accordingly, in the chapters of this dissertation I argue for restaging the
intersection between ethics and politics by means of a reformulation of the concept of
18
Sheldon S. Wolin, “Democracy, Difference, and Re-cognition,” Political Theory’ 21(August 1993): 480.
19
Cf. Brown, Politics Out ofHistory, chap. 2
20
See for instances, Hardt and Negri, Empire, especially their formulations of the multitude, and William
E. Connolly’s accounts of the “politics of becoming” in Why I am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1999) and Neuropolitics (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press,
2002).
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responsibility. In this vein, the argument seizes the aforementioned antinomies, not in
order to mend them, or freeze them within the context of current invocations of an ethics
of cultivation or command; instead, these antinomies need to be rendered in their aporetic
contrariness, rather than reconciled, or displaced by neologisms, or neo-Kantian
deconstructions that leave the liberal status quo in place, although refashioned by a new
language, by new metaphors
.
21
Instead, this dissertation seeks to recast the concept of
responsibility politically. In doing so, it seeks to do justice to its ambiguities and
complexities by apprehending it in its different manifestations. This by means of offering
a constellation of concepts that offer “snapshots” of the stakes of thinking responsibility
politically - here understood as responding to the suffering of naked human life in light
of the despotism and violence that has accompanied what we have come to call
modernity in its historical formations from the Renaissance on.
For critical theory to fulfill its vocation it needs to articulate a conception of
critique that can do justice to both its dialectical and its speculative moments, and do so
from the perspective of critique and democracy that the tradition of critical theory calls
for. It is from a reading of Adorno’s writings that a formulation of critical theory that is
definitely anchored in the dialectical tradition, and that is responsive to these questions,
emerges. I thus offer an interpretation of his work along these lines, one that runs against
the grain of many recent invocations of Adorno that have sought to reclaim the ethical
and political import of his conception of critical theory.
“Kafka’s popularity,” Adorno once wrote, is due to “that comfort in the
uncomfortable which has made of him an information bureau of the human condition, be
21
Archetypical here are the works of Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty. For a defense of the political
import of Derrida’s work as a liberal, see Simon Critchley, Ethics -Politics - Subjectivity (London and
New York: Verso, 1999), 84ff.
12
it eternal or modem, and which knowingly dispenses with the scandal on which his work
is built. In Adorno’s view, Kafka’s work “is assimilated into an established trend of
thought while little attention is paid to those aspects of his work which resist such
assimilation, and which, precisely for this reason, require interpretation.”22 It is not
without irony that Adorno’s work has suffered a similar fate. Even if his work is often
praised - especially his aesthetic theory and the ethical import of his critique of Idealism
and identitanan thinking - and has increasingly gained some currency in contemporary
political theory in the last decades, his popularity often resides more in assimilations of
his thought to contemporary philosophical or theoretical trends than in a careful
reckoning with his complex body of work. In these assimilations the scandal of his
critical theory, its roots in the tradition of Hegelian-Marxism, is dispensed with. Not
incidentally, what is found expendable are those aspects that radically question the
supposedly critical credentials, and political implications, of the very same currents of
thought that seek to claim Adomo. It is precisely these assimilations that I set out to
counteract in my reading of Adomo.
The disgarding of the scandal of Adorno’s Marxism is for instance found in yet
another turn taken by contemporary theory: this time an ethical one. But this turn to
ethics is not as widespread as the so-called linguistic turn in the humanities in the 1990s.
Indeed, in contrast with previous turns, it displays an almost apologetic reluctance about
its self-identity; in other words, the turn to ethics is plagued by uneasiness and
22
Theodor W. Adomo, Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1981 ), 245 .
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ambiguity
.
23 And yet, within contexts such as this one it has become usual to invoke the
strong ethical impulse infusing Adorno’s negative dialectics. But these invocations have
frequently led to an obliteration of what could be seen as the most scandalous aspect of
his thought: his unique theoretical-political engagement with the Hegelian-Marxist
tradition - deeply influenced by Nietzsche, Weber, and the dissonance of Arnold
Shoenberg’s musicology - along with his retrieval of a universal and emancipatory
conception of critical reason even while doing so from the perspective of a non-
ldentitanan negative dialectics. (Kierkegaard is an often neglected influence, even if
Adorno’s first original contribution to philosophy was a book on the Danish thinker - so
deep was his influence on Adorno that Sigfried Kracauer once declared: “If Teddie one
day makes a real declaration of his love ... the young lady will have to read the whole of
Kierkegaard ... to understand [him] at all. ’" 4) Indeed, what most accounts of the ethical
impulse of his work share in common is a silence in relation to this important aspect of
his work, as if it is an easily expendable attribute. To be sure, the descriptions of the
ethical impulse informing Adorno’s work vary, even if neglect of the scandal constitutes
a common thread: Adorno is said to be the proponent of an “ethical modernism,” an
ethical stance that should be seen as an non-threatening contribution to the predominant
analytical approach to ethics; or to be the bearer of an ethical message that is seen as a
forerunner or precursor of deconstruction; or as a thinker of Neo-Nietzschean
“generosity” that seeks to radicalize the ethos of liberal democracy (without however
23
See the discussion found in Peter Dews, “Uncategorical Imperatives: Adorno, Badiou and the Ethical
Turn,” Radical Philosophy 1 1 1 (January/February 2002): 33-37.
24 Quoted in Robert Hullot-Kentor’s “Forward: Critique of the Organic,” in Kierkegaard: The
Construction of the Aesthetic , trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota
Press, 1989), xii. See the discussion of Stefan Miiller-Doohm, En Tierra de Nadie: Theodor W. Adorno,
Una Biografia Intelectual, trans. Roberto H. Bemet and Raul Gabas (Barcelona: Herder, 2003), 178-195.
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posing the question of their own complicity with the lack of generosity of current
formulations of liberal politics).
25
Efforts such as J. M. Bernstein’s, for instance, lead to a
very un-Adomian position, one that does little justice to the political and theoretical
impulses animating Adorno’s philosophical reflections. According to Bernstein, “while
the institutional forms of liberal democracy and a market economy have thus far not
secured what they apparently promised, there is now no viable or available alternative to
them, nor is there a sufficient reason to believe that present failure is intrinsic to the
character of those forms. [...] in the absence of a rationally plausible and practically
possible alternative, there is no reason for not adhering to them, ameliorating their
deficiencies as best as we can. One cannot think of a political temperament more out
of sync with Adorno s. Even if at points indebted to the aforementioned approaches to
Adorno, I pursue a different reading that seeks to capture the critical import of Adorno’s
ethical thought politically
.
27
In other words, despite efforts in contemporary discourse to secure a place for
Adorno’s work in the intersection of ethics and politics, these attempts have thus far
obliterated the strong political component of his ethical message. Adorno’s ethical
" 5
See J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2001); Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York and London: Routledge, 1992); and
Romand Coles, Rethinking Generosity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), respectively. For a
rebuttal of this tendency to present Adorno as a forerunner of deconstruction in particular and post-
structuralism in general, one that does justice to the similarities and differences of both traditions, see the
collection of lucid essays by Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment (London and New York: Verso,
1995).
~ b
Bernstein, Adorno, 4
27
Efforts in Germany to reconstruct the “ethics” that Adorno never wrote are found in the following works:
Robert Schurz, Ethik nach Adorno (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 1985); Gerhard Schweppenhauser, Ethik nach
Auschwitz: Adornos negative Moralphilosophie (Hamburg: Argument, 1993); Mirko Wischke, Kritik der
Ethik de Gehorsams: Zunn Moraproblem bei Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993); and
Impuls und Negativitat: Ethik un Asthetik bei Adorno, ed. Gerhard Schweppenhauser and Mirko Wischke
(Hamburg: Argument, 1995). For a discussion of these works, and an important contribution of her own,
see Marta Tafalla, Theodor W. Adorno: Una Filosofia de la Memoria (Barcelona: Herder, 2003), 44-66.
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message, I shall argue, cannot be taken in isolation from the Hegelian-Marxism in which
his reflections took shape - albeit inflected with strong and important Nietzschean and
modernists motifs. (Especially evident are the Nietzschean motifs in relation to his
critique of identity and the kind of perspectivism that is built-in in the notion of
constellations, albeit one that does not renounce truth, even if considered as historical).
Fleshing out the latter elements need not be done at the expense of the former. After all,
his Magnus opus was entitled Negative Dialectics
,
and its most important axial concepts
are not only Hegelian-Marxist, but also politically and socially infused: “cultural
criticism, “constellations,” “reification,” “mediation,” “exchange-process,” and “the
total social process,” etc.; notions inflecting an ethical, political, and even juridical
message, but concepts that are part of Adorno’s constellational thinking, and thus mediate
its ethical dimension ." 8 This is especially evident in Adorno’s “morality of thinking,” as
he expounds it in Minima Moralia, a concept utterly infused with dialectical and political
concerns. And these are elements of Adorno’s version of critical theory that I will argue
are inseparable from the strong ethical motifs of his work.
But the rejection of universalism, reason, and dialectical thinking repeatedly
converges on one figure: G. W. F. Hegel. In fact, in contemporary Anglo-American
theory, especially in currents influenced by French post-structuralism, these discussions
have almost always become synonymous with Hegel, and, accordingly, unreflectively
" 8
See Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to Theodor W. Adorno (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979). See also the discussion of some of these concepts in Francis Mulhern,
“Beyond Meta-Culture,” New Left Review 16 (July/August 2002). Reification, for instance, is a crucial
notion in the western Marxist tradition, even if its status as a “concept” is often disputed, and its usages by
Lukacs and Adorno is complex. The classic albeit hardly unequivocal treatment of it is found in Georg
Lukacs’ History of Class Consciousness. In addition to Rose’s book, see Jameson, The Political
Unconscious. For a very stimulating formulation of the critical import of “reification” that traces its
different renderings within the western Marxist tradition, see Timothy Bewes, Reification, or The Anxiety
ofLate Capitalism (London and New York: Verso, 2002)
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dismissed. 29 Even so, there is an anxiety running through these rejections, one that some
of the master thinkers of poststructuralism acknowledge, even if the disciples tend to
brush it aside. And this anxiety is perhaps nowhere better formulated than in Michel
Foucault’s very eloquent rendering of the battles his generation had with the Hegelian
legacy. As part of his inaugural lecture at the College de France - he was taking over the
chair of his teacher and mentor, the Hegel scholar Jean Hyppolite - Foucault, to his
credit, offered a series of cautionary statements for a generation that after the events of
May '68 was readier than ever before to move away from Hegel. 30 But as Foucault puts
it, the rejection was perhaps not only thoughtless and premature, but also the stakes of
moving away from Hegel were far from clear:
But to make a real escape from Hegel presupposes an exact appreciation of what
it costs to detach ourselves from him. It presupposes knowledge of how close
Hegel has come to us, perhaps insidiously. It presupposes a knowledge of what is
still Hegelian in that which allows us to think against Hegel
;
and an ability to
gauge how much our resources against him are perhaps still a ruse which he is
using against us, and at the end of which he is waiting for us, immobile and
elsewhere.
31
29
See, for instance, Robert Young’s founding text within Anglo post-colonial studies, White Mythologies
,
where Hegel’s thought is misread consistently.
30
For the most thorough treatment of this tradition and its anxiety-driven relationship to Hegel and
Hegelianism, see Vincent Descombes, Modern French Thought
,
trans., L. Scott-Fox (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981). Ironically, Hegel’s fate has not changed much in the last fifty years or
so. Already in the fifties and sixties scholars such as the Jewish philosopher Emil L. Fackenheim and
Gustav E. Muller were arguing against such misreadings that have proven to be very hard to dispel. See
Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) and Muller, “The
Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis,”’ Journal of the History ofIdeas 19 (June 1958): 411-
14.
31
See Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” p. 134. Emphasis added.
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Foucault’s awareness of the stakes in moving away from Hegel is entirely absent from
recent condemnations of Hegel’s philosophy. These are certainly hard times not only for
Hegelianism but also for universalism and dialectical thinking. In what is frequently
referred to as “late modernity” political theorizing has become weary of what are
perceived as narratives positing teleological understandings of nature and history at their
center - to the extent that comprehensiveness is often the price paid for this neglect, as
theories pose abstractions, such as the multitude, neo-Kantian abstract and futunst
imperatives/commands on behalf of the Other, or the “plurivocity of being .”32
Abstractions that often brush aside complex structural dynamics that mediate political
movements as well as the nature of late modem capitalism in its also very complex
coupling with liberal democracy. The only problem with these readings, in the best cases,
is that these constitute rather partial, and sometimes bad, readings of Hegel; yet, in the
worst cases, such rejections not only lack a textual basis in Hegel’s writings but also
attest to a total ignorance of this complex body of work - let alone the rich dialectical
tradition that sprung out of his reflections. And the same could be said about the
treatment of Marx and the Marxist tradition in these discussions.
But some of the questions that Foucault posed more than thirty years ago still
hold: What is still Hegelian that allows us to think against Hegel? What are the stakes in
undertaking such reckoning? What are the prospects of thinking universal history from a
non-identitarian perspective that situates itself between the dialectic and the speculative?
Can ideas such as “Universal History” be rendered critically? Does critical theory need to
32
Here I have in mind thinkers as diverse as Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Gilles Deleuze, Antonio
Negri, and scholars of political theory such as William E. Connolly. On the other hand, Slavoj Zizek and
Gillian Rose constitute the two most fruitful and original engagements with Hegel, and the dialectical
tradition, in the last twenty years.
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abandon its historical dimensions? Or does it need to rethink its traditional categories in
order to devise a notion of universal history leading to retrieval of a critical and
responsible historical political consciousness?
In light of Adorno’s constant engagement with Hegel’s philosophy, in this
dissertation I take Hegel’s philosophy very seriously and immanently read his theoretical
positions on the possibility of comprehensive knowledge and universal history - a
reading of Hegel that is admittedly mediated by Adorno’s, even if I do not always follow
his assessments of Hegel. I do so mostly in the first two chapters, where I argue that
Adorno’s negative dialectics provides a mode of thinking that enacts possibilities for
responsible critical thinking and acting in order to redress the perpetuation of the
suffering of naked human life. For not only does Adorno provide original conceptions of
dialectical thinking and of critical theory, he also poses the important question of the
responsibility of dialectical thinking in the aftermath of Auschwitz.
In this dissertation I thus offer a reading of Adorno that seeks to capture the
centrality of his reworked understanding of the dialectic for his version of critical theory
and its centrality for any ethical message derivable from his work. Out of this reading I
flesh out the ethical and political import of this mode of thinking and its centrality in
posing the possibility of a critical theory of responsibility.
By way of concluding these introductory remarks, I would like to outline the
contours of the understanding of responsibility that informs this work. In doing so I am
only offering the reader a formal definition despoiled of concrete historical content. In
other words, at this stage I ask for the indulgence of the reader as I offer a somewhat
elusive and schematic formulation of the conception of responsibility that I seek to
19
defend. If the constellation of concepts that the chapters of this dissertation offer captures
some of the material complexities of the understanding of responsibility here put forth,
the dissertation would have fulfilled its purpose, and the reader is advised to eventually
reread what follows in light of the understanding that emerges out of this work.
In the Western tradition, discussions about the meaning of responsibility can be
found in Greek tragedies such as Sophocles’ Antigone
,
Aeschylus’s trilogy The Oresteia,
as well as in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics - which is, arguably, the first systematic-
philosophical account of the question of responsibility understood as accountability. The
problem of responsibility is accordingly a multifaceted one: Aristotle, for example,
focuses on accountability and the importance of practical wisdom (phronesis), while the
Christian Augustinian tradition is not only concerned with human accountability but also
with God s accountability and the problem of evil, the latter understood as an absence of
good. Yet it is within a neo-Kantian approach that current discussions of responsibility
are increasingly framed. This neo-Kantianism emerges either by means of the binary
freedom /necessity, which in Kant correlates to the two distinct realms of noumena and
phenomena, or in the form of abstract and formal imperatives. Indeed, in important ways
both analytical philosophy and deconstruction operate under the rubric of Kantianism -
which is sometimes a way to sidestep Hegel and the Hegelian tradition. When framed in
the context of analytical philosophy, the question of responsibility is presented in terms
of the debates on the possibility of freedom of will, the relationship between freedom and
necessity, the nature of choice and accountability . 33
33
In this camp, the work of Bernard Williams emerges as offering the most insightful reflection, largely
due in part to his grounding in the pre-Hellenic and Hellenic periods. See his Shame and Necessity
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1993). There are many other thinkers
working in this tradition. See the collection of essays, Responsibility
,
ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al.
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From the perspective of deconstruction the problems take a different form:
deconstruction is a tradition that on one hand rehearses the Kantian themes of antinomies
and imperatives, but on the other hand poses the question of responsibility in terms of the
death of the subject and the rejection of reason, dialectics, and any other remnant of the
Hegelian tradition. This approach to the question places the emphasis on the need to have
an unconditioned acceptance and openness to the “Other” that sometimes takes the form
of a commandment or imperative. In some formulations the need for an unconditional
responsibility to the “Other” is proclaimed on behalf of the idea of hospitality and an
abstract and underdeveloped conception of cosmopolitanism in which an elucidation of
the political aspects of these questions is entirely absent
.
34 A common denominator of
these two otherwise mutually isolated camps - there is no real engagement between them
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Jamie Mayerfeld, Suffering and Moral
Responsibility (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Also located in this tradition but
combined with pragmatism is Marion Smiley’s Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
Here the work of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas (and sometimes Heidegger, albeit through the
lenses of these two) provide the primary theoretical referent. From Derrida’s corpus see Politics of
Friendship
,
trans. George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 1997); The Gift of Death, trans. David
Willis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New
York and London: Routledge, 1994); The Other Pleading, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1992); with John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with
Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997). From Levinas’ see Otherwise Than Being
or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998); Basic
Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996); Ethics
and Infinity: A Conversation with Philippe Nemo, trans. R. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1985). Other proponents of deconstruction such as Geoffrey Bennington, Thomas Keenan, Simon
Critchley, and Rudolph Gasche have attempted to present what they claim are the radical political and
ethical repercussions of deconstructive thought through the question of responsibility. Also largely inspired
by this body of work, John Caputo, Robert Gibbs, and Edith Wyschogrod have provided reflections on
ethics that combine insights from some of the aforementioned traditions and from other figures such as
Soren Kierkegaard, Franz Rosenweig, Walter Benjamin, and Michel Foucault. See, respectively,
Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction (London and New York: Verso, 1994); Fables of
Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,
1997)
;
The Ethics of Deconstruction, 2
nd
edition (Ashland: Purdue University Press, 1999) and Ethics -
Politics - Subjectivity, Inventions of Difference (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Against
Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibility (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000); An Ethics ofRemembering (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1998)
.
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IS the abstract treatment of the subject at hand. Another common thread is the liberal
politics that almost always springs from these efforts.
The great absence within this discursive matrix is a group of thinkers that have
made important contributions to the question of responsibility from a dialectical or
existential perspective. The different branches of continental philosophy developed at the
beginning of the 20 th century and that flourished in the aftermath of the Second World
War addressed issues of ambiguity, responsibility, and freedom at a theoretical level, but
are not present in these discussions. For instance, thinkers such as Theodor Adorno,
Simone de Beauvoir, Jean Paul Sartre, and, arguably, Hannah Arendt, are neglected,
quickly dismissed, or absent, even though each of these thinkers reflected and grappled
with the question of responsibility in innovative ways, posing - and in some cases
anticipating - some of the questions that are now considered to be “cutting edge”
positions. 35 Meanwhile, the only version of the tradition of critical theory that is
sometimes taken seriously today is the Habermasian paradigm. Yet Habermas’
abandonment of critical theory as formulated by the first generation of thinkers associated
with the Frankfurt School, his neo-Kantianism, and the intriguing resemblance of his
concerns and terms of discussion with the concerns and problems of the Anglo-American
liberal tradition that one finds in his recent “political” writings, make him both an easy
target for deconstructionists and a bearable ally for analytical philosophers. 36
35 An important exception in relation to Arendt is the work of Larry May. See Sharing Responsibility
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
36
For a survey of Habermas’ political and theoretical trajectory, see Martin Beck Matustik, Jurgen
Habermas: A Philosophical-Political Profile (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). For a critical
assessment, see Gopal Balakrishnan, “Overcoming Emancipation,” New Left Review 19 (January-February
2003): 115-128. Another important contributor to the “discourse ethics” that emerges from Habermas’
work is Albrecht Wellmer. See The Persistence ofModernity, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1992) and Endgames, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).
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Unfortunately, Habermasianism, among other currents of thought, has become a
synonym for critical theory.
The account of responsibility that I set forth resembles the deconstructive
tradition insofar as responsibility is understood as entailing a response, a response to
others. It also resists the philosophy of origins associated with the Idealist tradition, and
seeks to transcend the drive to identity in these formulations. Here responsibility is not
understood in terms of accountability but rather as “responding to .”37 But the similarities
end there. Following Adorno, difference as non-identity is at once retrieved and
respected. This, as I argue in chapters two and three, by immanently criticizing identity;
namely, the critique takes identity as its point of departure and does not renounce to it.
Also, one of the main contentions of this work is to challenge the view that the
emancipatory ideal of freedom is exhausted and therefore we must unreflectively
abandon and deconstruct reason, dialectic, and subjectivity when thinking ethics and
politics. It thus resists erasing the subject. Like identity, subjectivity can be criticized
from within the subject. Along these lines, reason is criticized, in its equivocations, in the
name of the ideal that is sabotaged in its instrumental realization. At the core of the
responsibility of reason resides its self-critique. In this vein, the non-conceptual is
apprehended from within concepts - indeed, in their non-identity with the experience
they seek to capture, concepts open up space for critique of the status quo. These are
political questions, not metaphysical. Furthermore, the tenor of some of the interventions
coming from the deconstructive tradition seeks to extrapolate a politics from ontology. In
contrast, in this dissertation responsibility is primarily an epistemological and a political
37
For a discussion of the different aspects of this concept, see Paul Ricoeur’s The Just
,
trans. David
Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 1 1-35.
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question. And unlike both the analytical and the deconstructive perspectives, which
denve a conception of ethics and politics from either ontology or by thinking analytically
about politics, a cntical theory of responsibility thinks politically about these questions,
and not the other way around
.
38
Hence the aporetic status of these reflections is part of its
political cntical task, not an apriori assumption. This requires that this conception of
responsibility needs to be disentangled from other conceptions that in their conflation of
responsibility with accountability treat questions of responsibility as questions of guilt:
the former is a political question while the latter is mainly legalistic and pertains to
individuals not collectivities
.
39
Indeed, Kant’s categorical imperative notwithstanding,
responsibility is a “structurally intersubjective” concept
.
40
Another instance where the critical import of the concept of responsibility is
strangled is in its current usage in conservative rhetoric, as a synonym with accountability
that seeks to privatize the concept. “Beyond question,” Manuel Cruz writes,
conservative sectors are using the notion of individual responsibility with the thinly
disguised aim of draining all content from the notion of collective responsibility — a
See Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment, chaps. 1, 4. At a meeting of the American Political Science
Association, in San Francisco in 2001, Sheldon S. Wolin made a comment that ran something like this: the
difference between political philosophy and political theory is that the former thinks about politics
philosophically while the latter thinks about theory politically. Needless to say, this study operates under
that distinction.
39 On this point my formulation is indebted to Hannah Arendt’s reflections on responsibility. See
“Collective Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954, ed. Jerome Kohn
(New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1994) and the essays collected in Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome
Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), especially pp. 17-48, 147-59. Also relevant are the formulations of
Spanish philosopher Manuel Cruz. See Hacerse Cargo: Sobre Responsabilidad e Identidad Personal
(Barcelona: Paidos, 1999) and “On Pain, the Suffering of Wrong, and Other Grievances: Responsibility,” in
Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Maria Pia Lara (Los Angeles and Berkley: The University
of California Press, 2001), 198-209. However, contra Arendt, the social cannot be bracketed. Indeed, most
of the suffering through which the humanity of human beings is violated takes place in “the sphere of the
social.”
40
See Cruz, “On Pain,” 202.
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notion which makes them uncomfortable, as it means a costly commitment to the most
disadvantaged sectors of society. These sectors prefer not to speak of society’s
responsibility to the unemployed, the sick, refugees, and, in general, all those who are
marginalized; rather, they propose making it the individual responsibility of the
unemployed to obtain a job, of the sick to take their medicine, of the active workforce to
provide for their own pensions, and so on .”41
But what is the exact meaning of thinking responsibility from the epistemological
perspective of cntical theory? In Adorno’s critical theory the question of responsibility
emerges in his account of subjectivity from the perspective of non-identity and
difference. In his reflections on the subject emerges an injunction, a different kind of
imperative to respect difference, as I shall suggest in chapters two and three. This, along
with the commitment to responding to suffering; or to put it slightly differently, if there is
a sense in which Adorno’s philosophy is materialist, it is in relation to the primacy of
suffering in his reflections. Indeed, Adorno’s critical theory takes corporeal experience
seriously; the suffering of concrete human bodies, and the memory of this suffering,
constitutes its material point of departure. It is precisely in that sense that his philosophy
is strongly aesthetic - the original meaning of aesthetics being a concern with the
concrete experience of bodily perceptions and sensations . 42 It is from the materiality of
objects - and bodies are objects in both a physical and cultural sense - and from the
suffering that emerges in situations of unfreedom, that all critical reflection precedes. As
such, this conception of responsibility has a concern for the centrality of a notion of
41
Cruz, “On Pain,” 199.
4
“ On this point see the excellent discussion found in Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic
(London: Blackwell, 1990), 13-30, 341-366.
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collectivity. Yet Adorno’s cntique of identity thinking is normally taken as suggesting
the kind of individualism that is suspicious of all collective endeavor, and once this is
coupled with the demands for critical distance in intellectual cntique, a picture of a quasi-
sohpsistic Adorno emerges
.
43
Without denying that there is textual foundation for this
reading, and in relation to Adorno the person it might be a plausible one, I rather suggest
that it does not capture the full implications of Adorno’s concern for responsibility - and
these might easily transcend the praxis that Adorno rejected, or negatively embraced.
Indeed, I shall argue that to conceive of responsibility politically one cannot not think in
terms that evoke individuals acting together as a collectivity and sharing political power.
In other words, to think of responsibility politically entails thinking about it in terms of
collective action and collective identity. This, along with the commitment to redressing
the suffering of naked human life
,
I believe, places the question of responsibility as a
question of democracy as it entails using political power to redress a condition, which in
turn requires sharing in it. In other words, one can only think of responsibility politically
from the perspective of democracy. Although with a different context in mind, Hannah
Arendt articulated this point: “I think we shall have to admit that there exist extreme
situations in which responsibility for the world, which is primarily political, cannot be
assumed because political responsibility always presupposes at least a minimum of
political power.”44 Bearing these caveats in mind I proceed to articulate the complexities
of this question from the perspective of critical theory by means of reading its
43
These charges against Adorno are often presented with varying degrees of vulgarization. For two
otherwise sophisticated readings of Adorno that nevertheless run along these lines, see Tafalla, Theodor W.
Adorno
,
97-107 and Sheldon S. Wolin, “Reason in Exile: Critical Theory and Technological Society,” in
Technology in the Western Political Tradition
,
ed. Arthur M. Melzer, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1993).
44
Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment
,
45.
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significance in relation to Hegelian-Marx.st tradition, Adorno’s dialectical-constellational
thinking, the Great War and the political theory of catastrophe, the dialectic of
enlightenment in its entanglement with late modem despotism and the historical coupling
of violence and civilization, the critical import of historicism for a ethico-political
historical consciousness, and universal history. The question of recasting responsibility
after Auschwitz is the guiding concern through all these excursuses.
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CHAPTER II
ADORNO S MARXISM: CRITICAL THEORY AND CRITIQUE AFTER
AUSCHWITZ
An adequate philosophical thinking is not only
critical ot the status quo and its reified replica in
consciousness but is equally critical of itself.
Theodor W. Adorno
A well-known tension within the Marxist tradition is its relationship with the legacy of
Hegelian philosophy. Starting from Marx’s own critical interaction with the Young
Hegelians, major twentieth century thinkers of this tradition, such as Georg Lukacs,
Herbert Marcuse, Georges Lefebvre, and Louis Althusser, have tried to elucidate this
2
relationship. Perhaps the main source of controversy has been the extent of Marx’s
relationship to Hegelian philosophy, and whether or not it ceased, or became mitigated or
even transformed, as he increasingly turned to the study of political economy in his
mature writings. This controversy has led to endless discussions on how to periodize
Marx’s intellectual development. Indeed, one of the attributes of Western Marxism, here
1
On the intellectual currents informing Marx and Engels theoretical and political formation see the
excellent study by Stathis Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx, trans. G. M.
Goshgarian (London and New York: Verso, 2003). One of the many virtues of this study is that it
demonstrates the centrality of the French Revolution, along with restoring the importance of often
neglected figures like Heinrich Heine and Moses Hess, as well as Engels’ contributions, to the initial
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understood as a tradition, has been the appeal to one or another intellectual ancestor of
Marx. Radically disparate thinkers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Benedict Spinoza,
Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, have
filled this slot, even if only the centrality of Ludwig Feuerbach and G. W. F. Hegel is
beyond dispute. But in relation to these two thinkers, especially Hegel, the question then
becomes to what extent and until when such an influence played a major factor in Marx’s
intellectual formation. That is, to what extent can Marx be considered a Hegelian, and if
so, how much is Hegelian in Marxism and in Critical Theory. For one of the most
important tensions associated with the legacy of Hegel is the tenability of the distinction
between a conservative philosophy and a radical “method.” And this is a distinction that
became increasingly important for the development of some currents of Western
Marxism, especially for Georg Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, although it was already
present in Marx and Engels’ respective formulations. As is well known, in the intellectual
milieu of the young Marx, Hegelianism was the predominant philosophical point of
reference on the modes of thinking that later on Marx and Engels would criticize in The
German Ideology. But the answer to “the Hegel question” is an intrinsic aspect of any
effort to elucidate the political import of the Hegelian legacy for critical theory.
“The Hegel question” is usually formulated in relation to the opposition between a
conservative system and a radical method: a philosophical system that is static in
contraposition to a method that is considered to be utterly dynamic. As one influential
commentator suggested, in Hegel’s dialectical method there is “an infinite principle of
development, an endless negativity into the future” while his system is anchored in the
3
See Perry Anderson’s classic treatment of these questions in Considerations on Western Marxism
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idea of an immanent totality that is seemingly more static; hence the perceived need to
conceptualize the latter on a different basis.
4
This opposition runs all the way through the
Young Hegelians, Marx, Engels, Georg Lukacs, and even up to Theodor W. Adorno’s
negative dialectics. In each of their different formulations this opposition has been
relentlessly ambiguous and torturous. Indeed, it is safe to say, or at least I shall argue, that
the development of critical theory within Western Marxism has been intrinsically related
to Hegel’s philosophy as much as Marx’s was.
In Marx one finds an initial engagement with Hegel not only in his early reading
of the Phenomenology of Spirit but also in relation to the latter’s political theory, as
Marx s political texts from 1842-1844 attest; an engagement that not only proved crucial
for Marx’s intellectual trajectory but set the stage for his “discovery,” or invention, of the
proletariat - a figure that is at the heart of Marx’s account of theory and praxis. Even in
the early Marx’s estimation, Hegel’s philosophy needed to be disentangled from the
mythical form it often took in his system.
5
In the preface to the second edition of Capital
Marx put the relation between his critical account of capitalism and Hegel’s philosophy
in the following terms: “My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different
from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it.” But despite this initial assertion of
opposition, Marx goes on to affirm a closer link between his dialectical method and
Hegel’s. “The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means
prevents him from being the first to present its general forms in motion in a
4
See Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel
,
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comprehensive and conscious manner ”
6
To be sure, comprehensiveness is not only
central for Marx’s critique of classical political economy, and for his analysis of
capitalism as a system of power, but it is the element of his thinking that allows for the
re-cognition of the implications of particular economic and political dynamics as part of a
larger socio-economic system of power. Indeed, it is this comprehensiveness that many
Marxists have cherished, not merely because it is crucial for an analysis of capitalism but
because the critical import of the theory cannot do without it
.
7
Marx readily
acknowledges that the critical import of comprehensiveness is already present in Hegel’s
philosophy in the way that he sought to transcend the oppositional thinking that
characterized Kantianism. It is also present in Hegel’s critique of the refusal to think the
relatedness of the concepts with which we approach the world and the world itself. Hegel
is thus rightly credited for having presented the dialectical method comprehensively, even
if he did so within the confines of an idealist system.
Marxism’s self-conscious relation to Hegel found more explicit formulation in
Engels’ well-known description: “the whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system is
declared absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method
,
which dissolves all
g
dogmatism.” The method is thus explicitly contrasted with the system: in Hegel a radical
method is supposedly entangled with a conservative system. Indeed, in their respective
6
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appreciations of Hegel, both Marx and Engels suggest that these two aspects of Hegel’s
philosophy could presumably be disentangled: that is, a radical and dynamic method
(dialectics) could be turned against the system. This amounts to an immanent critique that
will eventually undo Hegel’s pretension to devise a system. In other words, the method
could be retrieved while the aspirations to a system of philosophy, as Hegel expounded it
in his writings, could be left behind. And once the system is rendered disposable, a
critical theory of society might spring from the dialectical method.
Even so, and despite the critical statements of Marx in the preface to the first
volume of Capital
,
the structure of the work itself dispenses, in Hegelian fashion, with
the idea of the method being an independent foundation from the thing it analyzes. Stated
somewhat differently, the dialectical method is the thing in itself and is not external to its
object. According to Marx, “the movement of capitalist society is full of contradictions,”
contradictions that Marx dialectically expounds by means of a dialectical and speculative
contrast of the universal and particular within capitalist society, and does so
9
comprehensively. It is this dialectical rendering that allows Marx to start his analysis of
capitalism via the commodity structure of the system, and thus explore its intrinsic
dynamics as an economic, as well as social-cultural, mode of life and production. Such a
comprehensive dialectical approach is what makes it possible for Marx to understand
capitalism as a social process. Thus understood, different relations can be
comprehensively expounded, and the structural relations between the political economy
9
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and the sphere of the juridical and the political can be dialectically rendered in their
complexity. Marx’s analysis of capitalism is thus thoroughly dialectical .'
0
In Marx, dialectical thinking emerges as the most comprehensive way to depict
the contradictions of material experience in thought, while cognitively expounding
capitalism as a social process whose basis is found in its contradictions. One specific
instance of the entwinement between dialectical thinking and capitalism as a social
process based on contradictions that further illustrates this point is found in Marx’s well-
known analysis of commodity fetishism. For Marx, the commodity-form is “the most
general and the most undeveloped form of bourgeois production,” one that antecedes
capitalism but is, nonetheless, intrinsic to it. After penetrating its “fetish character,” Marx
goes on to disclose what he considers to be a simple fact of the commodity-form that is
often obscured within capitalism: its social aspect. “Commodities cannot themselves go
to the market and perform exchanges in their own right,” Marx writes; this is a process
carried on by individuals. By broaching the social aspect of the commodity-form, Marx
is able to discern not only the way in which the commodity-form is constitutive of the
abstract exchange process that takes place within capitalism, but can link this analysis to
the liberal “juridical relation” that also constitutes the exchange process. According to
Marx, individuals become part of the exchange process, and are, in turn, abstract “bearers
of these economic relations” of commodities, which correlates with the identity principle
i°
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that informs the equally abstract liberal discourse of rights that he vehemently subjected
to criticism in his essay “On the Jewish Question.” All these relations, and structural
determinations, take place “through the agency of the social process”; a process that these
relations also mediate, and further constitute .'
2
By dialectically positing the universal
(total social process) and the particular (the commodity-form), Marx can
comprehensively discern the structural relations mediating both of them, and can
speculatively render capitalism as a social process. And by taking the commodity-form as
his point of departure, Marx not only spells out its origins and its evolution to its present
form, but also casts it in terms of the social process of which it is a part, thus critically
illuminating both. In doing so, the abstractness of both liberal ideology and its political
economy can be immanently read against the experience these constitute and unfulfilled
promises of emancipation can be critically discerned.
Yet another instance of the profound significance of dialectics in Marx’s mature
critique of political economy is found in his important analysis of the relationship
between production and consumption within capitalism in one of the drafts of Capital
,
the Grundisse. In contrast with the classic economists, Marx resists separating these two
realms. Rather, he proceeds to dialectically, and speculatively, present the opposition
between these two concepts in order to show their mutual mediation as part of the social
12
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process. Marx’s dialectical rendering of the two “oppositions” need not posit one as a
constitutive substratum of the other - there is no primacy conferred to either term. Marx,
instead, renders explicit the mutual mediation of one process in relation to the other; a
mediation that takes place within a social process, and further constitutes it. This social
process, as such, can only be discerned speculatively, by means of the notion of totality.
Once rendered this way, both production and consumption “appear in any case as
moments of one process.”
5
Thus both are apprehended differently: “The conclusion we
reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but
that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within unity^
Marx’s protestation to the contrary, as I argue in the next chapter, this is basically
the Hegelian concept of totality, one that not only expounds its parts dialectically, but that
also strives to comprehend these speculatively as part of the totality that capitalism is, as
17
a process. Still, it is important to bear in mind that Marx’s conception of totality is not
posited metaphysically or from the Hegelian perspective of Spirit (Geistf rather, it is a
sociological, politically infused, rendering of capitalism that seeks to comprehensively
apprehend it, and thus offer a critical theory of its workings. Or, as he states it in the
Grundisse, “Capital is the all-dominating economic power of bourgeois society. It must
form the starting-point as well as the finishing-point, and must be dealt with before
Karl Marx, Grundisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy , trans. Martin Nicolaus
(London, UK: Penguin Books, 1993), 91.
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landed property. After both [capital and landed property] have been examined in
particular, their interrelation must be examined.”
But as already mentioned, in contrast with subsequent engagements with Hegel’s
philosophy, in particular with that of Adorno, Marx took very seriously Hegel’s political
theory. When combined with his critical engagement with the legacy of the French
Revolution and its emancipatory promise, it is easily discemable how Marx ended up
with an overly conceptual formulation of the proletariat in the Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy ofRight: Introduction (1844). Thus, the question of Marx’s complex relation
to Hegel cannot be reduced to so-called epistemological breaks, let alone to the
distinction between an early humanist and an older mature economist. Rather, if the
young Marx proceeded to posit the proletariat as a revolutionary subject, in Germany,
towards the end of his classic “Introduction” to his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right, and did so enveloped in a philosophical discourse” (this in sharp contrast with
Engels contemporaneous, yet sociologically rich, conception of the working class),
Marx s proletariat sprung from his political and philosophical engagement with Hegel’s
. .
19
political theory. Thus Marx put forward a conception of agency and revolutionary
action embedded in the imaginary inaugurated in 1789, one that later on, in writings such
as his unfinished Capital, does not seem in sync with the rapid transformation and new
20
awesome forms of power of capitalism. Hence the centrality of the legacy of the French
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Revolution, which along with Marx’s critique of Hegel’s discussion of the relationship
between the state and civil society, informed his conception of political praxis. Still, by
means of his theorization of the proletariat, Marx clearly broke away from Hegel’s
political theory, something that was prefigured by Marx’s concern, in his articles for the
journal Rheinische Zeitung, with the transition from civil society to state; again, not
incidentally, a Hegelian question. Also, even when Marx provided a more sociological
conception of the proletariat, he could not escape the imaginary of popular struggle
inaugurated in 1789: not only does the figure of the proletariat evokes images of the
sans-coulottes and the Third Estate, but as Marx increasingly moved away from his early
political concerns — the question of publicity and democracy figures largely in his early
analysis - the proletariat eventually disappeared, almost suggesting that once Marx
apprehended the magnitude of capitalism as a system of power, he could not conceive of
a revolutionary subject to match its power. Yet this hardly represented a move away
from Hegel. On the contrary, even if Hegel’s political theory is mercilessly criticized, and
Marx’s later concern with political economy represents a displacement of these questions,
identify it with the negativity of a non class which reveals the antagonism inherent in bourgeois society,
rather than treating it as a massive empirical fact destined to be absorbed by the ideal figure of human
plenitude - what does this come down to, if not calling, in the performative mode, for a type of political
practice that has yet to be constructed and, more importantly, to be thought?” See Koulevakis, Philosophy
and Revolution
,
350. And yet, for all its performativity, when Marx refers to the proletariat, and to the ideal
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as I argued above, the investigations of capitalism were informed by an engagement with
Hegel - albeit the Hegel of theoretical philosophy, the Hegel of the Science ofLogic
22
Even so, the question of the political practice that should go along with the
critique of capitalism has been a subject of contention within Marxism ever since. In the
twentieth century, with the reemergence of what Perry Anderson has called the “classical
tradition - figures such as Vladimir I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Leon Trotsky stand
out - these questions were once again posed, as the unity of theory and practice was a
central concern in light of the revolutionary process that at the time seemed imminent.
2 '
As part of this tradition, analyses of capitalism, anchored in Marx and seeking to expand
on his theory, were put forward in order to account for the new dynamics of accumulation
and imperialism that were intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production in the then
nascent century, important works such as Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of
Capital and Paul Sweezy’s The Theory of Capitalist Development
,
among others, sprung
from this tradition. Meanwhile, in the writings of Lenin “a Marxist political theory”
24
seemed to appear for the first time. In Anderson’s sympathetic representation,
“Whereas the economic studies of the period could build directly on the imposing
foundations of Capital
,
neither Marx nor Engels had bequeathed any comparable corpus
25
of concepts for the political strategies and tactics of the proletarian revolution.”
See the discussion in Schmidt, History and Structure, 61-66.
See Anderson, Considerations, 1-23.
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Yet the “political” of this political theory is hardly self-evident. Also, the
emphasis on “strategies and tactics” takes for granted the existence of the proletariat as a
revolutionary subject. And as the case of Len.n suggests, in these theorizations the
political was subsumed into the discourse of organization (“Fordism,” among others)
that, not without irony, was also an intrinsic part of capitalist ideology. The workings of
the proletanat were thus reduced to an organizational activity carried on by a vanguard
26
party. Luxemburg’s wntings on the Russian Revolution are a partial and somewhat
paradoxical exception - even while defending the decentralized political practice of
associations and councils, she sometimes reverted to organizational imperatives as her
argument for the centralization of agricultural policy suggests. In other words, the
existence of the proletariat as a political being was assumed, thus limiting the realm of
the political to questions of organization and, once the revolution took place, managing
the political. The increasingly ossified centralization and bureaucracy were hardly
accidents of the regime that sprung from the revolution. Both could be found in
embryonic form in the conception of politics animating its architects. And yet, according
to Anderson - whose own sophisticated version of “political Marxism” is, once again not
without irony, “divorced” from political practice as understood by the classical tradition -
with the advent of western Marxism came what he calls a “structural divorce” from
political practice, thus leading to western Marxism, a tradition “whose philosophers were
statutorily debarred from the revolutionary unity of theory and practice demanded by the
26
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eleventh thesis on Feuerbach
”'8
Ironically, Anderson has fiercely defended the political
credentials of Fredric Jameson - regarded by some as the most important US Marxist -
even if this is a body of work that following the path that Anderson has criticized in the
thinkers of the western Marxist tradition. For all its sophistication and insightful
representations of the intersection between the political economy with cultural and
artistic representations, Jameson’s account of postmodernism lacks any sustained
reflection on the political as such. More significantly, this account is so despoiled of any
serious engagement with this concept that in Postmodernism and the Cultural Logic of
Late Capitalism Jameson makes the unfortunate remark that the absence of “political
reflection” within the Western Marxist tradition (pace Gramsci) constitutes a “strength”
29
rather than a weakness. An observation that leads him to establish a parallel between
neoliberalism and socialism along these lines: both are equally subjugated to the
imperatives of the economic.
When Anderson chastises western Marxists, and Adorno in particular, he places
the same unwarranted political credentials on the proletariat that the classical thinkers
embraced. More importantly, once one looks at the way Marx conceived of the proletariat
the limitations of his accounts are particularly evident, especially if one considers the fact
that the proletariat eventually disappeared from his later formulations found in Capital.
And as the conception of class found in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte -
which many Marxists have found wanting for its very revealing ambiguities - suggests,
28
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actual political practice hardly corresponded with the conceptual formulation of the
proletariat once held by Marx. Then, the question is not so much that western Marxists
like Adorno choose to “abandon any enrollment and discourse within politics altogether”;
instead, in this tradition the political role of theory was reconceptualized. Now the task of
critical theory consists in how to politically apprehend and represent capitalism in its
economic, cultural, and political manifestations. Thus, with varying degrees of success,
shifting theory s concern with the political from the realm of “strategies and tactics” to
the realm of representation - a realm in which Anderson himself has become a crucial
actor in the contemporary world - is consonant with the kind of democratic political
practice that the young Marx intimated. As I shall argue below, Adorno’s failure to
theorize the political, or to deal with political questions, is a matter of theoretical
temperament rather than being intrinsic to western Marxism as a tradition, or to critical
theory.
* * *
Some of the aforementioned tensions found expression in what could be considered the
founding text of the western Marxist tradition: Georg Lukacs’ History and Class
Consciousness. In Lukacs’ text one witnesses both a retrieval of dialectical thinking and
an attempt to cling to the unity of theory and practice that was perceived as imperative by
the classical tradition. In other words, these tensions are retrieved by Lukacs analysis of
capitalism, and further extended to his argument on the historical mission of the
proletariat in the second decade of the twentieth century, in the aftermath of the Russian
Revolution. In what probably constitutes the most suggestive elaboration of the category
of totality within the Marxist tradition, Lukacs’ emphasis on totality retrieves dialectical
41
thinking in order to comprehensively render the structure of capitalism, particularly in its
relationship with bourgeois culture, while at the same time seeking a revolutionary agent
of change - one that could match the power and magnitude of the new forms of power
and domination that capitalism has brought into being. Lukacs thus follows Marx in
offering a dialectically infused analysis and exposition of “capitalism as a social
30
structure.
Bearing the stamp of Marx’s ambivalent relation to Hegel, in the preface to
History’ and Class Consciousness
,
Lukacs situates his reflections in relation to both Hegel
and Marx: Hegel’s position today is the reverse of Marx’s own. The problem with
Marx is precisely to take his method and his system as we find them and to demonstrate
that they form a coherent unity that must be preserved.” Or stated differently, Lukacs
seeks to render Marx’s critique of capitalism speculatively in order to expose its analysis
of the totality of the social process. Accordingly, the problem with Hegel is the opposite
of the one Lukacs finds in Marx: “The task he imposes is to separate out from the
complex web of ideas with its sometimes glaring contradictions all the seminal elements
of his thought and rescue them as a vital intellectualforcefor the present.”
3 '
These reflections need to be considered historically, in light of Lukacs’
intellectual milieu, one primarily dominated by neo-Kantianism and Husserlian
phenomenology. In this context, Lukacs felt compelled to once again posit the question
of the relationship between Hegel’s dialectic and his philosophical system. For “we must
3°
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demolish the ‘dead’ architecture of the system in its historical form and release the
extremely relevant and modem sides of his thought and help them once again to become
a vital and effective force in the present.” Like Marx before him, Lukacs also sought to
disentangle the radical method from the conservative system - even if from the
perspective of Hegel himself such a separation violates an important principle of
dialectical thinking, an argument that later on Adorno would confirm and elaborate in
Negative dialectics. Even so, Lukacs did not restrict the critical import of Hegel to the
radical method of the Phenomenology of Spirit, for him this is just one instance of the
many contradictions in Hegel. In order to discern the stakes of doing “justice to the
concrete, historical dialectic” requires a consideration of Hegel, its founder.
3
' Or as
Lukacs came to see it retrospectively, and without modesty, forty-five years later, “For
anyone wishing to return to the revolutionary traditions of Marxism the revival of the
Hegelian traditions was obligatory. History and Class Consciousness represents what was
perhaps the most radical attempt to restore the revolutionary nature of Marx’s theories by
renovating and extending Hegel’s dialectics and method .”
33
But the critical import of Hegel ultimately transcends the dichotomy between
system and method. Building on his “extension” of Hegel’s philosophy, and out of his
reading of Capital, Lukacs is able to proceed speculatively and suggestively read the
Hegelian category of an expressive totality in Marx’s analysis of capitalism as a social
process. By means of this analysis Lukacs further extends his own analysis of reification
to the sphere of social relations, while taking into consideration the illusory nature of the
32
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totality itself. It is, indeed, this aspect of his exposition that constitutes its speculative
moment. In his subtle rendering of the process through which reification is constitutive of
the expressive totality of the capitalist process, and is in turn further constituted by it,
Lukacs shows an acute sensibility to the profound Hegelian-speculative moment in
Marx’s own analysis, and the way this method cannot be disentangled from the object it
seeks to comprehend:
Marx’s account pushes the capitalist nature of all economic forms to their furthest
limits, he creates an intellectual milieu where they can exist in their purest form
by positing a society ‘corresponding to the theory’, i.e. capitalist through and
through, consisting of none but capitalists and proletariats. But conversely, no
sooner does this strategy produce results, no sooner does this world of phenomena
seem to be on the point of crystallizing out into theory than it dissolves into a
mere illusion, a distorted situation appears as in a distorting mirror which is.
however, ‘only the conscious expression of an imaginary movement ’.
35
Thus, as in Hegel’s account of philosophy’s late arrival to explain the affairs of the
world, theory, even in Marx, tries to concretize and apprehend an ever-changing reality in
which, as the well-known phrase from the Communist Manifesto suggests, “everything
that is solid melts into air. Moreover, like Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit , Marx’s
Capital can be read as a rendering of the non-identity, or the different phases of mis-
recognition, between the parts and the whole. It is this speculative mode of proceeding
34
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that allows for comprehensive knowledge of the totality constituted by the interrelated
social-pohtical-economic-juridical processes that are mutually determinative, even if
such a dynamic totality proves to be an elusive one. Or as Lukacs puts it: “Only in this
context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and
integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of
reality.” And this is a way of proceeding that “starts from the simple
. .
.
[and] progresses
...to the knowledge of the concrete totality, i.e. to the conceptual reproduction of
»36
reality.” Here Lukacs is effectively moving to the realm that would later on characterize
the western tradition of Marxism: the realm of representation, be it artistic or conceptual.
Thus questions of organization and strategy that shaped the classic tradition of Marxism
from Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, and Gramsci, yields to a Marxism that offers politically
infused reflections on the artistic, historiographic, and conceptual representations of the
reality that it seeks to efface.
But Lukacs move to this terrain is ambiguous. Yet, before one considers it, it
may be worth looking more closely at his notion of totality, and his contribution to the
formulation of this notion. Echoing Hegel’s reflections on the question of totality, Lukacs
affirms that this “category of totality does not reduce its various elements to an
undifferentiated uniformity, to identity. The apparent independence and autonomy which
they possess in the capitalist system of production is an illusion only insofar as they are
involved in a dynamic dialectical relationship with one another and can be thought of as
37
the dynamic dialectical aspects of an equally dynamic and dialectical whole.” (And this,
Lukacs, History, 8.
Lukacs, History, 12-13.
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along with Marx’s analysis of the exchange process, is crucial for Adorno’s critique of
Hegel’s concept of particularity and its relation to the particular, as I shall suggest in the
next chapter.) Moreover, for Lukacs it is only “the dialectical conception of totality [that]
can enable us to understand reality as a social process.” And this turns out to be crucial
not only for apprehending social reality in all its complexity, and as part of a larger
process, but for Lukacs a Hegelian-infused dynamic concept of totality “enables us to see
[the fetishistic forms of capitalism] as mere illusions”; illusions that are “no less illusory
for being seen to be necessary.”
38
Hence, the critical import of a comprehensive
conception of totality. For any critical account that seeks to break with the hegemonic
forms of social and political consciousness cannot dispense with a comprehensive
perspective that seeks to apprehend the interrelations among different modes of
subjection and domination. In other words, to critically ponder the intersection of, for
instance, race/gender/class relations of inequality and subordination, one must invoke a
comprehensive approach that tries to think these particular and differentiated social
dynamics in their often complex intersections without sacrificing the particular elements
pertaining to each one of them; at least not for a critical theory worth its name. This has
been one central task of critical theory, one that finds expression in Adorno’s writings.
If Marx, in the “Introduction” to the Grundisse, offers a critical historicist reading
of the way the categories of classical political economy are de-historicized, and reified,
Lukacs sought to historicize the formalism of liberal-bourgeois thinking in its
philosophical, economic, and juridical formalism, in order to reinstall a comprehensive
perspective that will allow theory to discern the totality of the process. For Lukacs, this
38
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time echoing Marx’s analysis in On the Jewish Question
,
the abstract mode of thinking
exemplified by classic political economy and liberal thought posits a unified system of
general “laws” in which “[the] true structure of society appears rather in the independent
rationalized and formal partial laws whose links with each other are of necessity purely
formal (i.e. their formal interdependence can be formally systematized), while as far as
concrete realities are concerned they can only establish fortuitous connections .”
39
Formal
thought, consequently, does not allow for comprehensive knowledge in which the
abstract character of the formal laws of the system, and the emancipatory promise these
portend, cannot be speculatively rendered in face of the concrete relations that take place
in them. And as feminist and other twentieth-century forms of critical theorizing have
shown, a critical analysis of the structural social relations of race, class, and gender can
only be seen in their complex mutual mediation and intersection, from the perspective of
a comprehensive account of the social process - even if a temporally bounded and
contingent one. Hence the difficulty of discerning the non-identity between the fonnal
laws of the system and the concrete reality in which these unfold. Hence, too, the
problem of reification - these formal laws are reified, and further provide a reified
account of subjectivity and personhood: “Thus the subject of exchange is just as abstract,
40
formal, and reified as its object.” Despite the differences between Adomo and Lukacs
in terms of their concepts of reification, and their respective relations to the Hegelian
concept of totality, Lukacs’ understanding of the relationship between the exchange
principle and the reification of autonomy and subjectivity, as I shall suggest in the next
39
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chapter, finds resonance in Adorno's analysis of late capitalism and in his non-
identitarian concept of totality.
Both Lukacs and Marx vividly show and attest to the problematic of the Hegelian
legacy with which the tradition of Hegelian-Marxism has been dealing ever since Marx:
on the one hand, the cntical potential of the dialectic is explicitly or implicitly articulated;
on the other hand, it is often pitted against what is perceived as a conservative and static
system, while the moment of speculation in the Hegelian dialectic is relegated to the later.
This accounts for the uneasiness of Marxism in relation to the Hegelian dialectic and for
some unresolved questions: if the critical impulse of the method, dialectic logic,
immanently undoes the claims of the system, how far away do we actually move from
Hegel? And given Hegel’s critique of the dichotomization of a method and its content,
what are the possibilities for critical theory in relation to Hegel? What does it mean to
break with Hegel? What if, as Gillian Rose has forcefully suggested, “Hegel’s philosophy
has no social import if the absolute cannot be thought”?
4
'
Is the absolute a disposable
addendum to the dialectic in Hegel’s system?
There is another aspect of Hegel’s philosophy that both Marx and Lukacs shared,
one that constitutes the weakest link in their respective theorizations of capitalism as a
social process, and one that is intrinsically related to the social and political import of
Hegel’s dialectic: the quest for a revolutionary agent to bring about the overthrow of
capitalism. If Marx deduced the centrality of the proletariat out of a reading of Hegel’s
Philosophy ofRight, Lukacs posits the proletariat as subject-object of history in ways that
resonate with Hegel’s Geist. Indeed, as part of his engagement with Hegel, Lukacs
41
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recognizes the importance of the “we” in Hegel’s philosophy
.
42
Lukacs certainly rejects
Hegel’s rendering of this “we” in terms of World Spirit, and his treatment of the “we”
echoes Marx’s statement of the proletariat as a universal class.
4
' Yet Lukacs identifies in
this question “deep affinities” between Hegel and Marx insofar as “both conceive of
theory as the self-knowledge of reality,” even if the relation is complex and the
differences matter as much as the similarities. For Marx presumably reclaimed “the
progressive part of the Hegelian method, namely the dialectic,” in order to historicize
social relations. In Lukacs’ reading, Marx immanently criticized Hegel and “measured
Hegel s philosophy by the yardstick he had himself discovered and systematically
elaborated, and found it wanting.” Hence, “It is at reality itself that Hegel and Marx part
company. Hegel was unable to penetrate the real driving forces of history.”
44
But here
Lukacs might have overestimated the power of “the method” he creatively appropriated
from Marx. For him the dialectical method destroys reification “and clears the way to a
45
knowledge of reality.” Inadvertently perhaps, Lukacs here hypostatizes the dichotomy
between reality and reification and places undue faith in the power of the dialectical
method for acquiring knowledge of that reality, even if by his own admission the
knowledge of such reality remains elusive. More importantly, here Lukacs re-introduces
identitarian thinking into his speculative rendering of capitalism, and with it, a remnant of
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Hegel’s idealism. These tendencies are nowhere better discerned than in his insistence on
positing the proletariat as a subject-object of history. If, for Lukacs, “theory is the self-
knowledge of reality,” then man has the capacity to know this reality, “man must become
conscious of himself as a social being, as simultaneously the subject and object of the
socio-histoncal process.” But this is far from being a mitigated call for transformatory
human activity, or a call for a democratic share in political power, one that is without
guarantees. Infused by vanguardist tendencies, Lukacs posits the proletariat as the
subject/object of history: “From its own point of view self-knowledge coincides with
knowledge of the whole so that the proletariat is at one and the same time the subject and
object of its own knowledge.” Thus the proletariat is not only the bearer of “the interest
of the total process,” an interest that resides in its emancipation, but its knowledge of the
totality brings about the universal emancipation that Marx’s proletariat promised.
Out of Lukacs reflections emerge two distinctive strands of theory that coexist in
tension: an epistemological critical theory and a social ontology. Lukacs’ quest for the
ontological basis for a revolutionary agent is part of the latter, while Critical Theory has
retrieved the former. Still, this quest for an agent need not discredit and overshadow his
insightful analysis of capitalism as a social process. Indeed, similarly to Marx, such
derivation of the proletariat seems to suggest that a change of consciousness will be
revolutionary per se, thus suggesting a voluntarist party-politics that is hardly inherent to
the comprehensive analysis of capitalism as a culture and as a social process, even if
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Lukacs sought to derive such a politics from his analysis.
4
As Gillian Rose has observed,
it is this umversalist model of the proletariat as the subject-object of history, that is the
weakest element of Lukacs’ analysis in History and Class Consciousness
,
and is what
ultimately discredited the work in the eyes of contemporary figures like Ernst Bloch and
48
Adorno. The latter, especially, resisted Lukacs’ concept of the totality. But as an apt
reader of Hegel, Adorno could not dispense of the comprehensiveness of this conception,
and reclaimed it by means of his understanding of constellational thinking: one located at
the intersection between the dialectical and the speculative.
It is against this background of Hegelian-Marxist attempts to comprehensively
think the social, the cultural, and the political within capitalism that Adorno’s thought is
best understood. Adorno, indeed, developed a critical theory out of a deep engagement
with Hegel s theoretical philosophy, as opposed to his political theory, one whose basis
resides in a reworked, open-ended understanding of dialectical thinking, but one that is
also at once sociological and political. Adorno’s singularity resides in the tension
between the dialectical and the speculative that takes place in his thinking and how that
tension is preserved in his reworking of Walter Benjamin’s notion of “constellations,”
47
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thus retrieving the critical import of epistemological critique within the Hegelian-Marxist
tradition.
* * *
Scholars and commentators have amply documented the remarkable consistency in the
concerns that guide Adorno’s philosophical trajectory from the early 1930s to his
untimely death in 1969.
5
° For instance, the critical import of the new philosophy Adorno
puts forward was already present in 1931, in his essay “The Actuality of Philosophy”:
“Philosophy which presents reality as such only veils reality and eternalizes its present
51
condition.” In this essay, Adorno assigns to philosophy an interpretative task: the notion
of constellational thinking is already present in the early essay, as well as an embryonic
formulation of Adorno’s critique of the philosophy of origins in both its Husserlian and
Heideggerian versions. “Just as riddle solving,” Adorno writes, “is constituted, in that the
singular and dispersed elements of the question are brought into various groupings long
enough for them to close together in a figure out of which the solution springs forth,
while the question disappears - so philosophy has to bring its elements, which it receives
from the sciences [science as Wissenschaft], into changing constellations, or, to say it
with a less astrological and scientifically more current expression, into changing trial
combinations, until they fall into a figure which can be read as an answer, while at the
52
same time the question disappears.” Hence, what Adorno sees as philosophy’s power of
50
See Buck-Morss, The Origins ofNegative Dialectics. See also Max Pensky, “Introduction,” The Actuality
ofAdorno, ed. Max Pensky (Albany: The State University of New York, 1996).
Theodor W. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” in The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 24.
Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 32.
52
"illumination” The continuity between the early and the later works resides in his
concern for epistemology, even if in the early essay this concern did not translate into a
full-fledged critical theory. Adorno's book on Husserl, a book he was working on while
in England at the beginning of World War II before migrating to the USA, belongs to this
same period, as well as the works on Kierkegaard .'
3
Even so, what is not present in those early reflections is the ethical and political
impulse that would later on infuse his version of critical theory. In other words, Adorno’s
thinking took a slightly different orientation in light of the catastrophes that World War II
brought with it: genocide as embodied in the megaton bomb and Auschwitz. The key
texts for Adorno’s turn to an ethico-politically infused conception of critical theory and
dialectical thinking is Minima Moralia and his joint effort with Max Horkheimer in
Dialectic ofEnlightenment. That combination of Hegelian-Marxist motifs with dialectical
thinking, infused by ethical-political concerns, can be better comprehended in relation to
the question of Auschwitz; a question that served as the axis for his thinking from
Minima Moralia on. Thus, to determine the ethical and political import of Adorno’s
thinking I would like to look at the centrality of Auschwitz in his writings, along with the
way it informs his conception of responsible dialectical thinking and critical theory, and
the account of subjectivity that emerges from these reflections. In so doing, crucial
questions about the political import of Adorno’s critical theory will be addressed.
Adorno’s reflections are most often presented as an anomaly within the Hegelian-
Marxist tradition that betrays its political commitment, especially due to his concerns
with questions of theoretical philosophy rather than with the political. In contrast, I have
Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1989); “On Kerkegaard Doctrine of Love,” Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science 8 (1939-1940): 413-429.
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suggested that the most enduring contribution coming from this tradition is in the realm
of representation. Adorno’s engagement with this question provides the basis to retrieve
the ethical and political import of his engagement with meta-theoretical philosophy. The
latter is the subject of the next chapter.
But what provides the ethical and political motifs informing his work? What is its
source? After all, Adorno claims to be some kind of materialist, so what is the “material”
experience that provokes his thinking? The answer to this question perhaps lies in a
comment that Adorno made in one of his lecture courses in Frankfurt in relation to the
question of metaphysics: “It is the question whether one can live after Auschwitz.”
4
For
Adorno, Auschwitz became the overwhelming concrete experience that signified the
catastrophe of genocide in the twentieth century. Rather than using a particular Jewish
term like Shoah, or a religious one such as holocaust, or even a more general one like
genocide, Adorno always referred to this catastrophe by the concrete location of one of
its most infamous killing centers, Auschwitz. Although Adorno was already sympathetic
to Marxism by the time the Third Reich took over power in Germany, the strong ethico-
political impulse in his theoretical reflections became more prominent after World War
II. (In contrast to some of his contemporaries, like Benjamin and Bloch, Adomo was
never attracted to Jewish thinkers like Rozenweig or Buber. Indeed and he never showed
55
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any major interest in this tradition.) Auschwitz became the referent for his reflections;
for Adomo it embodied the collapse of Western civilization. But it was not just an
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anomaly in an otherwise straight path of progress. As his subsequent reflections showed,
Auschwitz could be historicized without losing sight of its particularity. As Rolf
Tiedemann puts it, “Philosophical theory cannot simply accept that the death camps are
prefigured in an existing social structure or are the products of this or that historical
cause. Theory finds itself compelled to reinterpret history by going back to its archaic
beginnings.” Adorno and Horkheimer pursued this path in the Dialectic of
Enlightenment. Indeed, the imperative of thinking Auschwitz comes from the need for
theory to fulfill its critical, material, task. Adorno’s little understood dictums in relation
to the difficulty of poetry and metaphysics “after Auschwitz” needs to be understood in
this light, regardless of their general validity.
In his post world war II writings, Adorno grappled with the question of Auschwitz
mostly as a question of representation. Among the topics he reflected on are the
impossibility of metaphysics as traditionally understood, art, education, as well as the
significance of Auschwitz in the way memory, collective identity, individual autonomy,
57
and democracy are understood in its aftermath. For instance, in “Education After
Auschwitz” he states the rather modest though crucial aim of reconceived education after
the catastrophe. “Since the possibility of changing the objective - namely societal and
political - conditions is extremely limited today, attempts to work against the repetition
Rolf Tiedemann, “Not the First Philosophy but a Last One”: Notes on Adorno’s Thought, in Can One
Live After Auschwitz?
,
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Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (London: Blackwell, 2002).
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of Auschwitz are necessarily restricted to the subjective dimension .”
58
In this statement
there is without a doubt a moment of resignation that resonates with the common charge
brought against Adorno of always finding refuge in a realm outside of politics, normally
the aesthetic. Yet such a reading would lose sight of the centrality that Adorno gives to
individual education; what he also refers to, in this essay and elsewhere, as an education
for autonomy, for critique, that seeks to break with the indifference towards human
59
suffering. In any case, the sense of powerlessness that one may identify in some of his
formulations responds to an awareness to the role of market imperatives in constraining
individual autonomy in a liberal-capitalist society. Yet a critical concept of autonomy is
still possible, and Auschwitz constitutes its historical-material cornerstone. “All political
instruction finally should be centered upon the idea that Auschwitz should never happen
again.” In a similar vein, Adorno proceeds to criticize the doctrine of “reason of state” as
he rightly sees in that political logic “the horror
. .
.
potentially already posited .”
60
What
emerges from these statements is a critical conception of autonomy that seeks to educate
individuals to have a critical attitude towards power and its leveling tendencies.
6
' And
this cultivation of critique is linked to democracy. In one of those rare instances where
Adorno reflects on democracy he does so in reference to critique: “Critique is essential to
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all democracy. Not only does democracy require the freedom to criticize and need critical
impulses. Democracy is nothing less than defined by critique. [...] Critique and the
prerequisite for democracy, political maturity, belong together.”
62
Unfortunately reflections like these never amounted to a sustained reflection on
the political. But they do show the one-sidedness of the presentation of Adorno as a
thinker who offers Beckett and Schoenberg as the solution to world starvation and
threatened nuclear destruction.” Instead, for Adorno the aesthetic provided a realm
where the somatic aspect of re-cognizing suffering could be apprehended .*
4
Auschwitz
thus yields to one of Adorno’s most well-known formulations, the need for a new
categorical imperative: “a new categorical imperative imposed by Hitler upon unfree
mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that
nothing similar will happen .”
65
Accordingly, instead of positing Auschwitz as the “limit-concept” of historical
knowledge, or of modernity, in Adorno’s writings it emerges as a catastrophic experience
providing lessons pertaining to humanity at large. Yet Adorno is able to do so without
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redeeming it for the sake of a larger process, or as a moment of positivity. “After
Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as sanctimonious,
as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached, out
of the victims’ fate.” But rather than the impossibility, or lack of ethical import in
representing Auschwitz, this passage suggests a critique of the redemptive moment
associated with Hegel’s dialectical thinking, and not an ethical dictum against
representation as such. Auschwitz, precisely because of the imperative it imposes, needs
to be comprehended from the perspective of non-identity, from negative dialectics.
Indeed, destruction is associated with the principle of identity. And for Adorno, a
materialist philosophy not only has to represent this catastrophe in ways that individuals
may become responsible to the forms of suffering that might correlate it, but more
importantly, it leads to a rethinking of the traditional philosophical categories, hence the
parallel with the Lisbon earthquake. In contrast to Lisbon, Auschwitz was a human-made
catastrophe, and in its concentration camps the “administration” of murder despoiled
humans beings of their humanity.
Adorno understood his mode of theorizing as a form of practice, hence his refusal
to articulate any form of political action as necessary and his refuge in the realm of
representation, where his critical theory has a pedagogical function, but education for a
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critical conception of autonomy that is vigilant of power .
68
His guiding conviction is the
relentlessness of critique. An activity that demanded from him critical distance:
Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what already exists anyway. As
long as it doesn’t break off, thinking has a secure hold on possibility. Its insatiable
aspect, its aversion to being quickly and easily satisfied, refuses the foolish
wisdom of resignation. The utopian moment in thinking is stronger the less it -
this too a form of relapse — objectifies itself into a utopia and hence sabotages its
realization. Open thinking points beyond itself. For its part a comportment, a fomi
of praxis, it is more akin to transformative praxis than a comportment that is
69
compliant for the sake of praxis.
Democracy at once demands such distance and rejects it. But for a democratic conception
of autonomy to be concrete, the dialectical relationship of theory and praxis needs to be
preserved in their “distanced nearness .”
70
Responsibility after Auschwitz thus entails an
alert vigilance and critical attitude in relation to power. It involves responding politically
to the different instances of human suffering. In Adorno’s critical theory, given his
temperamental preference for the meta-theoretical, the most probing reflections emerge
in his account of subjectivity and of the “morality of thinking.”
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In Adorno’s morality of thinking, as he expounds it in Minima Moralia, are found
reflections that enact possibilities for responsible critical thinking and acting in order to
redress the perpetuation of the suffering of naked human life. Right away, in his
dedication, Adorno immediately affirms that his reflections spring from a “melancholy
science,” a statement that, as many commentators have rightly suggested, stands in
contrast with Nietzsche’s Joyful Science
,
even if stylistically Adorno’s reflections more
than resonate with Nietzsche’s. Even so, and despite the abundance of Nietzschean
motifs, the theoretical impulses animating this text are at odds with the playfulness
associated with Nietzsche. Indeed, and not without significance, even though Minima
Moralia is stylistically Adorno’s most Nietzschean text, the reflections in it present a
stark contrast with some of the basic tenets of Nietzsche’s philosophy: rather than a
vitalism that calls for a bold new philosophy of “dangerous perhaps,” (one that is surely
infused by a strong sense of responsibility after the death of god), Adorno posits the need
for thought to be responsible, not from the perspective of a new philosophy, or a
philosophy of the future, but from the old idea of “teaching the good life.” But this call
for the idea of the good life is done from the perspective of damaged life, the only
perspective that seems to be possible in the immediate aftermath of Auschwitz. After
Auschwitz, “the whole is the false.” What is more, Adorno’s invocation of the “good
life” is intriguing. In contrast to other German-.!ewish intellectual emigres, such as
Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, with the exception of the essay on the Odyssey in
Dialectic of Enlightenment , Adorno never had any sustained engagement with either
Plato or Aristotle, who are usually the figures associated with these sorts of invocations.
Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life , trans. Edmund Jephcott (London
and New York: Verso, 1990), 50.
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In fact, Adorno hardly ever engages any thinker whose work is situated before the
eighteenth century, or on political thinkers, for that matter.
In Minima Moralia
,
Adorno presents the subjective experience of critical theory
from the perspective of his concern with “damaged life”; a subjective and tentative
reflection done out of what he considered a forced contemplation: “The violence that
expelled me denied me foil knowledge of it”
?2
Here Adorno is claiming his personal
experience of exile and its cognitive import for critical reflection. Adomo explicitly
relates the subjective reflections offered in Minima Moralia to his joint authorship with
Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment-. “The specific approach of Minima
Moralia
,
the attempt to present aspects of our shared philosophy from the standpoint of
subjective experience, necessitates that the parts do not altogether satisfy the demands of
the philosophy of which they are nevertheless a part. The disconnected and non-binding
character of the form, the renunciation of explicit theoretical cohesion, is meant as one
73
expression of this.” Adomo thus presents the relation between the content of the
philosophy he expounds and the form in which he does it: a way of thinking that later on
would take pride of his anti-systemic and fragmentary content, one firmly embedded in
. .
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its exposition. The relation between these more subjective reflections with the Dialectic
ofEnlightenment is the concern that both texts share for the fate of individual experience,
and of difference, in the age of totalitarianism and the administered society. But this
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,
18.
Adomo, Minima Moralia
,
18. Cf. Adorno’s “The Essay as Form,” in Notes to Literature: Volume One,
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), 3-23.
See Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 18-22, 52-53, 162-64.
61
concern does not lead Adorno to posit individual experience as immediate, or to repose
on it, as previous critics of Hegel have done: individual experience is mediated, through
and through, by the objective dynamics of contemporary society; namely, by the total
social process of which both capitalism and fascism were a part. Thus, to apprehend the
individual, the standpoint of the totality cannot be entirely rejected, and the individual
cannot be posited in abstraction from this: “He who wishes to know the truth about life in
its immediacy must scrutinize its estranged form, the objective powers that determine the
individual even in its most hidden recesses”
75
Rather than positing either the individual or
the totality as a vantage point for thinking difference, Adorno seeks to apprehend both in
their mutual mediation, as both constitute, albeit not equally, individual and collective
experiences. But Adorno’s insistence on subjective experience does not proceed to take
the subject, as given in the philosophical tradition, as the point of departure for his
inquiry. The historical conditions do not allow thought to do so: “For since the
overwhelming objectivity of historical movement in its present phase consists so far only
in the dissolution of the subject, without yet giving rise to a new one, individual
experience necessarily bases itself on the old subject, now historically condemned, which
is for-itself, but no longer in-itself.” Two important assertions are illustrated in this
passage. First, Adorno posits the centrality of comprehensively expounding the historical
movement that has dissolved subjectivity; thus the present state of subjectivity is thought
of politically by casting its present fate in a historicized way. Second, Adorno suggests
that even though subjective experience tends to be annihilated in the present, what
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actually takes place, theoretically, is not its erasure, but a dislocation: the condemned old
subject is still “for it-self, but no longer in itself.” And both are equally important in
understanding the political and ethical significance of Adorno’s position.
Adorno thus links the possibility of subjective experience to a situation of despair,
and in spite of theonzing a melancholy science, or perhaps because of it, the lament that
has taken over subjective reflection needs to be resisted, and redirected. “Subjective
reflection,” Adorno further states, “even if critically alerted to itself, has something
sentimental and anachronistic about it: something of a lament over the course of the
world, a lament to be rejected not for its good faith, but because the lamenting subject
threatens to become arrested in its condition and so to fulfill in its turn the law of the
world’s course.” Moreover, it is in individual experience where the seed for critical
thinking resides
.
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Along these lines, Adorno formulates a “morality of thinking” strongly infused
with dialectical and political concerns. As part of this morality of thinking he formulates
a reworked understanding of subjectivity, a task he grapples with and carries on until the
late essay “On Subject and Object.” Adorno immanently reads Hegel’s account of the
relation between these two, and reformulates this relationship from the perspective of the
problem of immediacy and mediation. Like Hegel, Adorno posits the centrality of
mediation, but unlike Hegel he does not see the relationship between subject-object as
leading to a higher unity. Still, Adorno’s contrasting formulation is done in terms of
comprehensively rendering the relationship between oppositions positing the general
Adorno, Minima Moralia, 16.
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against the particular, or the individual against society. In so doing Adorno introduces his
conception of dialectical thinking as one bearing the weight of responsible thinking:
It is just this passing-on and being unable to linger, this tacit assent to the primacy
of the general over the particular, which constitutes not only the deception of
idealism in hypostasizing concepts but also its inhumanity, that has no sooner
grasped the particular than it reduces it to a through-station, and finally comes all
too quick to terms with suffering and death for the sake of a reconciliation
occurring merely in reflection—in the last analysis, the bourgeois coldness that is
only too willing to underwrite the inevitable. Knowledge can only widen horizons
by abiding so insistently with the particular that its isolation is dispelled. This
admittedly presupposes a relation to the general, though not one of subsumption
but rather almost the reverse. Dialectical mediation is not a recourse to the more
abstract, but a process of resolution of the concrete in itself.
9
By taking the concrete as his point of departure, Adorno reverses the Hegelian
formulation and seeks to render the intersection between the universal and the particular
from the perspective of the concrete, thus anticipating his later argument on behalf of the
80
primacy of the object. After presenting this formulation, Adorno approvingly quotes a
passage from Nietzsche’s Gay Science in relation to the latter’s critique of the way
8
1
identitarian thinking obliterates differences, and the uniqueness of the particular. The
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passage from Nietzsche reads: “He who seeks to mediate between two bold thinkers
stamps himself as mediocre: he has not the eyes to see uniqueness: to perceive
resemblances everywhere, making everything alike, is a sign of weak eyesight .”
82
In
Nietzsche’s awareness of this tendency of thought to identity, Adorno sees a crucial
element for the ethical sensibility he infuses in his conception of dialectical thinking. Out
of this concern he presents the import of his morality of thought. The passage merits
lengthy quotation:
The morality of thought lies in a procedure that is neither entrenched nor
detached, neither blind nor empty, neither atomistic nor consequential. The
double-edged method that has earned Hegel’s Phenomenology the reputation
among reasonable people of unfathomable difficulty, that is, its simultaneous
demands that phenomena be allowed to speak as such—in a ‘pure looking-on’—
and yet that their relation to consciousness as the subject, reflection, be at every
moment maintained, expresses this morality most directly in all its depth of
contradiction. But how much more difficult has it become to conform to such
morality now that it is no longer possible to convince oneself of the identity of
subject and object, the ultimate assumption of which still enabled Hegel to
conceal the antagonistic demands of observation and interpretation. Nothing less
is asked of the thinker today than that he should be at every moment both within
83
things and outside them.
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Here one finds the initial formulation of what later on Adorno presented as the
importance of both immanence and transcendence for critical thinking. Furthermore, the
assertion that to “be at every moment within things and outside of them” captures the
relevance of speculative thinking for Adorno’s critical theory. It is out of this assertion
that one can fully discern the stakes of Adorno’s reworked understanding of the
intersection between subject and object - a relationship that needs to be rethought after
the age of catastrophe, one that rather than erasing subjectivity rethinks it in light of the
primacy of the object. In an essay titled “Notes on Philosophical Thinking,” Adorno
writes that “truth is a constantly evolving constellation” that requires the subject to
apprehend its different configurations. But subjective experience takes the object as its
point of reflection, even if such a primacy is fragile, thus in its mutual mediation with an
object, the thinking subject must “nestle” with it.
* * *
The dialectical relation of subject-object occupied Adorno throughout his life. Here I
limit my treatment to three formulations: (1) the one offered in Minima Moralia, (2) the
reflections on the primacy of the object in Negative Dialectics
, (3) and his final, but by no
means conclusive treatment of this question in the essay “On Subject-Object.” In one of
the many suggestive aphorisms of Minima Moralia
,
Adorno presents the relation of
subject and object in terms of the paradoxical formulation of “distanced nearness”:
“Contemplation without violence, the source of all the joy of truth, presupposes that he
See Adorno, “Notes on Philosophical Thinking,” 131, 129.
66
Who contemplates does not absorb the object into himself: a distanced nearness .”
85
Adorno’s concern with traditional understandings of subjectivity is evident here: neither
Kantian constitutive subjectivity nor Hegel’s subject-object as Subject is able not to do
violence against the object. The subject needs to keep its distance as it gets close: the
impossible practice of “distanced nearness.” It is perhaps due to the seeming
impossibility of conceptualizing such a relation that Adorno constantly returned to the
question. In subsequent renderings he does it from the perspective of constellations.
In Negative Dialectics
,
Adorno formulates the epistemological intersection of
“subject and object” from the perspective of non-identity and constellational thinking.
One of the byproducts of Adorno’s rejection of the Hegelian dialectic is the abandonment
of the hope for a meta-context, or for an all-encompassing totality. Still, Adorno’s
position claims to be more inclusive than Hegel’s - albeit in a qualitatively different way.
Namely, as the subject approaches the object through constellations of concepts, its
particular aspects are rendered visible without incorporating these as a particularity of the
subject (as Adorno claims Hegel does), and without colonizing or dominating them. In
this way Adorno seeks to undo constitutive subjectivity from the perspective of the
subject. Besides, when dialectics is considered, as Adomo does, as a self-critique of the
concept, breaking with sovereign subjectivity from within the subject seems the most
appropriate mode of proceeding, especially to non-violently get closer to the object,
.... 86
without colonizing its Otherness. In so doing, Adorno’s non-identitarian dialectic
formulates the relationship between subject and object in terms of the primacy of the
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latter over the former in order to undo the hierarchy of subject over object that he
identifies in idealism. But this is hardly an inversion of the hierarchy, a change of
positions. Instead, Adorno seeks to lend a voice to the object, to its difference, by
proclaiming its primacy and thus to abolish the hierarchy altogether:
But it is not the purpose of critical thought to place the object on the orphaned
royal throne once occupied by the subject. On the throne the object would be
nothing but an idol. The purpose ofcritical thought is to abolish the hierarchy
^
At this point the reader may ask, Is it possible to abolish the hierarchy by means of
positing the primacy of the object? What is the political and ethical import of this move?
Adorno anticipated the first question and his answer provides an indication of how he
might have responded to the second. In relation to the first question he writes: “An object
can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other than a subject,
whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset an object as well .”
88
Objectivity is
constitutive of the notion of the subject, while subjectivity is not constitutive of the
object. Or, stated differently, every subject is an object, but not every object a subject.
Here, once again, Adorno displays dialectical thinking at its best: a quasi-Hegelian
rendering of the relational character of concepts, but one not cut short by the needs of a
system. More importantly, out of this rendering a relational account of subjectivity
emerges: a reworked understanding of subjectivity with a strong ethical and political
import.
Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 181. Emphasis added.
Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 183.
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It is along these lines that in the essay “Subject and Object,” Adorno presents a
bold claim in order to buttress his assertion on the primacy of the object: the object can
be potentially conceptualized without the moment of subjectivity, but the subject cannot
be conceptualized without it being an object
.
89
Adorno thus de-centers the subject from
its previous position of dominance over the object, and yet the subject is preserved. But
this is not merely a shift in ontology. On the contrary, by means of positing the primacy
of the object Adorno articulates epistemologically a social and political concern; namely,
to alienate the subject from its subjective side and bring an awareness of its objectivity
and of the objectivity of its conditions of possibility
.
90
Instead of erasing the subject, or
totally effacing it, Adorno reconceptualizes the subject in terms of its objectivity. In a
similar vein, Adorno expands on his assertion of the primacy of the object when he
writes: The object s primacy ... is the corrective of subjective reduction, not the denial
91
of a subjective share." Hence, the primacy of the object rather than displacing
subjectivity yields to a new understanding of the subject, a chastened view of the subject,
in a relation of respect to the object. But this is hardly the chastened subject of liberalism.
By means of re-cognizing the objectivity in subjectivity, the subject does
epistemologically what Adorno has claimed for individuals politically - it remains alert
to its possible complicity with domination. It is the non-identity of the object with the
subject, its refusal to conform to the concepts constitutive subjectivity seeks to impose on
89
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it, that forces the subject to think differently in order to apprehend the object in its
difference, without dominating or colonizing it.
Besides, non-identity is what allows the subject to understand its own objectivity.
Indeed, by insisting on identity the subject fails to realize its own objectivity, and further
silences the object. In order for the subject to apprehend its objectivity and avoid
silencing the object as the other, the relationship between the two needs to be thought of
speculatively: as Adorno suggests in his discussion of the opposition of universal and
particular, both moments are “necessary and deceptive,” and it is in conceiving the
relationship between subject and object in equally ambiguous terms that a critical
openness to the other becomes possible. Thus far, especially in relation to this essay,
Adorno’s discussion has taken place in a high meta-theoretical plane. But for Adomo this
type of reflection is politically infused; or in his own somewhat different rendering,
“Social critique is a critique of knowledge, and vice-versa.”
From this account of subjectivity emerges the possibility for a relation of equality,
an ethical-political sensibility to difference and otherness, one that conveys a concrete
responsibility to the suffering of the object, the other of the subject. An account of
responsibility that is only concretely discemable within the context of what Rainer Nagle
has conceptualized as the “scene of the other” in Adorno’s thought. This “scene” is the
scene of the non-conceptual: it is the scene where the subject ends up in when its claims
of constitutive sovereignty are undone. In Nagle’s rendering, “The path to the non-
conceptual, to the crypt, leads not through rejection of concepts; rather it is constituted by
92
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them. What concepts articulate points beyond them to a scene of the Other ”
93
Nagle
draws this account from Adorno’s Negative Dialectics when he writes: “The truth which
is met through concepts beyond their abstract content, can have no other scene than the
scene of that which has been repressed, neglected, and rejected by concepts. The utopia
of cognition would be to open that which has no concept through concepts, without
. ... 94
assimilating it to them. To put it politically, it is the moment of substantive equality
that respects differences and takes these as equal without colonizing them. This is what
Etienne Balibar has speculatively theorized as “equaliberty”: a moment of universality
that seeks to theorize ‘equality and liberty together” while reclaiming the language of
collectivity for democracy. “Rights to equality and liberty are indeed individual, only
individuals can claim and support them. But the abolition of both coercion and
discrimination (which we call emancipation) is always clearly a collective process
,
which
can be achieved only if many individuals (virtually all of them) unite and join forces
95
against oppression and social inequality.”
Nagle also interprets this scene politically: it involves “a certain kind of political
practice,” one that is vigilant to the exclusions that the dialectic of enlightenment brings
about. Also, this is the scene of memory, “of the language of the dead. Only the dead can
96
speak the language of that no-place, utopia, as long as the living do not live yet.” In this
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vein, Nagle presents the importance of the silence of the nameless others that have
preceded us, and those that are still with us, but excluded as being part of this ethical
scene; hence, the importance of history and historiography in breaking with these
silences, as well as to lend a voice to the memory of past sufferings that still weigh in our
present. And yet, there is an aspect of the scene of the Other that Nagle conspicuously
leaves out: the scandal of Adorno’s thought, the centrality of Capitalism as a social
process, the total process whose constitutive dynamics play out in this scene, without
determining, even if its imperatives also mediate it.
But to think of this scene comprehensively I would like to invert the terms of
Nagle’s formulation, and instead of referring to it as the scene of the Other, following
Etienne Balibar, I suggest thinking of it as the Other Scene. In this scene, alongside the
possibility of relating difference to the non-identity of the object, “the heterogeneity of
political process” is comprehensively depicted as a mediating factor. More importantly,
it is the imaginary terrain in which the production of social and political antagonism is
never reduced to a last instance, and these are present as both over- and under-determined
at once. It is the scene in which abstract conceptions of the proletariat yield to the
uncertain, fugitive and yet vital politics of collective action and contestation associated
with democracy.
The other scene is also the scene of the other. It is the scene in which the
interrelationship between subject and object can be rendered in its complexity, its mutual
mediation, and the mediation of Capitalism as a socio-cultural process. It is within this
scene that one can comprehend the moment of objectivity of the subject in its social and
Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, xiiff.
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political configurations: an important role of the subject in the political process of liberal-
democratic-capitalism is as an object of this order but also its subject - even is
understood as the sohpsistic subject who is the bearer of abstract rights. This is the scene
in which one needs to respond to the suffering of silenced others, which often takes shape
as a form of naked human life; the scene in which this suffering can be comprehended in
its universal, particular, and singular dimensions; it is the scene of democratic re-
cognition. It is the scene of responsibility to the suffering of naked human life. In sum,
this is the scene of critique and critical theory. In what follows different formulations of
the stakes of thinking this scene would be pondered.
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CHAPTER III
CRITICAL THEORY: BETWEEN THE DIALECTIC AND THE SPECULATIVE
In fact, dialectics is neither a pure method nor a reality in
the naive sense of the word. It is not a method, for the
unreconciled matter - lacking precisely the identity
surrogated by the thought - is contradictory and resists
any attempt at unanimous interpretation. It is the matter,
not the organizing drive of thought that brings us to
dialectics. Nor is dialectics a simple reality, for
contradictoriness is a category of reflection, the
cognitive confrontation of subject and thing.
T. W. Adorno
Any consideration of the political import of Adorno’s critical theory needs to closely
consider his engagement with Hegel’s theoretical philosophy. As has been widely noted,
in his early years, Adorno became acquainted with Kant, Kierkegaard, and Husserl, while
being deeply influenced by Lukacs’ Theory of the Novel and History of Class
Consciousness
,
as well as by Walter Benjamin’s The Origins ofGerman Tragic Drama .
1
Along with these major texts, there were certainly other important influences in Adorno’s
philosophy such as Marx, Freud, and especially Nietzsche. Without denying the
importance of the aforementioned bodies of work, I would like to focus on the centrality
of Hegel for Adorno’s critical theory. I shall argue that it is by means of his immanent
critique of Hegel that his own original contribution was achieved. Although Nietzsche’s
critique of the tradition, of how thought is driven to identity as a mean of “self-
preservation,” along with Marx’s account of the exchange-relationship in Capital,
constituted the most important elements in Adorno’s critique of identity thinking and his
The classic work here is Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics (New York: The Free
Press, 1977). For a detailed treatment see Stefan Muller-Doohm’s intellectual biography, En Tierra de
Nadie: Theodor W. Adorno, Una Biografia Intelectual, trans. Roberto H. Bemet and Raul Gabas
(Barcelona: Herder, 2003). The German original: In Niemandsland. Theodor W. Adornos intellektuelle
Biographie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhkramp, 2003).
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concern for non-identity, his conception of negative dialectics preserves Hegelian
concepts, and his cntical theory - mostly consisting of an ethically and politically infused
conception of negative dialectics from the perspective of non-identity - was largely
formulated by means of an immanent critique of the Hegelian system. To be sure,
Adorno s intellectual formation was deeply influenced by his interest in music, especially
in the circle of Alban Berg, and the atonal music of Arnold Shonberg, which in
combination with his philosophical and sociological concerns, gave expression to a mode
of thinking that bas been characterized as a philosophy of dissonance
.
2
Still, in what follows I shall focus on his engagement with Hegel’s dialectical
thinking. It is my contention that the political import of Adorno’s critical theory, and the
indispensable relation to Hegel, can be drawn more vividly by paying close attention to
the centrality of the Hegelian legacy for critical theory, and for western Marxism. The
critical and political import of Adorno’s constellational thinking cannot be fully
appreciated if his Hegelian-Marxism is neglected. Here I at once follow and rework
Rose’s motto: “Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the Absolute cannot be
thought.” In other words, for critical theory to be critical it cannot not think
comprehensively: “After everything, the only responsible philosophy is one that no
longer imagines it had the absolute at its command; indeed philosophy must forbid the
thought of it in order not to betray that thought, and at the same time it must not bargain
See Robert Hullot-Kentor, “The Philosophy of Dissonance: Adorno and Shonberg,” in The Semblance of
Subjectivity: Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory
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Press, 1997), 313.
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away anything of the emphatic concept of truth. This contradiction is philosophy’s
element. It defines philosophy as negative.”
3
* * *
In one of the best known sections in the Preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology; of Spirit,
Hegel deploys the metaphor of the Bacchanalian Revel to depict his concept of “truth as
the whole, a process in which the whole movement of Geist recollects itself as a
reconciled totality. Here is the passage from the 1807 text:
The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet
because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much
transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single
shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are
as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent. In
the whole of the movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself
therein, and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that
recollects itself, whose existence is self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge is
4
just as immediately existence.
By reference to this well-known passage of the Phenomenology of Spirit , Gillian
Rose presents a critique of Adorno from the perspective of her reworked understanding
of dialectical thinking, one that seeks to retrieve the speculative moment of thought from
3 Theodor W. Adorno, “Why Still Philosophy?” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans.
Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 7.
G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 27-
28.
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the perspective of “the broken middle.”
5
In her provocative text, the essay “From
Speculative to Dialectical Thinking - Hegel and Adorno,” Rose invites the reader to put
aside, at least for a moment, our very post-modern anti-Hegelian biases, and to think the
relation of speculative and dialectical thinking in all the three dimensions Hegel granted
to this complex intersection: “the abstract, the dialectical, and the speculative .”
6
Rose
uses this tripartite structure of Hegel’s thinking to criticize Adorno’s insistence on a
negative dialectics. For Rose, Adorno’s emphasis on the negative moment has the
pernicious effect of cutting the dialectic short. (An ironic charge, given that these are the
very same terms Adorno uses to criticize Hegel’s deployment of dialectical thinking.
7
)
Also, according to Rose, “Adorno reduces speculative to dialectical thinking, replacing
recollections of the whole by judged oppositions .”
8
In fact, it is by comprehending
Adorno’s thinking “within the whole and within the tradition as he adjudicatively
retrieves and undermines [it]” that the possibility for social critique resides, or so Rose’s
9
rather murky formulation suggests. Furthermore, for Rose, Adorno resists rendering his
thought speculatively, and thus resists giving himself up to the third moment of the
See Rose’s complex elaboration of this theme in The Broken Middle: Out ofour Ancient History (London:
Blackwell, 1992). On Rose, see Tony Gorman, “Gillian Rose and the Project of Critical Marxism”, Radical
Philosophy 105 (January/February 2001); Martin Jay, “The Conversion of the Rose”, in Refractions of
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dialectic. Or as she states it, “Adorno reduces speculative to dialectical thinking,
replacing recollections of the whole by judged oppositions.”"
In this vein, Rose identifies in Adorno a failure to “relate [dialectical] oppositions
to each other as they came to light in a dynamic historical development,”" thus
suggesting that Adorno’s thought is ahistorical, while also arguing that Adorno’s failure
to articulate comprehensive-historical thinking, alongside with his insistence on engaging
in theoretical philosophy at the expense of political theorizing, are not the outcome of
Adorno s temperament, scholarly taste, or inclinations, but is rather intrinsic to Adorno’s
negative dialectics. In Rose s estimation, by renouncing to the Hegelian notion of the
Absolute, and by insisting on cutting the dialectic off from is speculative moment,
Adorno’s thought renounces the speculative moment of thinking, one that is crucial for
any comprehensive critical theory of society.'”
Rose’s is a rather sophisticated critique of Adorno’s critical theory, one that
deserves consideration, especially from the perspective this study advances - one seeking
to retrieve the ethical and political import of his critical theory in order to ponder the
question of responsibility in the aftermath of the twentieth century. In contrast to
commonplace Habermasean or neo-Kantian critiques of Adorno, Rose’s questions the
import of his negative dialectics from a perspective firmly anchored in the dialectical
tradition. That makes her critique politically insightful and important; what is at stake is
the possibility for critique within dialectical thinking. By engaging Rose’s critique one is
10
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in a better position to discern the contours of not only the role of dialectical thinking in
Adorno s critical theory, but also the critical import of his formulations.
It is thus worthwhile to recast the critique Rose levels against Adorno via a
reading of the passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology that serves as the point of departure
of her critique. In the section of the Phenomenology on the Bacchanalian revel, Hegel is
describing the content of philosophy, or what philosophy consists of. As Hegel expounds
it, philosophy has to do with “the actual, that which posits itself and is alive within itself
- existence within its own Notion [Begriff].” Philosophy is thus “the process which
begets and traverses its own moments” one that is able to recollect the whole process, as
a movement in consciousness, which in turn constitutes philosophy’s claim to truth .'
4
In
this way, Hegel brings together some of the major concepts that have made him famous
(or infamous): actuality, process, recollection, and “the whole movement is the truth.”
Adorno - in a passage that is conspicuously left out of Rose’s account- reads the
Bacchanalian revel passage differently. Out of these differences in relation to Hegel the
stakes in retrieving a reworked dialectical tradition are better apprehended. In Hegel:
Three Studies, Adorno, after a long quotation of the passage in question, writes: “Here, to
be sure, ... the standstill is reserved for the totality. . . But like every aspect of the whole
in Hegel, this too is simultaneously an aspect of every individual part, and its ubiquity
Translators have used both “concept” and “notion” to translate from the German Begriff. I have followed
the choice of the translator, and whenever I felt that it was needed, I have added the German term in
brackets.
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may have prevented Hegel from acknowledging it. [Hegel] was too close to it; it
concealed itself from him, a piece of unreflected immediacy.”
1
' Where Rose sees vintage
speculative thinking in Hegel’s formulation, Adorno in contrast sees Hegel illicitly
seeking refuge in “a piece of unreflected immediacy.” To posit such a moment of
immediacy, for Adorno, is something thoroughly undialectical that is discemable through
a rigorous immanent critique of Hegel. Moreover, such positing of immediacy violates
one of the most important dialectical principles animating Hegel’s philosophy: the
absence of a determinate starting point, a moment of immediacy, an absolute beginning.
Here, as in other places, Adorno finds Hegel cutting the dialectic short. For dialectical
thinking is thoroughly mediated. At least in Adorno’s account. Incidentally, it is precisely
Adorno’s charge against Hegel that Rose in turn presents against Adorno. But before
adjudicating correctness or incorrectness between Rose and Adorno, I would like to
closely read the passage in question in its entirety - in light of Hegel’s own account of
speculation and totality - in order to ponder what the stakes are for dialectical theory in
Hegel’s enigmatic equation of the truth with a Bacchanalian revel.
Immediately preceding the passage on the Bacchanalian revel, Hegel discusses
the limits of mathematical truth, and the problem of conceiving philosophical truth in
these rather formalistic and abstract terms. Hegel then proceeds to discuss the movement
of spirit in its unfolding, its process of self-knowledge. This is indeed one of the few
16
places where Hegel expounds his method as such. Hegel inserts this passage in order to
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clarify the content of philosophical truth, and as a clarification of the method through
which he is proceeding, one that Hegel considers intrinsic to the process itself, and thus
cannot be disentangled from its content. In contraposition to mathematical propositions,
“Philosophy
... has to do, not with unessential determinations, but with a determination
in so far as it is essential; its element and content is not the abstract or non-actual, but the
actual, that which posits itself and is alive within itself — existence within its own
„i 7
notion. This is a point Hegel reclaimed in the Science of Logic where, in explicit
reference to the Phenomenology
,
he later wrote: “Philosophy, if it would be science
cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere, borrow its method from a subordinate science like
mathematics, anymore that it can remain satisfied with categorical assurances of inner
„i8
intuition. As Hegel states it in the Science of Logic, the method “is not something
distinct from its object and content.” Here, to be sure, Hegel is not suggesting that the
method cannot be formulated in its pure form, otherwise he could not have written his
Science of Logic. Rather, he suggests that the method cannot be posited in advance or
externally: the method is the outcome of the process in which Spirit (Geist) embarked in
a journey of self-knowledge. Or as Hegel - with the satisfaction of finding repose after a
seemingly successful journey - restated it towards the end of the dense Science ofLogic.
“From this course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion [Begriff] that has
itselfas the absolute, both subjective and objective,for its subject matter, consequently as
the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete existence that is the
Science of Wisdom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). For Hegel the method cannot be separated
from its object.
17
Hegel, Phenomenology, 27.
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Notion itself." Hence, the absolute rests on the principle of identity: identity-in-
difference.
Philosophy is thus neither concerned with positing an abstract ontology as its
“onginary” point of departure, nor as a method, or a transcendental principle outside the
actuality of its object. Hegel, instead, talks about philosophy in term of an actual “that
posits itself and is alive within itself’; a principle of immanence in which the truth
emerges as part of the whole process, but one that is self-determined, and, thus,
thoroughly mediated. “It is the process which begets and transverses its own moments,
and this whole movement constitutes what is positive [in it] and its truth.” Consequently,
as he earlier enunciated in this same preface, “the truth is the whole”: namely, it is the
whole process in which immediacy is sublated by the constant mediation of its parts with
the totality, the universal with the particular, as these unfold in the singular .
20
“This
truth,” Hegel goes on to suggest, “therefore includes the negative also, what would be
called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract.” In
other words, the negative moment is not expendable, it is surely a part of the process, but
it is sublated by the positive moment, which is where “the whole movement” of the
process can be discerned and rendered by means of speculative knowledge. Even the
most evanescent of moments, Hegel insists, are part of the process, and their moments of
truth are contained within its totality. The process “constitutes the actuality and the
19
Hegel, Science ofLogic , 54, 826.
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At one point Rose formulated this principle as part of her critique of the Dialectic of Enlightenment-.
“Expressing the dilemma of enlightenment and domination has priority over presenting speculative
experience, Bildung - the relation of universality and particularity as it is actually and potentially
negotiated by the singular.” See Rose, “From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” 59.
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movement of the life of truth.” Or so Hegel’s own views of the process go. “The result,”
he insists, “is therefore the truth ,”
2 ’
Hegel insists that this result cannot be thought of as one despoiled of
contingencies, nor as a crass determinism; even so, for Hegel it is the outcome of a
teleological process. Later on, in the Encyclopaedia
,
Hegel is emphatic in arguing that
teleological necessity need not be conceptualized as determinism." Hegel, like the
subsequent tradition that ensued from his thought, grapples with the tension between
necessity and contingency. And this in Hegel manifests itself in terms of freedom and the
specific determinations of thought. For the true freedom that defines Spirit (Geist) and
history is one that expresses itself as a differentiated and reconciled unity. Accordingly,
true knowledge entails discerning the specific determinations of things, of our objects of
knowledge, as well of oneself an object of self-knowledge. Hegel thus effectively
intertwines epistemology and practical philosophy. And in what constitutes Hegel’s
important challenge to causal conceptions of knowledge, he proposes a conceptual
approach that seizes reality as an internal necessity in order to apprehend it in terms of
23
both its necessity and its contingency. In his discussion of reciprocity in the smaller
logic of the Encyclopaedia he then writes:
Hegel, Science ofLogic, 837.
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See G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Science of Logic, I (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 158; Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Philosophy of Spirit, III
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 337.
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Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect,
and stands ... on the threshold of the notion; but on that very ground, supposing
that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive idea, we should not rest content with
applying this relation. If we get no further than studying a given content under the
point of view of reciprocity, we are taking up an attitude which leaves matter
utterly incomprehensible. We are left with a mere dry fact; and the call for
mediation, which is the chief motive of applying the relation of causality, is still
unanswered. And if we look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction felt in
applying the relation of reciprocity, we shall see that it consists in the
circumstance that this relation, instead of being treated as an equivalent for the
notion, ought, first of all, to be known and understood in its own nature. And to
understand the relation of action we must not let the two sides rest in their state of
mere given facts, but recognize them ... for factors of a third and higher, which is
24
the notion (Begriff) and nothing else.
Mediation ( Vermittlung), which is also a central concept in Adorno’s negative dialectics,
has thus a contrasting role in the Hegelian system: in order to attain an end, there is the
need for a mean, and in Hegel’s system the mean is the mediation between two dialectical
moments that in their origins are independent, yet after these are comprehended in a
relation of mutual mediation, these are also understood as two moments that are
internally united. However in the passage in question not only the restlessness of
mediation and its centrality are hinted at by Hegel, but also the goal of a “thoroughly
Hegel, Encyclopaedia /, 219.
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comprehensive” knowledge is articulated. And both are aspects of the concept (jBegnff),
the higher unity on which the idea of reconciliation in the Hegelian system rests.
Hegel s conception of philosophy is thus epistemological; namely, for all his
criticism of previous epistemologies - from Descartes’ methodism to Kant’s failure to
transcend the level of the understanding (reason as Verstand)
- Hegel posits an
epistemological conception of philosophy. By comprehending the totality of the process
in all its mediations, according to Hegel one cognizes the truth, which turns out to be the
process itself - and this is perhaps the most enduring legacy of Hegel for critical theory.
Stated differently, for critical theory to be critical it needs to address questions of
epistemology, not ontology. (And this might explain Adorno’s preference for the mature
Marx of Capital in contrast to the Heidegger-influenced Marcuse who had a strong
affinity to the early Marx of the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.) Susan
Buck-Morss aptly formulates this crucial aspect of critical theory, as an epistemological
practice, when she argues that critical theory provides a “cognitive experience at a level
of reflection that has the power to dispel the illusion of the inevitability of events” in
ways such that we can re-cognize events in both their contingency and structural nature,
and thus demonstrate “that it is how we conceive of them that gives them their aura of
„
25
fate.” This in itself does not yield a critique but it is an indispensable component of it as
it creates space for it that, combined with democratic action, can bring about political
Susan Buck-Morss, Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory in the Left (London and New
York: Verso, 2003), 42.
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change. All in all, the basis of critical theory, at least since Hegel and Marx, is
epistemological rather than ontological.
Following a rather condensed exposition of his epistemological positions, Hegel
proceeds to exemplify the epistemological import of comprehensiveness through a
discussion of Spartan society. In a passage that at once combines a critique of Rousseau’s
paradox of the general will with a critique of ontology, Hegel criticizes the question of
what comes first, the manners of a people as grounding a constitution, or a constitution
that instills the manners associated with the community it bounds and constitutes. But
instead of remaining within the paradox, or presenting it as an antinomy, Hegel
speculatively suggests that this paradox is better cast in terms of a comprehensive
understanding of Spartan history and Spartan life from the perspective of the concept
(Begriff). In other words, as one commentator has correctly extrapolated, in Hegel “the
identification of the cause with the content shows the comparative convenience of taking
as a point of departure not a concept of reality as composed of separated and diverse
substances, but of a [comprehensive] unity ... for instance, the principle of an epoch as
28
what unites and identifies ... different manifestations of spiritual life.” Hegelian
concepts such as the principle of an epoch are speculative attempts at a higher unity for
the sake of comprehensive knowledge of the totality in all its determinations. Hegel
follows the same principles in speculatively developing a philosophy of history. For
Cf. Wendy Brown, Politics Out ofHistory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 5.
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instance, as historical beings both humans and Geist participate in a relation of mutual
constitution and mediation.
This process of seeking comprehensive knowledge can be better understood in
light of Hegel s different renderings of the relation between the whole and the parts. In
the Encyclopaedia he writes:
The immediate relation is that of the Whole and the Parts. The content is the
whole, and consists of the parts (the form), its counterpart. The parts are diverse
one from another. It is they that possess independent being. But they are parts,
only when they are identified by being related to one another; or, in so far as they
take up the whole, when taken together. But this ‘together’ is the counterpart and
29
negation of the part.
There is both identity and lack of identity between the whole and the different parts that
constitute it. And these are apprehended within a comprehensive totality, as part of a
process of mutual mediation. It is in this process where, for Hegel, the unity between the
opposites is found. But the moment of reconciliation between the oppositions is not for
him an external imposition; rather, it is intrinsic to the relation between the oppositions
that are expounded - in this case, the opposition of the whole and the parts. In the Science
ofLogic, Hegel renders this relation in terms more evocative of his dialectical-speculative
thinking:
The whole accordingly consists ofparts, so that it is not anything without them. It
is therefore the whole relation and the self-subsistent totality; but for this reason it
is only relative, for that which makes it a totality is rather its other, the parts; and
Hegel
,
Encyclopaedia I, 191.
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are
it has its subsistence not within itself but in its other. [...] Thus the parts
likewise the whole relation
... the whole is equal to the parts and the parts to the
whole
... [the] whole is not abstract unity, but unity as of a diverse manifoldness;
but this unity as that which the elements of the manifold are related to one
another, is the determinateness of each element through which it is part .
30
Identity and difference are thus part of a self-determined expressive totality, one in which
both necessity and contingency are necessary, and accordingly contained.
3
' For Hegel,
therefore, the conditions for acquiring knowledge of an internal necessity amongst two
perceived separate things, or interpretative knowledge, is not met by the dialectical
moment in the relation of oppositions. Rather, Hegel poses the centrality of speculative
knowledge in bringing about comprehensive knowledge. Speculation is thus understood
as the intuition of the existence of a special unity between the parts, one that goes beyond
affirming that the parts mutually constitute and determine one another. Once speculative
knowledge is achieved, the unity of all the parts is discerned as part of an expressive
,•
32
totality.
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Hegel, Science ofLogic, 514-16.
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Out of this brief rendering one can see how for Hegel even the moment of repose
is an important part of the totality, as well as constitutive of his system: Spirit needs to
recollect itself in order to gain self-knowledge, and in this moment of recollection a
comprehensive view of the moments of universality and particularity as rendered in the
singular events of history can be discerned. In this recollection is where speculative
knowledge of the totality by means of the concept (Begriff) emerges. Actually, it is this
moment of repose that Rose considers crucial for speculative thinking. But this moment
of repose is also what Adorno sees as Hegel’s moment of “unreflected immediacy,” what
he, following Benjamin, calls “dialectics at a standstill.”
33
And yet, for Hegel, this is the
moment in which the possibility of philosophical truth arises, the quasi-mystic moment of
comprehension in which “the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than
determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they
are negative and evanescent.” This is the cognitive moment in which the whole is
comprehended; a moment that is both historical and concrete. “In the whole of the
movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, and gives itself
particular existence, is preserved as something that recollects itself, whose existence is
self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge is just as immediately existence.”
The Ethics and Other Works, ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 86, 137, 267
.
This conception of freedom has had important theoretical and political implications - for freedom is
perceived as the ignorance of necessity. Spinoza’s philosophy has been re-appropriated by liberals and
Marxists alike. Among the latter, where the most stimulating perspectives are found, one finds Louis
Althusser and Antonio Negri, who elaborate an anti-Hegel Marx on the basis of Spinoza. Yet these two
attest to the political problems of such formulations: in the case of Althusser it translated into a causalist
and deterministic Marxism in which a vanguardist conception of “theory” (Spinoza’s reason) was given
primacy; and in the case of Negri, it has led to an utterly abstract concept of the multitude that is everything
but sociological, and fails to appreciate the moment of mediation in its Spinoza-inspired concept of the
multitude. Cf. Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (London: Blackwell, 2003), 203-06.
Adorno, Hegel, 133. For a discussion of the role of this imagery in Adorno’s epistemology see Rolf
Tiedemann, “Concept, Image, Name: On Adorno’s Utopia of Knowledge,” in The Semblance of
Subjectivity, 123-145.
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Recollection, movement, and self-knowledge are the crucial Hegelian concepts
here. It seems that it is out of the different configurations that these concepts take within
Hegel s system that his concept of the absolute as subject emerges. Or perhaps, to reverse
the equation, it is because Hegel presupposes the absolute, in its unity, that these
moments are rendered in the way they are within his system. In any case, this is a unity
that according to Hegel is a higher unity comprising both objectivity and subjectivity.
(But as Adorno insisted in different places, this absolute presumes that “subject-object is
subject” and thus fails to dialectically mediate its status as an object both
epistemologically and sociologically, the latter in terms of the objectification of the
34
subject within capitalism.)
But how much is recollected from a movement of self-knowledge? Is the negative
moment recollected? Is the particular and the evanescent reality preserved in the moment
of recollection? Or do “we” need to repose in order to have a comprehensive view of the
historical process? Does the repose constitute speculative thinking, or unreflected
immediacy? How transparent is the repose if it is one depicted by means of images that
evoke ecstasies and drunkenness? Is this moment of self-knowledge crucial for
speculative thinking? Does comprehensiveness presuppose a subject that reposes? These
are all pressing questions, especially because these go the core of the question of the
possibility of retrieving the comprehensive moment of speculative thinking without
falling back into an abstract conception of a subject of history, as Subject. Gillian Rose,
for instance, associates this moment of recollection with the possibility of
comprehensiveness, and links the latter with the promise of a critical retrieval of
34
See Adorno, Hegel, 13. See also Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, trans.
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Marxism. Yet Rose is at pains to reclaim the epistemological import of the moment of
recollection without Geist as subject. Who then recollects in the absence of Geist? Who?
Humanity? Who is then the possessor of a collective memory? Or, perhaps, of collected
memory? Who is the bearer of that memory? Furthermore, then, what does it mean to
read speculatively? What is the relationship between dialectical and speculative thinking
in Hegel? Does Adorno, as Rose suggests, cut dialectical thinking short by stopping short
of speculation?
In order to clarify the stakes in these questions one needs to look more closely at
the way Hegel deploys both categories, the dialectical and the speculative. Only then can
one determine the prospects of dialectical thinking, and the possibility of retrieving it for
a comprehensive and historicized critical theory of responsibility, one that retains the
critical import of comprehensiveness, from a non-identitarian perspective, while resisting
falling back into subjectivist formulations such as the absolute as Geist, or of a different
form of identitarian thinking. It is, indeed, by spelling out and exploring these questions
that the full philosophical and ethical import of Adorno’s negative dialectics, and his
conception of critical theory, can be fully apprehended.
* * *
In order to present the intersection between the dialectical and the speculative in Hegel, I
shall call the reader’s attention to another notorious passage of Hegel’s that is widely
35
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quoted, and equally misunderstood, even by Hegel’s own contemporaries: his statement
in the Philosophy ofRight that “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.”
37
So widespread was the misunderstanding that in the introduction to the first part of The
Encyclopaedia ofPhilosophical Sciences (1830) Hegel felt compelled to restate what he
meant by this proposition and sought to clarify its meaning: for this was a set of
propositions that “have given rise to expressions of surprise and hostility.”
38
Hegel
explains how he sees the intersection of the actual and the rational by clarifying not only
the meanings of these two terms but also their relatedness. The relationship between the
rational and the real needs to be read speculatively, he suggests; such a proposition in
relation to the rational and the real is an argument on behalf of concreteness and
comprehensiveness. Namely, only by comprehensively rendering the present both in its
identity and lack of identity, with its ideals and aspirations, can the possibility for a
critique of the present be re-cognized in light of its unfulfilled possibilities and ideals.
Hegel’s own formulation refers to the speculative rendering of essence and existence, and
.
. t < 39
the identity and lack of identity between the two. For instance, if one suggests that a
democratic society is undemocratic, one is measuring the actual concrete experience and
practice (existence) of a given society against its own notion of itself (essence): in this
case there is a lack of identity between the existence and the essence, which yields to a
critique of present structures in the name of the ideal that informs them, but which they
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (London and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967), 10
38
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fall short in fulfilling, a cntique that at once shows the non-identity between concept and
object and by doing so the unlikely utopian moment in the concept - the latter accounts
for Adorno’s insistence that any critique of the concept needs to start with it.
4°
Accordingly, the critical moment of Hegel’s philosophy, instead of positing an abstract
imperative, or an ideal state that eludes situatedness, consists in the attempt to discern the
lack of identity between universal and particular within actuality, by measuring one
against the other; an immanent process through which the possibility for a critique of the
present under consideration is yielded concretely.
4
' Stated somewhat differently, once
read speculatively, the proposition of both identity and lack of identity serves as an
important cognitive element in de-reifying so-called democratic institutions and social
relations that might otherwise harbor deeply anti-democratic principles, a move that, in
turn, might lead to reconceptualize those immanently, even if with an element of
transcendence (Adorno); or for instance, democratic constitutionalism rather than
constitutional democracy (Wolin).
But this is not the way this formulation has historically been understood. Hegel
partly ascribes the misreading of his position to the dogmatic assertion of divorcing ideas
from experience, an operation that he identifies with “analytic understanding” (reason as
Verstand). And as a corrective to this, he once again reiterates and expounds the need for
40
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philosophic thinking to be speculative
.
42
Hegel, to be sure, insisted on this as early as the
Phenomenology of Spirit, where he defended the importance of “the speculative
proposition.” But his rendering of the proposition in the Phenomenology is notoriously
stark as it seeks to expound explicitly, and somewhat formulaicly, an aspect of his
presentation that is constitutive of the text itself. In Hegel’s severe formulation:
“Formally, what has been said can be expressed thus: the general nature of the judgment
or proposition, which involves the distinction of Subject and Predicate, is destroyed by
the speculative proposition, and the proposition of identity which the former becomes
contains the counter-thrust against that subject-predicate relationship .”
43
Accordingly,
statements such as “what is actual is rational and what is rational is actual,” or those on
the identity of religion and state, attest to both the identity and non-identity of the subject
with the predicate. The identity and lack of identity of the two parts cannot be
demonstrated transcendentally, nor can it be judged in this way; rather, it needs to be seen
as a result not yet attained: both the subject and the predicate acquire meaning once
44
related to one another. Hence, oppositions such as identity and difference cannot be
separated: as Hegel puts it, “difference ... is at the same time an inseparable element of
identity.” Even so, the political and social import of the Phenomenology resides in re-
presenting these oppositions in the way these are manifested in different spheres of life,
42
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thus imparting a political education (Bildung) to his audience through an exposition of
the different stages of Precognition, and concretely expounding their actuality. Hence,
the absolute in Hegel is a moment not yet attained, even if the critical import of his
philosophy rests on it, or at least in the attempt to apprehend reality from its
46
perspective.
Speculative thinking thus understood needs to transcend judged oppositions and
re-present these oppositions in their actual configurations in different spheres. And this
is intrinsic to rational-philosophical thinking, and for comprehensive social and political
knowledge, too. For Hegel, The mind or spirit, when it is sentient or perceptive, finds its
object in something sensuous...” and the mind, accordingly, “renders thought its object.”
“But while thus occupied,” Hegel then adds, “thought entangles itself in contradictions,
i.e. loses itself in the hard-and-fast non-identity of its thoughts, and so, instead of
reaching itself, is caught and held in its counterpart .”
47
But, contrary to analytic
understanding, speculative thinking does not stop here; this is where mere understanding
stops, which according to Hegel is exemplified by Kant’s critical philosophy. In Hegel’s
view there is a craving of thought that remains unsatisfied, and “[tjhat craving expresses
the perseverance of thought, which continues true to itself, even in this conscious loss of
its native rest and independence, ‘that it may overcome’ and work out in itself the
. . . .
48
solution to its own contradictions.” Or as he spells it out elsewhere: “Speculative
thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast to contradiction, and in it, its
46
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own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as ordinary thinking, where its
determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations or into
49
nothing.” Incidentally, it is that “craving” of thought that thinkers like Nietzsche and
Adorno would later on identify as the imperialistic moment of thought: and for Adorno
this is not incidental: it springs from the monotheistic pretensions of modem reason. (I
discuss this point further in chapter V.)
Following these renderings, one distinguishes at least two functions for
speculative thinking: (1) it is the attempt to transcend ordinary thinking by relating
contradictions and showing the moment of identity, even if only conceptually, between
them; (2) and as the perseverance of thought to achieve knowledge of how these
contradictions are determined, sometimes mutually, as it attempts to reconcile these in a
higher unity. And the basis of both functions rest on dialectical thinking: but for the first
the cmcial dialectical moment is the negative
,
while in the second one sees the drive to
reconciliation in the negation of the negation, the so-called third positive moment.
In the Encyclopaedia
,
Hegel offers a rather formulaic sketch of the different
moments of thought, and how each one relates to the other, which sheds light on the
centrality of the speculative moment in his thinking: “In point of form Logical doctrine
has three sides: the Abstract side, or that of understanding; the Dialectical, or that of
50
negative reason; the Speculative, or that of positive reason.” These stages or moments
of the logic are also moments that are present in every concept, and within the concept
(Begriff), and cannot be thought of sequentially, or in temporal terms. Hegel quickly
49
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warns his readers not to take then in the abstract way he presents them: in order to present
each of them, he needs to expound them at the level of the understanding
,
as separated
entities, hence his reliance on ordinary thought and the difficulty in apprehending his
formulations.
For Hegel, the abstract moment of the Understanding “sticks to fixity of
characters and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it treats as
having a subsistence and being of its own.” The understanding separates things and
presents them as unmediated opposites: it is confined to reason as Verstand, not as
Vernunft. This is the point - in Hegel’s estimation - where Kantian philosophy stops; it
cannot be speculative, especially given that Kant associates speculation with misguided
attempts to apprehend the thing in itself, and with the formulations of ontological
arguments on the existence of God. Or as Hegel put it in the Science of Logic, Kantian
philosophy is responsible for “the renunciation of speculative thought.”
5
^ Yet it is this
epistemological opposition between the realm of appearances {phenomena ) and the realm
of the thing itself (noumena), what Hegel challenges speculatively: after all, by thinking
the boundary-limit of knowledge, exemplified by the realm of noumena, Kant is able to
think that which lies in the realm of noumena, the very same thing he claims cannot be
, ,
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thought.
Following this critique of Kant, Hegel formulates the next stage or moment of
thinking, one that is intrinsically related to the previous one as it constitutes its negation:
51
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the negation of the understanding is the dialectical stage, one in which “these
characterizations and formulae [of the Understanding] supersede themselves, and pass
into their opposites.” The dialectic is the moment of the negative; “its purpose is to
study things in their own being and movement and thus demonstrate the fmitude of
partial categones of understanding.” By means of this juxtaposition Hegel seeks to
justify not only the transition from one moment to the other, but also the possibility of
deriving a third positive moment from the negative one - if “Dialectic is the very nature
and essence of everything predicated by mere understanding,” dialectic is, too, subsumed
in the next moment: the speculative. Yet, in contrast to the Skeptical tradition, for Hegel,
“philosophy does not remain content with the purely negative result of Dialectic. [...] For
the negative which emerges as the result of dialectic is, because a result, at the same time
positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into life itself, and made part of its
,,
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own nature. Insofar as it is a result, the negative also contains that from which it
emerged, thus there is both identity and lack of identity between these two moments.
By means of these formulations Hegel sought to derive a positive moment from
the negative, a transition that commentators have pointed out is not entirely convincing,
57
not even on logical grounds. Or as Adorno eloquently puts it in Negative Dialectics
,
“To equate the negation of the negation with positivity is the quintessence of
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identification; it is the formal principle in its purest form”; namely, “The thesis that the
negation of the negation is something positive can only be upheld by one who
presupposes positivity - as all-conceptuality - from the beginning.”
58
In Adorno’s
reading, the moment of identification is posited abstractly, and is thus a formal aspect of
Hegel s philosophy that hardly emerges from experience. What might be more important,
the identity of the two moments is posited in advance, and hardly arrived at dialectically.
After all, even in Hegel’s own formulation, it is the negative moment that is crucial in the
dialectical movement, and is the one that Adorno reclaims for his critical reconfiguration
of the dialectic. Just consider one of the most poetic renderings of the second moment in
the Hegelian triad as formulated in the preface of the Phenomenology’ of Spirit, a
formulation that attests to the importance of mediation in Hegel’s dialectical thought but
also resonates with Adorno’s “logic of disintegration” as expounded in Negative
Dialectics :
But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself
untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in
it. It wins in truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this
power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative as when
we say of something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it,
turn away and pass onto something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this power only
59
by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it.
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Adorno
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Even so, in other formulations Hegel places the “tarrying with the negative” as
necessarily leading to a third positive moment. For instance, in the Science of Logic
Hegel offers a more detailed account of the negative moment, in light of which it is easier
to grasp the role of the negative in dialectical thinking, and its critical function. Here,
after stating that the method” of his philosophy “is the consciousness of the form of the
inner self-movement of the content of logic,” he writes;
[T]he negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not
resolve itself into nullity [...] but essentially only into the negation of its
particular content, in other words, that such negation is not all and every negation
but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and
consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains
that from which it results; which strictly speaking is a tautology, for otherwise it
would be an immediacy, not a result. Because the result, the negation, is a specific
negation it has content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its
predecessor; for it is richer by the negation of opposite of the latter, therefore
contains it, but also something more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It
is in this way that the system of Notions as such has to be formed—and also has
to complete itself in a purely continuous course in which nothing extraneous is
60
introduced.
But from the specificity of negation, as a determinate one, does not follow that there is a
higher unity that follows from the coupling of the negation with its first moment. And
engagement with Hegel, see Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment (London and New York: Verso,
1995), chap. 12.
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yet, Hegel is at pains to argue that the negation leads to a new affirmation: a richer and
higher notion. The negation, in so far as it contains a moment of what it negates, is
something higher than the first moment. But it is not merely the absence of the concept or
thing it negates. Rather, it is a reflective process in which one pole negates the other and
returns to itself; not to the same level of knowledge previously possessed, but to a richer
understanding of its own concept. Still, the assumption that this unity becoming
something higher seems externally posited; namely, it does not necessarily follow from
the dialectical relatedness of the concepts themselves. But Hegel insists that it is from this
negative moment that the third moment of the dialectic, the positive, is derived. And it is
this third positive moment that for him constitutes the kernel of speculative thinking.
Stated somewhat differently, the dialectic is the negation of the understanding,
and the speculative the negation of the dialectic, but in the speculative a higher unity
emerges that carries both the immediacy of the first, and the mediation of the second
moment, thus emerging as a higher unity.
6
' But what Hegel presupposes, and by no
means convincingly shows, is that out of a speculative rendering of the oppositions in
their mutual relation and constitution, a unity emerges. Only by positing Geist in its
teleological process of self-knowledge can such an assumption be made, thus confirming
the validity of Adorno’s claim that the positive could only be derived from the negative if
it is taken as the initial point of departure, a move that constitutes another instance of
unreflective immediacy. Adorno presents an analogous critique in relation to the moment
of both subjectivity and objectivity that the epistemological higher unity, the absolute,
presents, and how it masks a domination of subjectivity over objectivity. For as Adorno
Hegel, Science ofLogic, 830ff.
101
writes, “In the objectivity of the Hegelian dialectic, which quashes all mere subjectivism,
there is something like a will on the part of the subject to jump over its own shadow .”62 A
will that comes out of a unity that is posited in advance in order to preserve the cogency
of the transition from one moment to the other, but one that sacrifices objectivity and
difference for the sake of identity and subjectivity.
Even so, Hegel’s thought remains caught in a tension between the centrality he
ascribes to the negative dialectical moment and its sublation in the third speculative
moment. It is the negative moment, after all, that in Hegel’s own view constitutes “the
genuine dialectical element, even if in other formulations he sees it as leading to the
positive moment of the speculative: “It is in the dialectic as it is here understood, that is,
in the grasping of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative, that
speculative thinking consists .”
63
Still, according to Hegel, “The dialectical stage has the
features characterizing the third grade of logical truth, the speculative form, or the form
of positive reason.” Or as he states in a more expansive rendering: “The negative
moment is the one that [posits] the specific differences of the understanding.”
6
The
negative is the moment of difference - which is crucial for Adorno’s negative dialectics
while the speculative moment is the one in which the unity of oppositions are
apprehended and a third affirmative emerges; one that for Hegel “is involved in their
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disintegration and in their transition."" Speculation thus emerges as a conceptual
process. Accordingly, in yet another Hegelian formulation, the three moments constitute
one another in the following way:
The understanding determines, and holds the determinations fixed; reason is
negative and dialectical, because it resolves the determinations of the
understanding into nothing; it is positive because it generates the universal and
comprehends the particular therein
.
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Once rendered together, in all their respective determinations, speculative thinking yields
knowledge of both the universal and the particular - albeit, the latter only once
comprehended therein. Indeed, there is conspicuously no statement about movement in
the opposite direction, at least on Hegel’s part. Here the universal has primacy over the
particular, Hegel’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
Hegel also attaches the negative to the labor of Geist: “the negative, that which
constitutes the quality alike of dialectical reason and understanding.” And all this
revolves around the notion of Geist : “Spirit thinking its own external nature.” Conceived
in this way, Spirit, the universal, is what constitutes consciousness, and under which the
dialectic of universal and particular takes place. Speculative knowledge, thus, is the
cognitive process of comprehensively relating opposites and casting these oppositions
from the perspective of a higher unity, an all-encompassing expressive totality.
At this particular point the cogency of Hegel’s cosmology is not very strong,
which may account for his insistence on this richer third moment, one presumably
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carrying with it a higher unity between the oppositions - a point he constantly stresses
and states but hardly convincingly shows. No doubt that once different determinations
and relations between concepts are discerned, the knowledge of how these are
intertwined increases, and thus a richer comprehensive knowledge of, for instance, the
way the universal and particular are intersected and mutually mediated may emerge. But
the cognitive gain need not lead to a positing of an identity between concept and object in
this ‘higher unity,” or to positing an absolute subject. Yet that is exactly what Hegel
seems to derive. Once again, as Adorno unequivocally suggests, here Hegel presupposes
what he seeks to prove - the identity of subject and object: “The Hegelian system must
indeed presuppose subject-object identity, and thus the very primacy of Spirit which it
. „
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seeks to prove.
Out of these reflections also emerges a critique of the epistemological model of
subject-object relation” as formulated by Hegel’s predecessors in modem philosophy.
Hegel not only challenges the ways in which this binary has been kept, but also presents
the importance and need to transcend this binary, and posit it as a higher unity, one that
69
will be achieved only in the reconciliation of absolute knowledge. For consciousness
“contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self or the object
in its own self in sofar as it is equally pure thought."
By comprehensively positing the presence of objectivity and subjectivity in both
poles of the binary, Hegel undoes this binary while sublating it; a move that Adorno’s
68
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negative dialectics endorses, as we shall see. But Hegel’s leap to unify the oppositions in
a positive moment of reconciliation is resisted by Adorno’s consciously aporetic stance at
least since his joint authorship, with Max Horkheimer, of the Dialectic of Enlightenment
for Adorno, Hegel’s philosophy rests on the original identity of subject and object.
7 '
And the unity, the identitarian principle, is posited by the notion of Spirit; it is close to a
SoUen (an ought) that is imposed from the outside, as Hegel’s deduction from the
relatedness of the concepts does not lead to this; hence its abstractness
^
It instead leads
to a constant reconfiguration of thought, it leaves no room for a moment of repose, albeit
neither does it posit an abstract restlessness: the restlessness of Adorno’s negative
dialectics is, instead, deeply political. Thus offering a political and ethical reading of
theoretical philosophy, not a philosophical reading of politics, such as the ones offered by
Hegel, where the individual and the concrete are often sacrificed for the sake of the
universal. Indeed, since the Dialectic ofEnlightenment Adorno, here in conjunction with
Horkheimer, articulated the critical import of Hegel’s concept of “determinate negation,”
although this time it is contrasted with the “rigorism” of instrumental reason:
Unlike rigorism, determinate negation does not simply reject imperfect
representations of the absolute, idols, by confronting them with the idea they are
unable to match. Rather, dialectic discloses each image as script. It teaches us to
read from its features the admission of falseness which cancels its power and
hands it over to truth. Language thereby becomes more than a mere system of
signs. With the concept of determinate negation Hegel gave prominence to an
71
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element which distinguishes enlightenment from the positivist decay to which he
consigned it. However, by finally postulating the known result of the whole
process of negation, totality in the system and in history, as the absolute, he
violated the prohibition and himself succumbed to mythology
.
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* * *
For Hegel, as already argued, the speculative moment is the one in which unity is
apprehended, and a third positive moment of reconciliation (of identity-in-difference)
emerges from the disintegration of oppositions. In contrast, Adomo emphasizes the
centrality of disintegration - one surely indebted to Hegel’s formulation of the dialectic,
while rejecting a third moment of reconciliation, and reclaiming the negative moment as
the moment of difference. In other words, instead of positing a philosophy of identity,
Adomo rather formulates a different logic of disintegration: one that “is suspicious of all
identity”, and instead of seeking the “identity in the difference between each object and
its concept,” formulates a “disintegration of the prepared and objectified forms of the
concepts which the cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly.”
74
And it is this logic
of disintegration, one that even it though challenges constitutive subjectivity - or because
it does so dialectically - does not erase the subject.
“The farewell to Hegel,” Adomo argues, “becomes tangible in a contradiction that
concerns the whole, in one that cannot be resolved according to plan, as a particular
contradiction.” Stated differently, the contradiction cannot be sublated and thus
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment: Philosophical Fragments , ed. G.
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incorporated in Hegel’s system as a particular that can be transcended from the
perspective of the whole; instead, it challenges the pretensions to wholeness in Hegel’s
philosophy. The contradiction Adorno refers to is in relation to the aforementioned
account of method in Hegel, especially in Hegel’s critique of previous philosophical
attempts to separate a method from its content, its object. In Adorno’s reading, Hegel
violates his own precepts: “Hegel ... wanted a philosophy without a detachable form,
without a method to be employed independently of the matter, and yet proceeded
75
methodically. Or at least so much can be apprehended from his treatment of
philosophical categories in the Science of Logic, a text where questions of method take
precedence, and the leap between the negative and the positive is taken, even if in his
other political, epistemological, and historical writings such a deduction hardly follows.
'
It is out of this violation of its most basic principle that Hegel ends up positing an abstract
reconciliation, a moment that represents a flight from the concreteness of objects. Hence,
the aforementioned abstract nature of the concluding chapter of the Science of Logic
constitutes, from an Adomian point of view, an example of how Hegel proceeds
methodically, and not merely the absence of the conditions for its concrete manifestation,
as Rose suggests.
In this vein, Adorno reclaims the Hegelian notion of a method that is not
detachable from its content, a method that is not one. This insight is preserved in his
negative dialectics. He also emphasizes its importance further by presenting dialectical
thinking as the radical moment of Hegel’s thinking, one that Adorno reworks:
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In fact, dialectics is neither a pure method nor a reality in the naive sense of the
word. It is not a method, for the unreconciled matter - lacking precisely the
identity surrogated by the thought - is contradictory and resists any attempt at
unanimous interpretation. It is the matter, not the organizing drive of thought, that
brings us to dialectics. Nor is dialectics a simple reality, for contradictoriness is a
category of reflection, the cogitative confrontation of concept and thing. To
proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake of the
contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction. A
contradiction in reality is a contradiction against reality.
If reality is contradictory thought needs to recreate those contradictions in the categories
by means of which it comprehends this reality. Also, Adorno’s negative dialectics takes
as its point of departure for reflection the concreteness of the object. Hence it’s
materialism. In this vein, it resists thinking contradictions ontologically; he rather does so
from a politically infused sociological, and cognitive, perspective. And in what
constitutes a genuine dialectical moment in his formulation of this aspect of dialectical
thinking, the experience of the contradiction is what triggers thought; critical thinking
resists mending the contradictions theoretically. Instead, what critical theory does is to
think against those contradictions comprehensively in order to challenge their reified
forms. Thus the contradictions of reality can be comprehended in critical ways in order to
subvert that otherwise reified reality.
By dialectically, and speculatively, rendering the contradictions in thought to the
contradictions in reality Adomo seeks to formulate a dialectics of non-identity in which
77
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neither is identity posited from the outside, nor is difference, or non-identity, reified.
Rather than regressing to a Kantian, or Cartesian, conception of method, Adorno
radicalizes Hegel’s account and, ironically, is truer to Hegel’s critique of methodist
philosophies. The materialist aspect of this mode of dialectical thinking is retrieved
accordingly. Indeed, the materialism here is emphasized by the constant mediation of the
object in relation to the concepts that seek to represent it. But materialism here refers to
the privilege of concrete experience for thinking rather than a mechanic conception of
reality, or of history, as vulgar conceptions of Marxism indicate
.
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Accordingly, Adorno’s negative dialectics cannot be reconciled or sublated from
a Hegelian standpoint. It manages to dispense with the abstractness of Geist without
sacrificing its comprehensiveness. Additionally, by means of its logic of disintegration it
is able to present the “untruth” of reconciled subjectivity, of identity thinking. But this
turn, to be sure, can only be taken immanently. Adorno’s logic of disintegration takes the
idealist formulation as its point of departure: “The idealistic magic circle can be
transcended only in thoughts still circumscribed by its figure, in thoughts that follow its
own deductive procedure, call it by name and demonstrate its disjointness, the untruth of
79
totality by unfolding its epitome.”
Still, Adorno’s formulation of dialectical thinking renders itself aporetic. It
emphasizes its bottomless nature and non-identity between contradictions - the latter are
comprehended sociologically, not ontologically. Negative dialectics preserves the tension
between what Hegel and Rose considered the two moments of the dialectic: the
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dialectical and the speculative. And by resisting the imposition of a third positive moment
of reconciliation, he seeks to formulate a more inclusive dialectic. But one that in its
inclusiveness does not sacrifice objectivity for the sake of subjectivity, nor posit the
domination of subject over object, or of identity over difference: “But in reality this very
non-identity has the form of identity, an all-inclusiveness that is not governed by any
third, reconciling moment.” This more inclusive dialectic has a strong political import
insofar as it seeks to do justice to the others but without positing an abstract concept of
the other, or referring to the ethical and political demand for responsibility as an abstract
imperative.
The political aspect of Adorno’s critique is better understood in light of Adorno’s
earlier formulation of the same problem in relation to the philosophy of origins: “The
qualification of the absolutely first in subjective immanence founders because
immanence can never completely disentangle the moment of non-identity within itself,
and because subjectivity, the organ of reflection, clashes with the idea of an absolutely
8
1
first as pure immediacy.” Adorno thus suggests that “the suppression of non-identity”
needs to be understood not only as a conceptual or philosophical problem but also as a
political one: as Peter Dews has aptly put it, such suppression of non-identity is “the
82
expression of a historically and socially determined drive for control.” Or as Peter
Osborne has put it, though in a different context: “... the character of [Adorno’s shift
from the subjective to the objective] ... is not that of a ‘fragmentation’ or ‘de-centering’
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of the subject so much as either a withdrawal or alienation of its subjective dimension
from its (objective) conditions of existence (the withdrawal of an already de-centered
subjectivity into itself), or, at worst, its dissolution, its reduction to objectivity.”
83
And, to
be sure, this is a political-economic-cultural process rather than an ontological one. Thus,
it is futile to substitute, as Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy for instance does, identitarian
thinking, or the negative moment of dialectics, with an abstract affirmation of plurality.
Or to put it differently, these questions of theoretical philosophy need to be thought about
politically in terms of the possibility of acknowledging the limits of subjectivity and of
formulating an “open-ended dialectic of concrete experience,” one that is both critical
and responsive to difference, but, more importantly, one that also seeks the overcoming
84
of domination. For as Adorno argues, the contradictions of thought are also
contradictions of experience, and even though thought partly constitutes this reality, it is
also constituted by it. This is yet another reason for Adorno’s refusal to posit dialectics as
a philosophical ontology. Rather, he presents negative dialectics as the ontology of the
wrong state of things, and as such it is “neither a [Hegelian] system nor a contradiction.”
As is the case in some of Hegel’s formulations, for Adorno, dialectics is intrinsic with its
object. But in the case of Adorno, such an object could be society based on the exchange
principle that presupposes an abstract equality based on the principle of abstract legality
that he, like Lukacs, sees as intrinsic to the exchange process of late capitalism. And such
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abstract equality, thoroughly mediated by the exchange principle, is constitutive of the
abstract procedural structure of liberalism and its discourse of rights.
One of the tasks of negative dialectics is thus to illustrate the exclusions of
differences, and the domination of otherness that are a byproduct of this process. He does
so by comprehensively thinking the political, the economic, and the cultural not as
isolated spheres but as mutually mediated. In other words, only a critical theory that seeks
to apprehend the role of the universal and particular in the singular can do justice to the
mutual mediations of the cultural, the economic, and the political (which are not
independent of one another, as dialecticians would know) in every particular instance.
This is why in Negative Dialectics Adorno does not entirely reject the speculative
moment of thinking. Adorno’s rendering is worth quoting at some length:
The power of the status quo puts up the facades into which our consciousness
crashes. It must seek to crash through them. This alone would free the postulate of
depth from ideology. Surviving in such resistance is the speculative moment:
what would not have its law prescribed for it by given facts transcends them even
in the closest contact with the objects, and in repudiating a sacrosanct
,
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transcendence.
Adorno relates the speculative moment of thinking to the possibility of transcendence.
Such possibility is constitutive of his understanding of critical theory. Immediately
following his presentation of the centrality of the speculative moment of thinking,
Adorno formulates his well-known statement on the importance of lending suffering a
voice. He writes:
85
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Where the thought transcends the bonds it tied in resistance - there is its freedom.
Freedom follows the subject’s urge to express itself. The need to lend a voice to
suffering is the condition of all truth. For suffenng is objectivity that weighs upon
the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively
conveyed
.
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Speculation, in Adorno’s negative dialectics, thus consists not only of the freedom of
thought, the contingent and fragile moment of transcendence from the status quo, or the
refusal to let thought’s law be prescribed by the present; it also consists of the possibility
of articulating identity from non-identity, and vice versa: “Contradiction is non-identity
under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primacy of the principle of contradiction
makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity.” Instead of positing “identity-
in-difference as an ideal of reconciliation, in Adorno’s formulation, speculative thinking
locates the lack of identity between the concept that a given reality uses to measure itself,
and its lack of identity with it: politically, this translates into using the ideal of democracy
and freedom to criticize societies that in their self-image pretend to be democratic. More
importantly, rather than abstractly seeking to find unity amidst heterogeneity, dialectical
thinking thinks of difference and heterogeneity concretely, and both defends and
criticizes these two principles insofar as in their concrete manifestations they contribute
to suffering and domination.
In this vein, Adorno evokes the speculative rendering of unity and heterogeneity
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from the perspective of non-identity. Consequently, Adorno preserves the speculative
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moment even when a break with the idealist formulation of it is called for, but this
moment is preserved in a richer and broader formulation. “Even after breaking with
idealism, philosophy cannot do without speculation, which was exalted by idealism and
tabooed with it - meaning speculation, of course, in a sense broader than the overly
88
positive Hegelian one.” Only by reworking the speculative moment of thinking can
Adorno think the possibility of “a possible reconciled non-identity” without
domination. Besides, if lending a voice to suffering is the condition of truth for critical
theory, it needs to be done comprehensively; that is, by casting the forms of suffering
from the perspective of the non-identitarian totality that is the “total social process.” For
instance, in the Hegel model of Negative Dialectics
,
where Adorno retrieves a non-
identitarian concept of universal history, he formulates this problem in terms of a critique
of the Hegelian absolute: If [Hegel] transformed the totality of historic suffering into the
positivity of self-realizing absolute, the One and All that keeps rolling on to this day -
with occasional breathing spells - would teleologically be the absolute of suffering”
91'
Human suffering cannot be reconciled and redeemed in Hegelian fashion; rather, to lend
voice to suffering in its particular and concrete manifestations it is necessary to recast a
comprehensive narrative in which both the contingent and the structural-capitalist
elements in it can be cognized. In other words, to comprehensively re-cognize suffering,
in its historical dimensions, Adorno’s critical theory preserves the moment of
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speculation, and aims at the comprehensiveness, that Hegel, Marx, and Lukacs aimed at
from the perspective of the totality. In Adorno’s theory, I would like to suggest, such as
moment is preserved in the idea of thinking in constellations.
9 '
* * *
Adorno’s attempt to formulate a critical theory of society that still carries the
comprehensiveness associated with speculative thinking without its idealist or
identitarian consequences is found in what, following Walter Benjamin, he identifies as
constellational thinking, or thinking by means of “constellations of concepts.” In contrast
to Hegel’s rendenng of dialectical and speculative thinking, and the positive identity he
imposes on it, Adorno’s formulation of constellational thinking does not presuppose an
identity of subject and object. Instead, when the subject apprehends objects through a
constellation of concepts the subject does not seek to provide an exhaustive account of
the object in all its determinations: a constellation of concepts seeks to bring into light the
particularities of the object, as well as its non-identity, without claiming to exhaust the
former, or completely apprehend the latter: “a constellation illuminates the specific side
ofthe object, the side which to a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference of
92
a burden.”
Stylistically, it is the essay, as a form, that for Adorno best captures the mode of
presentation that characterizes constellational thinking. As early as his inaugural lecture
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of 1931 Adorno was arguing on behalf of constellational thinking, and even at that time
he saw in the essay, what he refers to as “essayism,” the ideal venue.
93
More than thirty
years later, in the “Essay as Form,” he writes: "The constellation is a force field, just as
every intellectual structure is necessanly transformed into a force field under the essay’s
,94
gaze. The attnbutes of constellational thinking are further elaborated in terms of the
openness and experimental nature of the essay as a genre. In the “Essay as Form,”
Adorno writes,
The essay, however, is concerned with what is blind in its objects. It wants to use
concepts to pry open the aspect of its objects that cannot be accommodated by
concepts, the aspect that reveals, through the contradictions in which concepts
become entangled, that the net of their objectivity is a merely subjective
arrangement. It wants to polarize the opaque element and release the latent forces
in it. Its efforts are directed towards concretizing a content defined in time and
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space; it constructs a complex of concepts interconnected in the same way it
imagines them to be interconnected in the object.
35
In its fragmented and anti-systematic nature, the essay seeks to capture the aspects of the
object it describes that systematic and methodist thinking erase. Moreover, by
apprehending those aspects that systematic conceptual thinking considers as reminders,
or simply does not even notice, the essay, as exemplary of constellational thinking, brings
to reflection the non-identity between the object it describes and the “objective” structure
that systematic thinkers ascribes to them. Also, it “imagines” how the concepts that form
the constellation correspond to the objects they describe, as they seek to describe objects
in their concreteness. By devising constellations of concepts, the essay as a form attempts
to capture the remainders of the concept without doing violence to them, as these
constellations also reveal the subjective aspects of the objectivity of the concept by
rendering objects in their concreteness. Constellations of concepts are thus able to
represent “from without what the concept has cut away within: the ‘more’ which the
.
. 95
concept is equally desirous and incapable of being.”
Besides, the possibility of constructing a multiplicity of context-bounded
constellations negates the possibility for a meta-context, or for an all-encompassing
totality, without sacrificing comprehensiveness. In this way, constellational thinking is
more comprehensive than Hegel’s absolute insofar as it does not sacrifice non-identity,
and the particular, for the sake of identity and the universal moment of absolute
knowledge. It is more inclusive, too - albeit in a different way: constellations seek to
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comprehend objects in their particularity, without claiming to exhaust them, nor
dominating them by means of the primacy of constitutive subject, vity. Thinking in
constellations thus suggests the possibility of inclusiveness without domination. In other
words, rather than arguing for an abstract inversion of non-identity over identity, Adorno
seeks to immanently cntieize identity from the perspect.ve of its remainder, non-.dentity,
and thus undo the domination of one over the other, and speculatively render both as
tom halves that do not add up.” After all, contradictions are not ontologically posited, or
transcendentally deducted by Adorno; instead, “[Contradiction] indicates the untruth of
identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived.”
97
But constellations of concepts need not be restricted to the process of bringing
into light the aspects of the object that identitarian thinking dispenses with. The cognitive
power of constellational thinking correlates with the comprehensiveness the dialectical
tradition running from Hegel to Lukacs associates with the concept of totality. To better
illustrate this point it is worth considering the role totality plays in Adorno’s negative
dialectics.
In The Actuality of Philosophy” Adorno unequivocally asserted that critical,
philosophical, interpretation needed to do away with the concept of “totality”: “If
philosophy must learn to renounce the question of totality, then it implies that it must
learn to do without the symbolic function, in which for a long time, at least in idealism,
the particular appeared to represent the general. It must give up the great problems, the
size of which once hoped to guarantee the totality, whereas today between the wide
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meshes of big questions, interpretation slips away”’
8
Even so, by the time that Adorno
wrote Negative Dialectics he artieulated a more nuanced, dialectical concept,on of
totality. “Totality is to be opposed by convicting it of non-identity with itself - of the
non-identity it denies, according to its own concept.”” The opposition to totality needs to
come from an immanent critique of the concept of totality itself. In this vein Adorno,
once again, makes explicit the aporetic stance from which his reflections emerge:
Negative dialectics is thus tied to the supreme categories of identitarian philosophy as its
point of departure. Thus, too, it remains false according to identitarian logic; it remains
the thing against which it is conceived.”'
00
By means of this formulation Adorno remains
committed to the idea of redemption that manifested so strongly in Walter Benjamin’s
writings, namely, instead of positing neologisms, he seeks to immanently criticize
concepts and render their double-character, that is to say, their historical implication with
both domination and the possibility of redemption.'
0 '
At this point it is clear that Adorno’s critical theory has an ambivalent relation to
the nation of totality: it both values its comprehensiveness but, as I have argued, rejects
its totalitarian tendencies. It is in this vein that later on, in Negative Dialectics
,
he
articulated a concept of totality not as an abstract conceptual category, but as a social
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totality [gessellschaftliche Totalitdt] in winch both “substantial individual analysis and
dialectical theory” are expressed, which Adorno also sees as “the abstract legality of
totality itself: the legality of exchange [Touches]!
02
It is by means of the mediation of the
totality of the social process that Adorno suggests the intersection between subjective and
objective experience needs to be apprehended, comprehensively and concretely.
In sum, despite his protestations against both idealist and materialist conceptions
of totality, Adorno considers society as a social totality, one that capitalist social relations
impose in an abstract form. Once a system has pretensions of total dominance, one cannot
conceptualize it otherwise. Still, his approach to it is not one that seeks to
comprehensively exhaust this totality in all its determinations but constructs
constellations of concepts in order to shed light on objects: to cast a glance at society and
dialectically cognize the intersection between universal, particular, and singular. This
Adorno tries to achieve without suggesting that by so doing he redeems the domination
and inequality found in the system - a redeeming impulse that is present in Hegel’s
identitarian philosophy of history and that Adorno vehemently rejects. The possibility of
apprehending objects through constellations of concepts, which delicately glance at their
object of cognition, is in itself not enough to alter their reality, or to redeem it. Yet critical
theory’s contribution is perhaps confined to this domain: although the conditions to
“redeem the bill” that critical theory presents are not present yet, it still presents this
102
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utopian moment, and thus reminds traditional criticism of its share in “the blindness of its
object .”'
03
To further explore the eentrality of dialectical thinking for Adorno’s critical
theory it is important to consider the relationship between the emphasis on non-idem,ty in
Adorno’s formulations and the conception of critique and critical theory that emerges
from it. I would therefore like to articulate the importance of immanent transcendence as
it emerges in his reflections on cultural criticism.
* * *
It is important to note that Adorno’s emphasis on non-identity avoids hypostatizing non-
identity, that is, the postulate of non-identity comes from the refusal to avoid the
domination of concepts over objects, as well as their remainders, that which is left out by
identitarian conceptual thinking. It refuses to conceal or reify the domination and
antagonism in society. Accordingly, this theorization of non-identity is thoroughly
dialectical, it is also deeply political in its critique of domination, and deeply ethical, too,
especially in its commitment to lend suffering a voice. As Adorno wrote in Minima
Moralia, the utopian impulse of non-identity comes from a reconciled ideal, yet not a
forced one:
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is to
contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of
redemption. [...] Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estranged the
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will
appear one day in the messianic light. [...] Even its own impossibility it must at
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last comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed
on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly
104
matters.
Hence, as early as in Minima Moralia, Adorno introduces the standpoint of redemption
not to redeem past sufferings, or reconcile those in a higher unity or in a third moment.
Redemption stands here for the moment of transcendence, the utopian content of thought
that is relentlessly critical of political and epistemological domination, of the suffering
social inequalities produced. Reconciliation thus emerges as a critique of Hegel’s third
moment. Or as he puts it Negative Dialectics
,
"The idea of reconcilement forbids the
positive positing of reconcilement as a concept.”"’
5
For reconciliation to be concrete, the
utopian promise of emancipation, abstract reconciliation, needs to be negated. Also, in a
formulation with echoes of Max Weber’s celebrated phrase on aiming at the impossible
to achieve the possible, Adorno reclaims the moment of transcendence as a utopian
promise that informs the immanent critique, the latter working within the realm of the
concrete.
The relation of immanence and transcendence in Adorno’s critical theory is
acutely spelled out in Adorno’s rendering of dialectical theory as a practice of cultural
critique in the essay “Cultural Criticism and Society.” In this essay Adomo at once
criticizes understandings of culture that posit culture as an unmediated autonomous
sphere of life, and those that present it as a mere reflection of material production, while
formulating a unique notion of critical theory from the perspective of a reworked
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understanding of the relationship between immanence and transcendence in dialectical
thinking; a critical activity that even though it privileges the activity of immanent
critique, also does justice to the moment of transcendence in thinking.
Adorno s retneval of immanent criticism is deeply indebted to Hegel’s account of
the concept. But as already mentioned, it departs from Hegel’s account in significant
ways, especially in relation to the question of identity:
The less the dialectical method can today presuppose the Hegelian identity of
subject and object, the more it is obliged to be mindful of the duality of the
moments. It must relate the knowledge of society as a totality and of the mind’s
involvement in it to the claim inherent in the specific content of the object that it
be apprehended as such. Dialectics cannot, therefore, permit any insistence on
logical neatness to encroach on its right to go from one genus to another, to shed
light on an object in itself hermetic by casting a glance at society, to present
society with the bill which the object does not redeem.
Once again, the main difference between Adorno and Hegel, and not an insignificant one
according to this passage, is the way the former presents non-identity, and thus resists the
externally posited identitarian unity of the latter’s philosophical system. In addition to
spelling out differences, Adorno also issues a warning: given that unity, or reconciliation
of subject and object is not posited, critical theory needs to be more mindful of the
relational nature of the oppositions, the negative moment, and avoid freezing dialectical
moments as unmediated oppositions. Knowledge’s aporetic nature needs to be
comprehensively rendered, albeit never reconciled. Thus, the task of dialectical thinking
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is to attempt to apprehend the totality of the social process without claiming to capture it,
or to freezing it, in a set of oppositions; its task is to think it comprehensively in all its
determinations, even if the latter are impossible to apprehend in their totality. Besides,
given Adorno’s ultimate rejection of Lukacs’ concept of totality, he is forced to devise a
different approach to apprehend and comprehend the total social process, and to
dialectically render society and its antinomies.
According to Adorno, a critique of culture based solely on immanent criticism is
insufficient to discern the “role of ideology in social conflicts .”'
08
That is, given the role
of ideology in social relations, Adorno rejects a conception of social critique that solely
relies on immanent criticism. Such a conception can wind up being complicit with the
present. Or at least that is what Adorno finds in Hegel’s philosophy, whose “tendency to
resignation [with the status quo] is undeniable .”'
09
Thus in order to elaborate a non-
identitarian dialectical conception, Adorno refers to Marx’s contention that culture cannot
be fully understood only in terms of itself. Only through a nuanced dialectical rendering
of immanence and transcendence the possibility for critical theory resides:
Criticism retains the mobility in regard to culture by recognizing the latter’s
position within the whole. Without such freedom, without consciousness
transcending the immanence of culture, immanent criticism itself would be
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inconceivable: the spontaneous movement of the object can be followed only by
someone who is not entirely engulfed by it."
0
Only from a comprehensive, speculative perspective can the whole in which culture plays
a part can be thought, apprehended in order to re-present {Darstellung) it, even without
claiming fixity and exhaustiveness for it. In such a comprehensive view of the whole is
where the possibility for critique resides. For it is in consciousness, with its capacity to
transcend the limitations imposed by the status quo, where the possibility for critical
freedom can be found. Yet this capacity is not determined by a privileged subject
position. Rather, it comes as part of the critical activity of thinking, whose possibility is
nothing more than an outcome of contingency. Or as he later on puts it in Negative
Dialectics : “If a stroke of underserved luck kept the mental composition of some
individuals not quite adjusted to the prevailing norms - a stroke of luck they have often
enough to pay for in their relations with their environment - it is up to these individuals
to make the moral and, as it were, representative effort to say what most of those for
whom they say it cannot see or, to do justice to reality, will not allow themselves to
see.”
111
Still, immanent criticism carries with it a moment of transcendence. This moment
of transcendence often takes the shape of a spontaneous moment of thought, a moment
that escapes the necessity of the social and cultural laws - of the imperative, as I rather
put it - that partially determine and constitute the sphere of culture. Although culture
does not fully escape the laws of capital in an exchange society, it is not fully determined
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by it, either: culture and society are mutually mediated, and both are constitutive and
constituted of one another. It is worth mentioning that Adorno's critique of identity not
only springs from the Nietzschean motifs of his work; in an important way, identity
thinking correlates the exchange principle of capitalism, even if it cannot be reduced to it.
And as part of “the total social process” the sphere of culture is also mediated by the
imperatives of capital. Mediation, however, does not stand for “alternation.” In fact, to
conceive of mediation as the alternation of the different moments of identity and non-
identity, or of the particular aspect of a cultural formation with the universal moment of a
particular process, entails renouncing the indispensable moment of identity - only from
this moment can non-identity be understood as a contradiction, which is the core of
dialectical mediation. To conceive it otherwise, entails obliterating the dialectical
moment from Adorno s formulations. “The antithesis between universal and particular
too is necessary as well as deceptive. Neither one can exist without the other, the
particular only as determined and thus universal, the universal only as a determination of
a particular. Both of them are and are not. This is one of the strongest motives of a non-
.... 113
idealist dialectics.”
Yet cultural forms possess moments of spontaneity. It is one of the tasks of
thinking to critically transcend the immanence of culture, its object, in order to apprehend
these moments - albeit doing so immanently. This invocation of transcendental critique is
hardly a regression under the spell of the Kantian idea of transcendental critique as
expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason. Nor is this an instance of a quasi-
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transcendental form of thinking currently associated with Derridean deconstruction .'
14
Instead, Adorno immanently discerns the need for a moment of transcendence in
immanent cntique. And this insight reverts in the intersection between particular and
universal in Adorno’s critical theory: “Hence the task of criticism must be not so much to
search for the particular interest-group to which cultural phenomena are to be assigned,
but rather to decipher the general social tendencies which are expressed in these
phenomena and through which the most powerful interests realize themselves.”"
5
The
singular, which is the cultural in this case, is posited as a mediated object in which both
elements of the general social laws of production and regulation in a capitalist-liberal
regime, along with the particular interests these serve, can be apprehended. But culture is
also formulated as a sphere construed by particularities that are not reducible to universal
or general socio-economic imperatives.
By thus framing the task of critique Adorno ends up with a dialectical conception
of critical theory that oscillates between immanence and transcendence. Or as he
articulates it: “The alternatives—either calling culture as a whole into question from the
outside under the general ideology, or confronting it with the norms which it itself has
crystallized—cannot be accepted by critical theory. To insist on the choice between
immanence and transcendence is to revert to the traditional logic criticized by Hegel’s
polemic against Kant. As Hegel argued, every method which sets limits and restricts
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itself to the limits of its objects thereby goes beyond them .”'
16
At this point Adorno’s
Hegelian understanding of conceptuality resurfaces. In Hegel there is a strong critique of
Kant’s claim that the sphere of the noumena constitutes a “boundary concept.” Insofar as
it constitutes a boundary concept it already sidesteps into the realm it presumably does
not have access to. And given Adorno’s insistence on the negative moment in the
dialectic, and his care for non-identity, his thought is particularly sensitive to this,
especially since identifying is a tendency intrinsic to the activity of thinking: “To think is
to identify. Nevertheless thought needs to break through the drive to conceptuality by
means of its own concept, hence its immanent moment. And in such breaking its
transcendental moment takes place - although this transcendental is not a pure one.
Indeed, Adorno relates the perspective of purely transcendent critique to the view of the
whole totality of the social process as reified. Hence, its weakness and the need to
combine this perspective with immanent critique:
The position of transcending culture is in a certain sense presupposed by
dialectics as the consciousness which does not succumb in advance to the
fetishization of the intellectual sphere. Dialectics means intransigence towards all
reification. The transcendent method, which aims at totality, seems more radical
than the immanent method, which presupposes the questionable whole. The
transcendent critic assumes an as it were Archimedean position above culture and
116
Adorno, Prisms, 3 1
.
117
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 23.
128
the blindness of society, from which consciousness can bring totality no matter
how massive, into flux ."
8
Henceforth the possibility of an Archimedean point, an outside perspective, is an abstract
fiction. The seemingly relative advantage of transcendental criticism turns out not to be
one. If a transcendental perspective allows for a discernment of the whole in its reified
stage, its abstract nature could easily lead to its reification, and thus leave everything as it
is. It is, then, no surprise that Adorno considers the immanent critique to be “the more
essentially dialectical.” In this vein Adorno gives primacy to immanent critique in his
reworking of the dialectical tradition from the perspective of non-identity. Or as he
formulates this relation elsewhere, “the concept of the transcendental is a reminder that
thinking, by virtue if its own immanent elements of universality, transcends its own
120
inalienable individuation.” And it is the non-identity between the mutually mediated
dominant ideology and the material conditions from which it emerges, and also
constitutes, where the space for critique resides. Accordingly, critical theory is
intrinsically tied up with the dialectic of non-identity that presents the ideological critique
as an immanent activity: “it is not ideology in itself which is untrue but rather its
pretension to correspond to reality. Immanent criticism of intellectual and artistic
phenomena seeks to grasp through the analysis of their form and meaning, the
.... 121
contradictions between their objective idea and that pretension.” But, as is the case
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With a reified view of transcendent critique, immanent critique cannot be taken as the sole
mode of social and cultural criticism: “On its own [immanent critique] is unable to
resolve the contradictions under which it labours. Even the most radical reflection of the
mind on its own failure is limited by the fact that it remains only a reflection, without
altering the existence to which its failure bears witness. Hence immanent criticism cannot
1 22
take comfort on its own idea.”
In rendering the relationship between immanence and transcendence, Adomo not
only emerges as a true dialectician, in addition, the speculative moment of his thinking is
fleshed out. Even though it is not sufficient on its own, it is immanent critique that is
capable of embodying the contradictions of society “in its innermost structure.” While
Adomo presents the need for immanent critique, and its primacy, by infusing a
transcendental element into it, he still avoids abstractly positing it, and thus mitigates its
claims to sovereignty. This rendering of the centrality of both immanence and
transcendence in critical thinking has been formulated as Adorno’s “impossible practice
123
of cultural criticism.” But, as the previous discussion suggests, it is a bottomless
conception of critical thinking, a surely difficult one, but not impossible: rather, it is like
Adorno’s account of conceptuality, an aporetic yet necessary practice that is needed to
cast the present in a critical light. More importantly, its aporetic stance is not ontological,
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>t is social: “I, pursues the logic of its aponas, the insolubility of the task itself. In such
antinomies criticism perceives those of society.”'
24
Adorno seeks to think these aporias comprehensively and defends a mode of
immanent criticism through which the aporias of the current ideology, or of society’s
self-image, can be rendered in their social dimension; thus his cultural criticism is infused
by a strong sociological and political content. It is Adorno’s conviction that through an
aporetic rendering, society’s antinomies can be discerned more intelligibly. And, perhaps
more significantly, spaces for action and critique are opened up once the aporetic logic of
critical theory renders society’s antinomies comprehensively, in their structural and
ideological aspects; a rendering infused by a strong sociological perspective and by a
political commitment to change the status quo, to alter “the existence to which its failure
bears witness.”
* * *
In light of the preceding discussions, Adorno stands out as offering the most conceptually
sophisticated political reading of theoretical philosophy coming from the western Marxist
tradition. As Rose suggests, Adorno does not engage Hegel’s political writings and rather
focuses on the latter s theoretical philosophy. But such focus was politically infused as
part of a larger agenda of ideological critique that correlates, and surpasses, Marx’s
unfinished The German Ideology and The Poverty ofPhilosophy in its conceptual power,
even if his own work is deeply indebted to that of Marx. Thus, rather than dwelling on
Adorno’s “failure” to engage with Hegel’s political writings, or with political theory in
general, as a sign of a political deficit in his version of critical theory, I seek to draw from
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his critical theory and attest to its political theory by engaging theoretical quest,ons
politically, from the critical perspective that emerges from his writings. His lack of
interest on political questions or concepts is a matter of his theoretical temperament
rather than intrinsic to the theory itself. And in the case of Adorno, his contribution
cannot be fully understood without considering his unique engagement with the
Hegehan-Marxism springing from the tradition of western Marxism, as well as the
centrality of Auschwitz for his reflections.
Rose is thus partly right: Hegel’s social thought has no political import if the
absolute cannot be thought. But the truth in such remark resides in the level of
speculative comprehensives that Hegel’s absolute claims, and not in the absolute as
subject. One cannot not think comprehensively.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT WAR: CATASTROPHE, VIOLENCE, AND CIVILIZATION
One speaks of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But
it is not a threat - Auschwitz was this relapse, and
barbarism continues as long as the fundamental
conditions that favored that relapse continue largely
unchanged.
Theodor W. Adorno, “Education After Auschwitz”
The brutality ot imperialism, slavery, war, civil war, and conquest of at least the last five
hundred years - from 1492 on - notwithstanding, it is with the advent of the twentieth
century that the image of human-made catastrophes and excesses finally captures the
Occidental imagination. Aside from episodic ruminations such as Augustine’s on the sack
of Rome, the “lettered” European reaction to the Lisbon earthquake, or the sense of
uneasiness brought about by “the Thirty Years War” of the seventeenth century, it was
the experience of the “Great War,” and the calamities that followed, that finally brought
to European consciousness the perils of senseless human suffering. 1 The Great War was
an experience so traumatic that it generated, alongside modernist literature, what might
be called literatures of catastrophe composed of works that, by means of representations
of the atrocities of the war, challenged the European self-satisfaction embodied in the
idea of steady progress that flourished in the nineteenth century. 2
1
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Paul Fussell, in his classic work on the impact of the war on English literature.
The Great War and Modern Memory
,
summarizes this theme when he states that the
great war was the last one “conceived as taking place within a seamless, purposeful
‘history’ involving a coherent stream of time running from past through present to
future.”3 Or as literary historian Samuel Hynes puts it, “This sense of radical
discontinuity of present from past is an essential element in what eventually took form as
the Myth of the War.” The Great War thus changed, at the very least, the perception of
what was possible
.
4
Indeed, the sense of discontinuity was often translated into an image
of loss, of a void or gap in history. Thus the notion of a break in history sprung from the
“anti-monumental” literature that responded to the calamities of the Great War and the
experience of loss these brought to European consciousness, rather than in relation to the
violence of imperialism that preceded it, which very rarely led to a questioning of
Occidental understandings of civilization
.
5
The anti-monumental works, in some cases a part of modernist literature, finally
brought the sense of rupture and void that violence creates to European literary
consciousness. But by focusing on the historical break that the sense of loss and
discontinuity depicted, even the anti-monuments seeking to challenge the
monumentalization of the war ended up inscribing the narrative of progress they sought
3
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to debunk. Stated differently, by making the Great War a turning point, these literary
representations effectively excluded the imperial violence that often accompanied the
previous era of progress, or at least displaced it from European historical narratives and
political consciousness. Catastrophe became a trope only when war ravaged Europe
itself, and the senselessness of violence was realized because it involved “civil war”
between Europeans rather than fighting “brutes.” Thus the critics of progress reinstated
the same silencing narrative of progress: it only seemed to have stopped in the twentieth
century
.
6
Although more often than not literary representations of catastrophe are the
terrain of literary historians and critics, this development in the field of literature had a
correlate in early twentieth-century political and philosophical thought. After all, the
roots of political theory as a critical activity have been traditionally intertwined with a
sense of crisis . 7 And yet, not enough attention has been paid to the way the image of
catastrophe not only informs twentieth-century political thought, but how it also reflects
on the historical assessment of a tradition that is deeply Occidental. Indeed, one can find
important parallels between the reaction to catastrophe in literary works and the works of
political theory.
6 On silencing as an Occidental historiographical practice, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
7
See Sheldon S. Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Machiavelli and the Nature ofPolitical Thought,
ed. Martin Fleisher (Atheneum, 1972) and Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory (William
Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1970). See also the preceding chapter of this study. Recent political
theory, especially in its liberal variant, has paid little attention to these experiences in the second half of the
twentieth century. Indeed, in the last 30 years there has been a relative silence in relation to violence and
terror, and only after a September 1
1
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Anglo-American theorists have started to rethink these connections.
Susan Buck-Morss ’ work is an important exception coming not incidentally from the tradition of critical
theory. See Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000); and
Thinking Past Terror (London and New York: Verso, 2003).
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For the generations living through the Great War and its aftermath-comprising
towering figures such as Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976),
and Max Weber (1864-1920) - to the one reaching intellectual maturity on the eve of
World War I - which includes Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Hannah Arendt (1906-
1975), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Ernst Bloch, Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Karl
Jaspers, and Simone Weil (1909-1943) - the experience of the Great War, the Bolshevik
threat, and the second Thirty Years War” that subsequently consumed Europe, created
an image and memory of war and catastrophe that significantly shaped their theoretical
and political visions. As Enzo Traverso has correctly indicated, in the time span of a
decade from Weil’s reflections on the Iliad, composed in 1940, to Arendt’s Origins of
Totalitarianism in 1951, vigorous reflections on force, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, and
genocide were largely framed by the notions of barbarism and violence, history as
catastrophe, and the category of totalitarianism. Among these works one finds
Benjamin s “Theses on the Concept of History” (1940), Franz Neuman’s Behemoth
(1942), Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) Horkheimer’s
Eclipse ofReason (1946), Adorno’s Minima Moralia (1944-47), Gunther Anders’ essays,
later published as Die Antiquiertheit des Menchen (1956), Karl Jaspers’ The Question of
German Guilt (1946), Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man (1947), and Dwight Macdonald’s
“The Responsibility of Peoples” (1945). 8 All of these reflections were, with different
8
See Enzo Traverso, La Historia Desgarrada: Ensayo sobre Auschwitz y los Intelectuales, trans. David
Chiner (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 2001), 21-22. It is worth noting that Weil’s essay was published in
English for the first time in MacDonald’s Politics.
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degrees of emphasis, historically minded meditations on the catastrophes of the first half
of the twentieth century
.
9
In the first half of the twentieth century, violence and barbarism occasionally
provided the background of a theorist’s reaction to the catastrophe of the Great War, the
rise of Fascism and Stalinism, and World War II in Europe. (The cold-war liberal
narrative on these experiences, for instance, marred Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism.) But in the
second half of the twentieth century only Hannah Arendt, who experienced World War II
in the vulnerable predicament of statelessness, continued to pursue systematic reflections
on violence as such. And in her case it was done in reference to subsequent events in the
American context; namely, the Black liberation movement and the increasingly spreading
anti-war sentiment during the “sixties,” albeit always doing so from the perspective of a
“century of wars and revolutions,” thus constantly historicizing these from the
perspective of what John Keane has called “the long century of violence .” 10
However, for all the turmoil it caused in the United States, the Vietnam War did
not evoke a sense of catastrophe comparable to the Great War in Europe, nor did it instill
a sense of urgency to theorize violence in its multifarious forms, even if it certainly
9
It is, then, not until the second half of the twentieth century that there has been an astonishing paucity in
reflections of political violence and its ethico-political implications, especially amongst the generations that
gained theoretical and political consciousness from the 1960s onwards. In fact, despite being part of the
mainstay of political theory, the problem of violence is hardly present in any major post-world war II
political theorists, especially within the Anglo-American tradition, where John Rawls’ work was the
primary reference point up until the mid-90’s. More recently, his reflections on justice and liberalism have
had to share center stage with Habermas’, while the work of some disciples of Leo Strauss and Michel
Foucault zealously playing a lesser role.
10
See Amo J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 82; Hannah Arendt, “On Violence,” in Crises of the Republic (New
York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1969). See also John Keane, Reflections on Violence (London: Verso, 1996),
especially his discussion of the twentieth century as “the long century of violence,” in pp. 3-31.
137
evoked a new sense of intellectual responsibility. 11 On the contrary, these experiences
often led to a laudable, even if often idyllic stance of anti-violence, which easily fit into
the subsequent public idealization of Martin Luther King, Jr. and demonization of
Malcolm X, among others. The mass murder of Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge, of the
Kurds in northern Iraq by Saddam Hussein (only recently deployed as part of the
retrospective legitimation of the US war against Iraq), South Africa’s apartheid, or the
brutality of Israeli occupation in Palestine and its resistance, have gone largely
untheorized. As it turned out, it is with the US’s perceived failure to act preemptively in
the genocide of the Tutsi of Rwanda, and of the Croats, Muslims, and Albanian Kosovars
in the former Yugoslavia, along with the attacks of 1 1 September 2001, that violence has
recaptured the attention of the West. It is as if in the intermediary sixty years, as violence
and barbarity was displaced from the mainlands of Europe and the US, to theorize about
its changing nature was not a worthy concern. Then, as in J. M. Coetzee’s novel Waiting
for the Barbarians, the barbaric hordes were mostly kept at bay - while their shadows,
both real and imaginary, remained menacing even when somewhat contained. But current
reflections have hardly explored the multifarious and complex nature of violence. Rather,
11
See, for example, Noam Chomsky’s well-known essay “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” New York
Review ofBooks
,
23 February 1967.
12
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imperial context, in his 1976 lectures “Society Must Be Defended”; and Balibar has not only offered
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and not without irony, the new focus has ultimately led, tacitly and sometimes even
explicitly, to the legitimation of military interventions of an imperial nation-state to
contain the violence that is largely the offspring of the nation-state
.
13
In contrast, the age of catastrophe, as historians Eric Hobsbawm and Anson
Rabinbach call the forty years from the outbreak of the Great War to the aftermath of
World War II, led to reflections on those catastrophes that often yielded an anti-
redemptive attitude in relation to violence, modernity, and progress
.
14
Arendt is a good
example of this. By means of her reflections on the political aspects of these years was
able to incisively historicize the genocide of the Third Reich by reference to European
nineteenth-century imperialism in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Yet she also clung to
an anti-redemptive view of violence and revolution that more than occasionally led her to
problematic distinctions such as the one between power and violence, one that ultimately
rests on the simplification of the former. These are especially discemable in On
Revolution and in her critique of what she sees as Fanon-inspired rehearsals on behalf of
the redemptive moment of violence in the former colonial world. In other words, even if
in Arendt one finds a figure that comprehensively understood the link between genocide
and European imperialism, in her one also finds a disdain for attempts to redress the
violence of the social (where the realm of production is located) politically, or to see the
democratic promise and import of some of the Fanon-inspired forms of violence she so
vehemently despised, let alone the violent nature of capitalism as a system of power.
13
Archetypical examples of the two faces of this trend are Samantha Powers’ highly acclaimed book ‘A
Problem from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002) and Philip
Bobbitt’s The Shield ofAchilles: War, Peace, and the Course ofHistory (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003).
For an insightful interpretation of the latter, see Gopal Balakrishnan, “Algorithms of War,” New Left
Review 23 (September/October 2003): 5-33.
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Like Arendt’s, many of the aforementioned reactions were paved by political and
ethical ambiguities in relation to violence and war, which had an effect on how modernity
and modernization came to be seen retrospectively. It is thus worthwhile to take a closer
look at some of the earlier formulations of the questions of violence, focusing on the
reflections found in three main thinkers of the age of catastrophe: Sigmund Freud, Max
Weber, and Simone Weil. A critical excursus through these thinkers paves the way for a
reappraisal of late-modern violence in its intersection with political responsibility.
* * *
In a short essay written in 1915, on the occasion of a commemorative volume titled
Goethe ’s Country, Sigmund Freud narrates a summer walk in the countryside with two
unidentified companions: a friend that he describes as “taciturn” and a young poet. The
poet, swift to contemplate the beauty of “the scene” was, however, unable to enjoy it. In
Freud s view, the transience of the natural beauty, in a climate of seasonal changes,
deeply disturbed the poet: “All that he would otherwise admire seemed to him to be shorn
of its worth by the transience which was its doom.” 15 Freud takes the poet’s attitude as a
point of departure in order to offer a succinct reflection on what he sees as the mind’s
workings in relation to transience; a reflection in which he intimates the argument of the
widely discussed essay “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay composed in 1914 but not
published until 1917.
However, as important as these intimations are, the political significance of the
piece may lie somewhere else. In it, Freud also presents some important reflections on the
violence unleashed by the Great War, its impact on Europe’s understanding of
15 Sigmund Freud, “On Transience,” in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works ofSigmund
Freud, Volume 14, trans. James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001).
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civilization, and the shattered image of progress the experience of the war instilled. For
the “conversation with the poet took place in the summer before the war,” a fact that led
Freud to further reflect on the psychic effect of a war that “robbed the world of its
beauties.” 16 For Freud,
[The war] not only destroyed the beauty of the countrysides through which it
passed and the works of art which it met with on its path but also shattered our
pride in the achievements of our civilization, our hopes of a final triumph over the
differences between nations and races. It tarnished the lofty nakedness and let
loose the evil spirits within us which we thought had been tamed for ever by
centuries of continuous education by the noblest minds. [...] It robbed us of very
much that we had loved, and showed us how ephemeral were many things that we
regarded as changeless. 17
Indeed, the experience of brutality and catastrophe that the Great War brought home to
Europe was for Freud an experience of loss, the loss of the illusion of progress and of the
innocence often accompanying the ideal of civilization. 18 Even if initially naively
optimistic about the war, as well as supportive of it - a sudden happenance for a thinker
so zealously against “illusions,” this to the extent that Peter Gay signals the episode as
Freud “suffering an unexpected bout of patriotism” - by 1915, Freud started to see the
16
Freud, “Transience,” 307.
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Freud, “Transience,” 307.
18
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war as a destructive experience. 19 The war, however, not only meant the enlisting of
Freud’s sons and eventual mobilization to the front, but as Gay notes, it also represented
an economic and intellectual setback for psychoanalysis. And it is a combination of these
two what, according to Gay, relentlessly “tested the limits of Freud’s patriotism.” 20
Freud, however, also saw an opportunity in the time of war: it ironically provided
an unexpected setting that might allow him to advance the credentials of psychoanalysis.
For as he spells it out in a letter of 28 December 1914, the war has ultimately confirmed
two tenets of psychoanalysis: the persistence of “primitive, savage, and evil impulses of
mankind,” even if in a repressed state, and the fragility and feebleness of the intellect. 21
In this same letter Freud further states: “If you will now observe what is happening in this
war—the cruelties and injustices for which the most civilized nations are responsible, the
different ways in which they judge their own lies and wrong-doings and those of their
enemies, and the lack of insight which prevails-you will have to admit that psycho-
analysis has been right in both its theses.”22 In Freud’s view, the war, to borrow Gay’s
formulation, “has deprived everyone of the illusion that humanity is originally good.”23
And rather than discrediting psychoanalysis it provided the best example to display its
explanatory power. Or so Freud hoped.
19
See Peter Gay, Freud: A Life For Our Time (New York: Norton, 1998), 346.
20
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22
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still, the war was experienced by many Europeans with a sense of loss; a sense of
loss that according to Freud, borrowing the language from “Mourning and Melancholia,”
needed to be worked through rather than acted out, especially by those who, like the poet
who is incapable of loving things for their transience and have renounced the belief in the
values of civilization in the face of the atrocities of the war, are in a state of mourning.
They mourn loss. And yet, although a painful process, in the individual mourning always
spontaneously comes to an end - an end that at an individual level indicates that the
capacity for love is once again free. “It is to be hoped,” Freud writes, “that the same will
be true of the losses caused by this war.”
Rather than rejecting civilization as just another illusion we once clung to, Freud
hopes that the work of mourning would eventually show that the true illusion, the
experience of loss during the war, should dissipate: “When once the mourning is over, it
will be found that our high opinion of the riches of civilization has lost nothing from our
discovery of its fragility.”"4 Instead, what the war has showed is how savage our instincts
could be once the repression civilization imposes on them ceases, themes that he further
developed in his letters and writings of 1915, and, later on, in The Future of an Illusion
(1927) and in Civilization and its Discontents (1929). In the latter Freud would write
about how hard it was to prove the existence of the “death instinct” in comparison with
the relative ease in proving that of Eros. 25 But the final proof came within the contest of
24
Freud, “Transience,” 307.
25
See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York and London: W.
W. Norton, 1989), 77-78.
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the war: “A more fruitful idea was that a portion of the instinct is diverted towards the
external world and comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness.”26
To fully grasp the significance of Freud’s reaction to the war and his insistence in
salvaging the idea of civilization it is important to see the role played in his narrative by
the ideal of the savage, which is one of the root metaphors of the West, at least since the
Renaissance; that is, how he filled “the savage slot” that has been constitutive of the
European imagination
.
27
For instance, in “The Disillusionment of War,” Freud
confidently asserted that “[w]e cannot but feel that no event has ever destroyed so much
that is precious in the common possessions of humanity, confused so many of the clearest
intelligences, or so thoroughly debased what is highest.”28 Also, the war has shattered the
confidence of scientific discourse. Yet it is the role of psychoanalysis, which for Freud is
a science, to alleviate the feelings of loss of the non-combatant by offering ways to cope
with the feelings of bewilderment the war imposes, in order to make the experience more
bearable. But what is the coping mechanism that Freud offers? How is the experience of
loss recast in order to “make it easier” for the non-combatant to find solace?
In this quest for solace, Freud embarked on a sanitizing of the idea of civilization,
even if one despoiled of the illusion of the eradication of violence: “cleanliness” and
“order” are important signs of its presence even if “intellectual, scientific, and artistic
26
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achievements” are taken as civilization’s most characteristics features
.
29
For “[w]e were
prepared to find that wars between the primitive and the civilized peoples, between the
races that divided by the colour of their skin-wars, even, against and among nationalities
of Europe whose civilization is little developed or has been lost-would occupy mankind
for some time to come.” In Freud’s perspective, what Europeans were not prepared for
was to witness this savagery on their own turf, consuming their own cherished
civilization. Freud then comes close to rehearsing an earlier version of the “white man’s
burden idea when he asserts that “we,” namely Europeans, expected that the leadership
role that has fallen on the “white race” would have brought about “creative powers”
allowing for the discovery of a civilized and peaceful way “of settling conflicts of
interests.” The war has touched a sensitive psychic cord of belief in the inherent goodness
of mankind and civilization insofar as it radically challenged “the attitude which we have
hitherto adopted towards death .”30 And here Freud recurs to the myth of “primeval man”
in order to make sense of our relation to death — so Freud suggests that our unconscious,
whose access needs to be mediated by “the psychoanalytic method of investigation, the
only one which reaches such depths,” is “almost exactly the same as that of primeval
man.” The war thus removes a “valueless illusion”: “It strips us of the later accretions,
and lays bare the primal man in each of us .” 32 In a similar vein, Freud also invokes
Homer’s Odyssey as archetypical of the projection of life unto death as well as offers a
striking rehearsal of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s image of the savage: in the savage “lies
29
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concealed a vein of ethical sensitiveness which has been lost by us civilized men.”33 But
unlike Rousseau, this admission does not lead to a trenchant critique of civilized society;
it rather leads to a disenchanted view of civilization that ascribes its negative aspects to
remnants of a primeval past while hypostatizing aggressiveness as part of human nature,
and presenting an account of civilization as a rather fragile achievement, one constantly
threatened, that “has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive
instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by physical reaction-
formations .”34
The war thus represented for Freud the loss not of civilization as such but of an
illusion about it, albeit a crucial one. Freud accordingly proceeded to formulate a
prophylactic view of civilization. This view seeks the aggressive impulses and death-
drives repressed only partially by civilization and casts these as archaic, as remnants of
an uncivilized past rather than as intrinsic to the civilizing process itself. For,
“Observation showed, to be sure, that embedded in these civilized states there were
remnants of certain other peoples, which were universally unpopular and had therefore
only reluctantly, and even so not fully, admitted to participation in the common work of
civilization, for which they had shown themselves suitable enough .”35 But it would be a
mistake to take the war as a shattering experience for the ideal of civilization per se, or
for the progress of science in unveiling reality and discrediting illusions. Rather, the
experience of the war is one that allows the shattering of an illusion: instead of the
33
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shattering of the ideal of civilization, what the war shows is its fragility. Furthermore,
what the confrontation with death and finitude destroyed was the idea of invincibility and
immortality associated with the belief in progress, meanwhile rendering civilization,
which in its enlightened version represented the struggle against prejudice, myth, and
illusion, itself into an illusion. Accordingly, Freud could confidently assert, “[l]ife has
indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content.”36 The Great War
brought about “disillusionment” but of a salutary kind. Freud sharply criticizes those who
voiced their disappointment with civilization because of the war. Even if Europeans’
sense of being the holders of a superior civilization was somewhat shattered by their
display of a brutality previously unseen in the continent, the sense of disappointment was
misguided. For Freud, the experience of the Great War “consists in the destruction of an
illusion.”
By the time Freud wrote The Future of an Illusion he was already asserting that
the major task of civilization, its actual raison d’etre, is to defend us against nature.”37
In this text, Freud then engaged in an anthropocentric analysis of religion as he states that
religion arises from the same need that civilization seeks to address, “the need of
defending oneself against the crushingly superior force of nature .”38 Both lay claims to
human needs. Religion, however, is an illusion that needs to be dispelled, a rejection that
36
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largely arises out of the emergence of scientific knowledge. And yet towards the end of
the book, Freud is at pains to demonstrate that scientific knowledge does not merely
dispel one illusion to replace it with another. As Freud’s fictive interlocutor states: “If
you want to expel religion from our European civilization, you can only do it by means of
another system of doctrines; and such a system would from the outset take over all the
psychological characteristics of religion-the same sanctity, rigidity and intolerance, the
same prohibition of though-for its own defense .”39 Admitting the force of the objection,
Freud makes an important concession: “I know how difficult is to avoid illusions;
perhaps the hopes I have confessed to are of an illusory nature, too.” Still, even if science
is also an illusion, it carries the means for its own correction. In contrast with religious
illusions, the illusion of scientific knowledge does not demand unconditional belief. It is
indeed open to the possibility that some of its tenets can be illusions and it can bear such
truth. But contrary to religious faith - and this is a crucial aspect of Freud’s argument -
science offers “evidence” of its successes and claims. He thus confidently concludes:
“our science is no illusion.”40
Yet Freud may have underestimated the force of the objection here. Scientific
discourse has monotheistic ambitions as well. And even if the major impact of those
ambitions were not formulated until after World War II, when the technocratic discourse
of instrumental reason and bureaucratic organization had reached a point beyond Freud’s
bleakest expectations, its broad outlines were clear at least since the seventeenth
39
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century. Also, like the discourse of civilization, it has its own intnnsic dynamics of
violence in relation to both humans and nature, as it has been episodically complied in
racism and bigotry, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. But the
late twentieth-century sensibility is obviously absent from Freud’s milieu. Thus, in
Civilization and its Discontents he is able to write: “We recognize
... that countries have
attained a high level of civilization if we find that in them everything which can assist in
the exploitation of the earth by man and in his protection against the forces of nature-
everything, in short, which is of use to him-is attended to and effectively carried out .”42
Even so, Freud, for all his zealous defense of civilization, unwittingly laid bare
more than its repressed “primal” nature. In his reflections one also finds an important
displacement of the question of responsibility from the perspective of accountability, in
addition to adding ambiguity to this concept. In other words, while in Freud’s reflections
violence is ontologized as part of human nature, his depiction of the battle between the
values of civilization and primal violence does away with Kantian notions of rational
accountability and of responsibility as the categorical obedience to the moral law. In light
of these reflections on war, violence, and civilization, to think of responsibility as only
accountability is misguided at best. To be sure, the question of responsibility does not
figure in these reflections. Yet some extrapolations can be made. Alongside the loss of
the illusions Freud dispels, one can add the loss of innocence in relation to violence, a
41
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loss that has implications for a conception of political responsibility. But it is in Weber's
reflections where the contours of these implications can be more vividly found.
Freud's reflections on violence are thus a testament of the relentless effort to not
merely salvage the discourse of civilization in the face of catastrophe, but to proclaim its
innocence. It will take another big catastrophe, and another generation, to reckon with
this legacy. And even then these questions are far from settled.
* * *
Max Weber’s sociological definition of the state as the ultimate holder of the legitimate
use of violence has significantly shaped discussions of state power and political violence
in twentieth-century sociological thought. 43 In his celebrated essay “Politics as a
Vocation” - originally a speech given at Munich University in 1918 in the anxious
context of the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the Bolshevik triumph, and the
German revolution from the top of late 1918 - the complex intersection between political
responsibility, violence, and the nation-state, is laid bare. As the tone of the essay makes
clear, for an aggressive-militant liberal like Weber there was no need to conceal the
violent foundations of the state while somewhat prudentially defending a liberal
democratic constitutional framework, such as the one the short-lived Weimar Republic
would offer, as a preferable form of governance.44 On the contrary, “Politics as a
43
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Vocation,” presents a politically infused lecture on the nature of political leadership and
the meaning of its calling. For as early as 1895, in his Frieburg inaugural lecture, Weber
stated “a colossal programme of political education” as not only the main goal of the
German Nation but also as “the ultimate goal ... of our science.”45 And this goal he
arguably never abandoned: albeit in a variety of forms, it found expression in his
sociological and methodological writings. The scope of Weber’s lecture is sweeping, as
he moves effortlessly through the prospects and travails of the political in the age of mass
politics, an age in which for him the “calling” of politics can only be the prerogative of
the political leader - the only figure who can truly be free in the age of mass politics and
instrumental rationality. And, in doing so, he offered probing reflections on the
legitimacy of the use of violence, leadership, the increasing bureaucratization in the age
of mass politics, and political responsibility. Particularly important is how out of Weber’s
discussion of power, violence, and authority within the modem political association par
excellence, the modem state, emerged his well-known account of three ideal-types of
authority: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic.
All of these concerns have received significant scholarly attention by sociologists,
political scientists, and more recently by political theorists - the last two groups have
paid particular attention to Weber’s complex liberalism. Even so, the reflection on
political responsibility that accompanies these concerns has commanded significantly less
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and, more recently, Harvey Goldman, Politics, Death, and
the Devil: Self and Power in Max Weber and Thomas Mann (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1992); Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001),
chap.4; and Fernando Mires, Teoria de la Profeson Politico: Corruptos, “Milicos, "y Demagogos (Caracas:
Universidad Central de Venezuela, 2002).
45 Max Weber, “Economic Policy and National Interest in Imperial Germany,” in Max Weber: Selections in
Translation, ed. W. G. Ruciman trans. E. Mathew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 267.
151
attention, even when his account of responsibility stems not only from his observations
on the rationalization process that in his view accompanied the consolidation of the
modem nation-state, but also out of his theorization of political violence. It is in these
discussions where important elements of the relationship between violence and
responsibility are found, reflections that provide the basis for a politically infused
reconsideration of this intersection in light of the violence and barbarism that
characterized the early years of the twentieth century. Weber, as has been correctly
pointed out by a perceptive critic, never developed a political theory per se, but his
reflections on the link between violence and responsibility constitute one of the major
contributions coming out of the political theorization of catastrophe. 46 Still, Weber’s
distinction between the ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and the ethic of
responsibility ( Verantwortungs
)
is largely presented as an interesting coda that further
attests to Weber s relentless critique of the idealist bent of socialism and the political
naivete of the bourgeoisie, or it is interpreted in relation to the tensions between
intellectual integrity” and “moral integrity” in his liberalism, or as Weber’s attempt to
show the “painful” aspect of political leadership, a warning for those suited for it .47 There
is, of course, a basis for these readings in Weber’s corpus. Rather than challenging these
interpretations, in what follows I would like to focus on the question of political
46
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responsibility and present it as central for Weber's understanding of violence and state
power in the age of mass politics and bureaucracy, thus looking at the question of
violence and power from the perspective of political responsibility, instead of the other
way around. In this vein, in what follows, 1 ponder Weber’s theorization of the modem
state and the account of responsibility and violence that henceforth emerges.
Ultimately, for Weber, “one can define the modem state sociologically only in
terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the
use of physical force.”48 For ‘“nearly all community formations,’ including those of
political associations, ‘have their origin in violence,’” Weber famously suggested. 49 By
placing the use of physical force as one of the “specific means peculiar” to the modem
state Weber at once acknowledged the centrality of violence in the modem state without
reducing its functions to the mitigation or negotiation of perpetual violence and
struggle. For Weber the central question that emerges is what are the representations of
violence that allow for its legitimacy. In Weber’s more precise formulation of the
intersection of power, violence, and legitimacy, “... we have to say that a state is a
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force [Gewaltsamkeit] within a given territory.” Immediately following this
48
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formulation he adds: “Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state .”51
That is, the legitimacy of the use of violence, the legitimate configuration of right and
might
’
1S anchored on a delimited space, which in modernity is the nation-state. Here the
centrality of the triad Nation-State-Territory for the representation of violence is exposed;
the state polices the use of violence and force within the given territory, which is where
its sovereignty resides. In other words, the state controls the use of violence as well as its
representation within a given territory, even if the exercise of violence oftentimes takes
place outside the bounds of the nation-state that generates the power behind it. Thus, as
in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan
,
the monopoly of the state is twofold: over the use of
violence and over its representations. And the latter is what ultimately adds the
legitimacy to the former.
Yet, even if the state’s monopoly of violence translates into the authorization of
the use of violence and its legitimation, it does not necessarily give access to its direct
usage, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions
or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it.” Here Weber tacitly
acknowledges that the same actor, or institution, does not always perpetrate state
violence; institutions and groups can exercise it insofar as these have the legitimacy of
the state. Accordingly, the state is “the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” Even
though it provides legitimacy to the use of violence in a given territory, its actual use is
not the sole prerogative of the sovereign or head of state. In modernity, state-sanctioned
violence is exercised by means of the military, the police, and more indirectly, by the
market.
51
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In this way, Weber sought to answer for modem times the ancient question that
occupied the likes of Plato and Aristotle: what is the end of a political association? For as
is well-known, according to Aristotle, the ancient Greek polis was the place where man,
the zoon politikon, could realize its nature as a political being; consequently, the means of
the polls (i.e. institutional mechanisms, slavery included) were conducive to the
realization of that end. But what are the equivalents in modem times? By placing
violence at the center of his theorization of the modem state, Weber follows Machiavelli
and Hobbes in shifting the terms of the discussion, albeit with one main difference:
Weber s times were also the times of capitalism, bureaucracy, and the nation-state. Now,
for Weber the question is not so much what are the necessary means to attain an end,
such as glory, in the case of Machiavelli, or order and stability, as is the case in Hobbes.
Rather, the question is how to cope with the forces at work in modernity (i.e., capitalism,
bureaucracy, and rationalization) each of which have forms of violence at its center. Even
more important from our present socio-political standpoint is the problem of somehow
controlling these, as well as managing them pmdently, even if for Weber these needed to
be carried on for the sake of an aggrandized national future. At different stages of his life
Weber oscillated between some balance of both political education and political
leadership as an answer to this question.
5
" In other words, even in the vocation essays,
Weber still stands on his professed hope of 1895 of educating the bourgeoisie for political
leadership; and echoes of this are found in the epic longing for a “political hero” in
1918. A political hero that confronts a daunting task: the forces behind the
52
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rationalization process, expressions of which are found embodied in the rational
bureaucracies of the modem state.
For Weber, a rational bureaucracy is constitutive of the modem state. It is one of
its mechanisms of organization; indeed, a necessary one given the modem path of
rationalization, a path that in his most bleak descriptions led to Weber’s metaphor of the
Iron Cage.” For the modem state, alongside the effective monopoly of violence, also
controls the total means of political organization.” Analogous to the way the monopoly
of violence does not always translate as violence perpetrated by the head of state, the
centralization of political organization hardly reverts to a modem version of an absolute
king in the sole person of the leader. Nor is the responsibility for the actions that are
constitutive of the different organizational imperatives of modem bureaucracy placed on
one individual. In the new configuration of power that the modem state represents, what
is demanded is a changed concept of political responsibility. And the seeds for this
concept are found in the process of de-personification that the rationalization process
brings about: “No single official personally owns the money he pays out, or the buildings,
stores, tools, and war machines he controls. In the contemporary ‘state’—and this is
essential for the concept of state-the ‘separation’ of the administrative staff, of the
administrative officials, and of the workers from the materials means of administrative
organization is completed .”54 Responsibility is thus displaced from the individual actor to
the institution. Weber sees this process as comparable to both the development of
capitalism and the emergence of modem science. Parallel to the way in which
traditionally intermediary classes, or estates, were eliminated in route to the centralization
54
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of social and political power - also parallel to the way in which the big capitalist-
monopolistic entrepreneurs gradually expropriated independent producers - science, or
scientific discourse, effectively managed to run off the field potential claimants for the
role of theory such as theology and philosophy
.
55
Politically speaking, the State
increasingly took over the roles assigned to the estates, the feudal remnants of the
absolutist state, and by means of a rational bureaucracy is able to “stand in the top
place .”56
All in all, out of this process the modem state emerges as a “compulsory
association which organizes domination” insofar as “[it] has been successful in seeking to
monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a
territory. The state thus successfully is able “to inaugurate the expropriation of this
expropriator of the political means, and therewith of political power.”58
Weber, however, remained somewhat ambiguous in relation to the rationalization
process and the consolidation of the modem state. In the tradition of Alexis de
Tocqueville and Karl Marx, Weber perceptively theorized the unprecedented and
daunting nature of modem power - his “Iron Cage” metaphor correlates with Marx’s
Herculean views of capitalism and deployment of Prometheus as a metaphor for the
proletariat, and with Tocqueville’s views of democratization and the new despotism it
inaugurates. And like his predecessors, Weber also longed for an agent that could match
modem power at the same level of force and coherence, even if his yearning was more in
55 On Weber’s views of science, see Wolin, “Max Weber,” 404ff.
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tune with Tocqueville’s anstocratic defeatism, and his low esteem for the bourgeoisie,
than with the optimism of the young Marx of early 1840s, or with the latter’s positive
assessment of the bourgeoisie in The Communist Manifesto (1848).59 In fact, there is no
redeeming proletariat in Weber’s formulations. Already in 1895, when he declared the
German proletanat economically “mature” in comparison with Germany’s bourgeoisie,
his political assessment of the proletariat inverted the equation: “/pjolitically
,
the
working class is infinitely less mature...”60 And yet, neither was the bourgeoisie
politically educated, nor was it foreseeable to educate it in “the deep instincts for power”
that characterized true “political leadership,” at least not at the time. 61 Or at least not for
Weber, a self-professed bourgeois, who, nevertheless, at the time of his inaugural address
could not confer political credentials to his class.62 Instead, what is found in Weber’s
formulation is the figure of the “political hero,” one that confronts the meaningless of the
world (as famously depicted in Weber’s methodological essays); one that in spite of the
conglomeration of the imperatives of capitalism, science, and bureaucratic organization
and administration, comprising the rationalization of life, heroically responds to the
calling of politics. The political hero’s remarkable appearance at the end of the “Politics
as a Vocation” merits lengthy quotation:
59
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Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and
perspective. Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth-that man would
not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the
impossible. But to do that a man must be a leader, and not only a leader but a hero
as well, in a very sober sense of the word. And even those who are neither leaders
nor heroes must arm themselves with that steadfastness of heart which can brave
even the crumbling of all hopes. This is necessary right now, or else men will not
be able to attain even that which is possible today. Only he has the calling for
politics who is so sure that he shall not crumble when the world from his point of
view is too stupid or too base for what he wants. Only he who in the face of all
this can say ‘In spite of all!’ has the calling for politics .63
Passion, perspective, the boldness to reach out for the impossible, sober heroism,
unwillingness to crumble or seek refuge when the world does not conform to his ideals -
these are the attributes of Weber’s political hero, the possessor of the true vocation for
politics.
Yet with these attributes come a special responsibility, a political responsibility
whose role in Weber’s formulation of political leadership is sometimes overlooked, even
if responsibility is a leitmotif in his discussions of science and his formulation of political
decisionism. A closer look at Weber’s rendering of the question of responsibility
provides the basis for a reconceptualization of this concept politically, or at least might
allow for the groundwork for this reconceptualization to proceed.
63 Weber, “Politics,” 128.
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Earlier in “Politics as a Vocation”, Weber locates responsibility in relation to the
political leader: “the leading statesman” has “an exclusive personal responsibility he
cannot and must not reject or transfer.”64 But here Weber might be reclaiming an idea of
action that seems anachronistic by his own standards, or at least in light of the processes
he described. For a byproduct of the rise of a centralized bureaucracy is the
depersonalization of political relations and the transfer of responsibility that comes along
with the process of rationalization as bureaucratic administration displaces responsibility
from ordinary individuals. Even so, Weber claims that in such a predicament, a new
sense of responsibility is thus bestowed on the leader. But unlike previous epochs, in the
modem nation-state the leader is not bounded by estates, nor is the leader always the
actor given the separation of functions that is characteristic of the modem nation-state -
as head of the modem state, the leader only manages politics but ultimately the leader
cannot be held accountable for everything that is done in the name of the violence it
authorizes. Stated differently, the responsibility of the leader cannot be simply
understood in terms of accountability. There is a different sense of responsibility the
political leader here must have — the one Weber argues cannot be transferred: a “feeling
of responsibility,” alongside “passion” and “a sense of proportion,” is presented as one of
the “preemptive qualities [that] are decisive for the politician ...”65 That is, even if the
leader is not the actor that carries on all the actions that he authorizes, so thus cannot be
personally accountable for every action carried on in his name, that would be utterly
abstract, as the level of accountability depends on the nature of the action and the moral
64
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and political stakes involved, the leader bears a different sense of responsibility that
informs his actions. In other words, responsibility defined as the need to politically
respond to a certain predicament, face the burdens of political action, and assume the
obligations involved. Here we thus find a distinction between accountability and
responsibility that correlates with the one given by Hannah Arendt decades later in
relation to the Third Reich: sometimes guilt and responsibility are found in the same
individual, yet to be guilty of a crime in Nazi Germany was not the same as to be
responsible for it, and vice versa . 66 With the advent of bureaucratization the question of
accountability becomes ambiguous. And as the endless debates on who can be hold
accountable for the Judeocide under the Third Reich attest, accountability and
responsibility cannot be conflated, especially when violence is depersonalized by the
mediation of institutionalized bureaucracies.
How does Weber negotiate this tension between the increasing depersonalization
of the bureaucratization process with the call for responsible action of one individual, the
leader? As he gets closer to concluding the lecture, Weber introduced an important
distinction that might provide a way out of this paradox, or at least negotiate it somewhat
differently. Weber poses the question to his audience: “What calling can politics fulfill
quite independently of its goals within the total ethical economy of human conduct -
Arendt s reflections are found in “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in Essays in
Understanding: 1930-1954, ed., Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), 121-39. See
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which is, so to speak, the ethical locus where politics is at home?”67 Preceding this
question, Weber describes politics as an ethos
,
a “cause.” He then proceeds to interpret
the relationship between this cause and an ethics, and in doing so he redefines the role of
ethics in relation to politics. This question is exemplified in reference to “the
responsibility towards the future” that takes precedence once a nation that has been at war
is declared victorious, and to the ethic of the defeated, one that for Weber is concerned
with the past, as “no nation forgives if its honor has been offended.”68 And yet, Weber
ultimately finds both accounts wanting. In their place, he rehearses, not unambiguously,
the ancient question of this relationship and after briefly considering “the ethic of the
gospel’ - whose ngor is for Weber “no joking matter” - asserts that for all its
absoluteness it ultimately fails to ask for “consequences.” And this for him is the decisive
point - a concern for the consequences of actions that is constitutive of an ethic of
responsibility.
Thus, rather than pondering the compatibility, or lack thereof, of “the ethic of the
gospel” with politics, he poses the question politically by looking into the relationship
between action and its consequences, and how this relationship, in turn, resides at the
intersection between ethics and politics. In so doing, Weber offers the familiar distinction
between an “ethic of ultimate ends” and an “ethic of responsibility”: the former has to do
with intentions and the latter has to do with the ability to foresee the consequences of
one’s action. Even if principle is not entirely absent from an ethic of responsibility, or a
concern with responsibility absent from the ethic of ultimate ends, there is for Weber an
67
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abysmal difference in the outcomes that can emerge out of following these two
.
69
Moreover, both ethical stances require judgment: for the ethics of ultimate ends the
individual has to discern what is the principle that takes priority in a given situation, since
two competing valid principles often collide, as Greek tragedians remind us; while for the
ethic of responsibility judgment needs to be exercised in relation to the possible reactions
one’s actions may have - even if in important ways, action is boundless, and it is never
possible to foresee all the possible reactions it may evoke, contingencies are often
structured and the ultimate boundlessness of action need not mean that certain reactions
are not more likely to take place than others, especially in relation to human actions that
are inevitably situated within institutional and historical constraints
.
70
Thus, when it
comes to the intersection of ethics and politics, an ethic of responsibility is better suited
to the challenges entailed in acting in the political realm.
Even so, the ethic of responsibility does not resolve the dilemma often involved in
justifying certain means to reach an end. For Weber, “No ethics in the world can dodge
the fact that in numerous instances the attainment of ‘good’ ends is bound to the fact that
one must be willing to pay the price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous
ones ...”
71 And this is a risk especially pertinent to the realm of politics - after all, its
“decisive means ... is violence.” For whoever embraces “politics as a vocation” these
paradoxes remain vivid, since even if the ethic of responsibility is the better suited for the
demands of politics, it is a combination of both that constitutes a “man who can have the
69
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'calling for politics .’”
72
This is a conclusion Weber reaches after surveying the role of
violence in negotiating the conflicts arising from the relative coexistence of both ethics
from the Pagan world to Calvin’s Protestantism. After surveying these, Weber reaches a
political formulation of the intersection between ethics and politics rather than an ethical
or religious one: “It is the specific means of legitimate violence as such in the hand of
human associations which determines the peculiarities of all ethical problems of
politics .”
73
To think of responsibility politically therefore entails taking into consideration the
dynamics of violence, power, and legitimation - the latter more often than not providing
the basis for the distinction between the first two. Or at least so much is suggested by
Weber s formulation of this problematic, especially in light of his assertion that “the quite
different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence.”74 Yet one need not subscribe
to the ubiquity of violence in order to gain insight from Weber’s formulations. Even if
violence and its representations are central for politics, the legitimate use of violence does
not exhaust the meaning of politics, or the meaning of power for that matter. Perhaps
another way to gain insight from Weber’s formulation is to bear in mind his warning to
those that “contract” with violence: “whoever contracts with violent means for whatever
ends—and every politician does—is exposed to its specific consequences .”75 As Simone
Weil once suggested, there is so much compromising with violence that can be done
without being swayed by its destructive logic. And yet, like Weber, such a warning did
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not translate into a principled rejection of violence. Instead, it led her to reclaim a concept
of responsibility in tune with the demands of politics - albeit politics conceived in a
different way.
* * *
If for Freud and Weber the experience of the Great War and the Bolshevik threat left an
imprint in their theoretical reflections, even if it did not lead to a wholeheartedly rejection
of civilization and its values, but to a rather sober assessment of it, for authors such as
Arendt, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Weil, it is a combination of this experience with
the subsequent brutality of the Spanish Civil War and of World War II that led to a more
vigorous reckoning with catastrophe. And all three authors reckon with the meaning of
the catastrophic first half of the twentieth century by looking back at the very basis of
European civilization. In the case of Arendt, the “extraordinary events of this century”
forced her to follow the path of a writer reflecting on the meaning of freedom and
politics, ancient and modem, the ambiguous revolutionary legacy, and the public/private
divide in modernity in order to understand totalitarianism. In contrast, an important
aspect of what Horkheimer and Adomo theorized as “the dialectic of enlightenment”
pertains to power and instmmental reason, and they reached as far back as Homer’s
Odyssey to reflect on the origins of instmmental reason as cunning. Meanwhile, Weil
went to Homer’s Iliad to reflect on the blindness of violence and power, a reflection
largely prompted by the atrocities of the Spanish Civil War and the first year of World
War II.
Weil, in her essay “The Iliad or the Poem of Force,” proclaims not Achilles as the
hero of the epic poem, but “Force employed by man, force that enslaves man, force
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before whieh man’s flesh shnnks away.” 76 In her essay, Weil goes on to dwell on the
effects of force on the humans that participate in it in order to suggest the transformative
nature offeree, even if she never redeems it. On the contrary, in Weil’s estimation force
is capable of converting a human into a thing
.
11
For Weber the rise of bureaucracies has
the effect of displacing responsibility, and instrumental reason might lead to a
dehumanization of human beings, thus paving the way for what Weil considers their
treatment as things. For Weil, force, especially once manifested in war, has the same
dehumanizing effect and it also effectively blurs the realm of action and responsibility.
Even more so, since force “in its grossest and most summary form” takes the shape of
sovereignty over life and death-it is “the force that kills” the one that effectively turns
one into a thing, a corpse. Yet force, for its propensity to end life in its crudest
expression, is not something expendable from the human condition, at least not so
according to Weil. Indeed, she ventures to suggest that force comes along almost as a
birthright. Perhaps all men, by the very act of being bom, are destined to suffer
violence; yet this is a truth to which circumstance shuts men’s eyes .”78
The metaphor of blindness is evocative since the blindness of power is the central
motif of Weil’s reflections on force. This blindness of power manifests itself clearly in
the way that both the strong and weak, once engaged in war, miscalculate their relative
power or lack thereof: “The strong are, as a matter of fact, never absolutely strong, nor
are the weak absolutely weak, but neither is aware of this.” And this lack of awareness
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Weil identifies as an offspring of the refusal of both parties to acknowledge their shared
humanity Both weak and strong refuse to acknowledge their mutual implication in
humanity—albeit it is that mutual implication what takes away the absoluteness of their
relative positions. But it is precisely this capacity for action, which is often carried on by
means of force, that for Weil constitutes the illusion of absolute power and absolute
weakness, respectively. For “the man who is the possessor of force seems to walk
through a non-resistant element; in the human substance that surrounds him nothing has
the power to interpose, between the impulse and the act, the tiny interval that is
reflection.”79 And it is in this “tiny interval” where the possibility for justice and
prudence resides. And yet, when force and power become their only ends, it is precisely
that already constrained space for reflection that is further shrunken.
In Weil s reading of the Iliad another aspect of this blindness of power is reflected
upon. On this occasion, it is the lack of reflection that accompanies violence in its crudest
forms that also blinds those that contract” with it to the fact that once a cycle of violence
is unleashed, consequent acts might turn the violence back against its previous agent.
That is, the subject implicated in the use of force eventually becomes its object. Referring
to the heroes and combatants of Homer’s Iliad Weil illustrates this point, “These men,
wielding power, have no suspicion of the fact that the consequences of their deeds will at
length come home to them-they too will bow the neck in their turn.” 80 And yet, those in
power usually do not even remotely consider this possibility, even if there is ample
historical evidence for it. Weil thus captures the hubris often found in the unyielding
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figures of Homeric poems and Greek tragedies in her depiction of the blindness of power.
And it is precisely the blindness of pure power as violence that Weil deemed the most
senseless. Cruel acts that are the offspring of power, often unleash cycles of violence,
even if these remain unarticulated for some time - after all, the weak are never absolutely
so, and their lot might change over time. Also, in its blindness power neglects the relative
boundless nature of action . 81 In important ways, human actions are boundless, especially
political actions that are backed up by raw power. This neglect is for Weil neatly
captured in the ephemeral moments of invincibility that characterize the victors of the
different battles; the victorious “forgets to treat victory as a transitory thing.”82 Also -
and this is analogous to their refusal of a shared humanity with the defeated - for the
victorious the possibility of self-destruction seems like an impossibility
.
83
This
shortsightedness shows a lack of awareness of the finitude accompanying any political
and social relation as well as a miscalculation of the actual amount of force at the
perpetrator’s disposal.
But these formulations hardly exhaust Weil’s reading of the Iliad. This reading
suggests yet another aspect of power and violence that is often not given its due attention,
even if it is of utmost relevance today, especially in relation to the despotism of science
and knowledge and the logics of violence and terror, once the latter are unleashed;
namely, the effects violence has on those touched by it, especially on its perpetrators, an
81
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effect that correlates to the de-humamzing impulse of converting human beings into
things. Weil writes, “Violence obliterates anybody who feels its touch. It comes to seem
just as external to its employer as to its victim. And from this springs the idea of a destiny
before which executioner and victim stand equally innocent, before which conquered and
conqueror are brothers in the same distress .”84 In this rendering, Weil couples the power
of action with its no less violent reactions, a coupling that suggests, among other things,
the futility of fighting violence with more violence
.
85
Weil thus conceives of a mutual
albeit paradoxical, fate for both parties involved in the cycle of violence. But Weil is
hardly arguing for a categorical or principled rejection of the use of violence and force.
After all, as part of her political practice, Weil herselfjoined the Republican side during
the Spanish civil war, and acknowledged the inevitability of fighting Hitler . 86 Her
position in relation to violence was thus much more politically ambiguous than some
popular readings of her essay suggest. “A moderate use of force,” Weil unequivocally
suggests, which alone would enable man to escape being enmeshed in its machinery,
would require superhuman virtue, which is as rare as dignity in weakness .”87 Here
something like Machiavelli’s “economy of violence” is thus called forth . 88 But Weil is
not ready to endorse the politics of deception that accompany Machiavelli’s practice of
84
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politics, nor his proto-consequentialist ethics, nor Weber’s ethic of responsibility, for that
matter. (And unlike Weil, neither Machiavelli nor Weber saw violence as a de-
humanizing force, even if Machiavelli condemned its crude manifestations, as his
depiction of Agathocles attests in the Prince.) Indeed, for Weil, Machiavelli’s “economy
of violence” is not a possibility.
Even so, Weil ultimately rehearses the early modem view, often exemplified by
Machiavelli ’s works, of the necessity of a virtuous or prudent individual to responsibly
exercise power. Here Weber’s political hero and Machiavelli’s prudent and virtuous (as
in virtu) Prince find their correlate in Weil’s invocation of “superhuman virtue.” To be
sure, Weil does not invoke such superhuman virtue in order to curtail the indifference
that accompanies violence; still, it might allow for the tiny space of reflection that is
needed.
Weil thus tries to sort out the implications of her admission of the need of “a
moderate use of force.” And in what constitutes an insightful combination of
Machiavellian, Hobbesian, and Rousseaunian motifs, Weil further writes: “moderation
itself is not without perils, since prestige, from which force derives at least three-quarters
of its strength, rests principally upon that marvelous indifference that the strong feel for
the weak, an indifference so contagious that it infects the very people who are the objects
^89
of it.” Still, the more violence is unleashed the less shocking its effects become; that is,
what emerges is a dynamic that often leads not to a lessening of violence but rather
results in more violence, as forms of violence are cushioned both aesthetically and
89
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aesthetically
.
90
Indifference thus becomes the order of the day
.
91
In light of this, the
moderate use of force is an ambiguous aspiration; hence, Weil’s insistence on the need
for a different kind of virtue, one above our human all too human predicament. It seems
that Weil’s own theoretical need to find a way out of the cycle of violence leads her to
rhetorically vindicate the possibility of opening up space for such practice, even if that
possibility seems foreclosed by her own understanding of the blindness of power.
Another byproduct of “the nature of force” is that it not only has the capacity of
converting a man into a thing in “a double sense” (as it dehumanizes both victim and
perpetrator), but also has an effect on how finitude and the human soul are understood.
For Weil, in the Iliad only the figure of Patroclus displays the kind of “god-like”
generosity she defends, even if she acknowledges that the poem presents sparse
“moments of grace”. 9^ And it is the latter that leads her to a vindication of the epic genre
in the concluding section of her essay, citing instances of the combination of “grace” and
force that constitute the human condition as depicted by Homer: as she puts it, “But the
purest triumph of love, the crowning grace of war, is the friendship that floods the hearts
of mortal enemies. Before it a murdered friend no longer cries out for vengeance .”93
Grace, thus conceived, has the capacity of breaking the cycle of force, the one that leads
to action and reaction of senseless violence and retribution. In light of this assertion, the
Iliad, like Aeschylus’ Oresteia, illustrates ways out of the cycle of violence that the logic
90
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Of action/reaction of violence leads to: in the case of Weil’s reading of Homer, it is grace;
for Aeschylus, it is a fragile political solution. Even so, as the Iliad suggests, grace is
also fragile, and even though it could be the means to stop the excesses of violence, it
could be destroyed by it. Hence its value as a document of Occidental civilization - as
Weil, among others, firmly believed. But there is something very political about the Iliad.
It is not merely a poem of force that speaks to its dynamics and its impact in the human
condition. It is also a deeply political poem, not only for its reflection on force, but,
perhaps more so, because it deals with “the destruction of a city”, which for Weil is “the
greatest calamity the human race can experience .”94 Also, in the Iliad
,
in what could be
considered another parallel with tragedies like the Oresteia, “neither victors, nor
vanquished are admired, scorned, or hated.” Rather, what the poem instills is a sense of
regret that men are capable of being so transformed.” Thus, its enduring legacy: it
provides a detached perspective that neither vilifies the victor nor victimizes the defeated;
this perspective rather shows a sobering picture of war in all its contrariness and cruelty,
without “pride or shame”, even if such a perspective is admittedly sometimes
unattainable. And this sobering perspective is part of the epic genius, something that
seems lost to us .
95
Weil s meditations thus qualify Weber’s realism, and by means of her rereading
of a foundational text in the Western tradition, the Iliad, attempts to shed a critical light
on the attitude towards violence in the present. The parallel with Adorno and
Horkheimer’s Dialectic ofEnlightenment is striking, even if the impulses animating their
theoretical temperaments differ: Weil read the Iliad politically in order to show the
94
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paradoxes and complexities of violence; Horkheimer and Adorno read the Odyssey to
illustrate the dialectic of enlightenment, and the roots of instrumental reason and
bourgeois rationality in the catastrophes of the twentieth century.
* * *
The expenence of violence, in whatever manifestation, led all these thinkers to ponder
the question of violence in its relation to civilization (Freud), to lay bare its role in
politics in both normal times and in times of crisis (Weber), and to think about the ethical
repercussions of its inner logic politically (Weber and Weil). And in different ways
Weber, Freud, and Weil equally struggle with the representation of violence as well as
with its uses. But the brutality and barbarism that in Freud’s reflections led to an
awareness of the fragility of civilization in Weber led to a conception of political action
based on an ethic of responsibility that he only outlines - an ethic predicated on an ideal
of a political hero, one that under the conditions of the modernity Weber describes seems
anachronistic. Weil s reflections, like those of Weber, also present a political ethic, even
if one that is hardly spelled out. But unlike Weber, she does not invoke a political hero;
what she does invoke is “superhuman virtue”.
When combined, the distinctive perspectives of Freud, Weber, and Weil offer a
plethora of insights on our own predicament, one in which the then nascent dreams and
catastrophes have already unfolded, even if history has not ended: civilization as fragile
and ambiguous legacy, the constitutive nature of violence in the modem nation-state, the
blindness of power, especially in its military form, and the centrality of a new conception
of responsibility in the new predicament the Great War inaugurated. Furthermore, in our
current predicament when an “incoherent empire” seeks to hold sway of the globe, Weil’s
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reflections on the “blindness of power” might shed a critical light on our recent history as
well as on our present
.
96
Along similar lines, a self-reflective turn can be invoked in
relation to Weber’s reflections on the “ethic of responsibility.” But responsibility
democratically conceived. And this means, among other things, to displace the question
of leadership and conceive political responsibility in terms of the actions of the demos,
or, as in the contemporary formulation of the ideal of liberal democracy, to reflect on the
actions done in its name. In other words, rather than invoking superhuman virtue, or a
political hero that in Weber’s celebrated quote aims at the impossible in order to reach
the possible, or ontologizing violence and thus salvage a prophylactic, even if repressive,
understanding of civilization, what is perhaps called for is to ponder the question
politically, from the perspective of democracy - here defined as the active participation
of citizens sharing political power. Still, to do so requires bringing the democratic back to
“liberal democracy”. This, along with a consideration of violence politically, demands
awareness of the forms of power behind its exercise, and the ends it legitimizes.
Ironically, in the age of post-democracy only democratic action can change our current
lot.
Even so, it is important to recognize the limitations of these three thinkers. And
one of things that these three representatives of twentieth-century political theory of
catastrophe failed to achieve was to historicize the representation of violence.
Analogously to the “anti-monumental” literature of the same period, they fail to cast the
violence of the twentieth century historically, question the narrative of progress, and
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ponder the legacy of imperialism in twentieth-century forms of political vtolence.
Accordingly, in the next chapter I recast the relationship between civilization and
barbarism, the logic of violence, and the need to retrieve a political ethic of
responsibility, by means of a political reading of the “dialectic of enlightenment”.
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CHAPTER V
READING THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT POLITICALLY
Critical thought, which does not call a halt
before progress itself, requires us to take up the
cause of the remnants of freedom, of tendencies
toward real humanity, even if they seem
powerless in face of the great historical trend.
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer
Nowadays, hardly any historian or social observer, regardless of her/his political
persuasion, doubts the unprecedented nature of the forms of violence and suffering in the
previous century. The twentieth-century is perceived as either uncharacteristically
violent, or at least significantly so: for Eric Hobsbawm “the old century” brought about
unprecedented violence and catastrophes for humanity; in the words of the liberal
political philosopher Isaiah Berlin: “I remember [the twentieth century] only as the most
terrible century in history; while a historian of a different political orientation and
historiographical temper than Hobsbawm s, such as Francois Furet, shares a similar view
of the century, as in his final major work, The Passing ofan Illusion
,
where the century is
portrayed as one marred by ideological excesses that led to catastrophic results that were
costly for human life; for critical theorist Susan Buck-Morss, who like Hobsbawm
gravitates within the Left, even if “the construction of mass utopia” was the constitutive
dream animating the twentieth century, it also often led to “the catastrophes of war,
exploitation, dictatorship, and technological destruction”; and for intellectual historian
Anson Rabinbach the past century is “on balance ... far richer in cataclysms than in
occurrences that inspire faith in progress and collective purpose.” 1 With varying degrees
1 Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals Between Apocalypse and
Enlightenment (University of California Press, 1997), 20.
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of pessimism about the future prospects for the dreams of modem,ty that were seemingly
shattered at the end of the century, let alone radically divergent theoretical and political
temperaments informing them, these views converge on the idea that twentieth-century
violence constitutes an unprecedented moment of modem history. Even if previous
epochs embodied the brutality of barbarism, slavery, and pillage in ways that correlate to
the twentieth century, the general tenor of the aforementioned positions indicates a sense
of uniqueness and lack of precedent of the genocidal politics that render humanity’s
dreams into catastrophes in ways not previously seen. In Hobsbawm’s unequivocal
statement: The 20th century was the most murderous in recorded history.”
2
Yet, even a cursory look at the global history of the last five hundred years
suggests that violence, terror, and catastrophe are hardly new or unprecedented. To be
sure, to assert the presence of violence and catastrophe in previous centuries, in ways that
not only correlate with the experience of the twentieth century - indeed, oftentimes these
paved the way for it - is not a claim that single-handedly denies the uniqueness of the
twentieth century, especially since it could aptly be described as “a genocide of
genocide.”" In other words, the singularity of the catastrophes that unfolded in the
twentieth century is certainly undeniable, for as Hobsbawm suggests, in “the Short
Century more human beings had been killed or allowed to die by human decision than
ever before in history. Also, the Great War, as suggested in the previous chapter,
“marked the breakdown of the (western
)
civilization of the nineteenth century,” a
2
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capitalist civilization “in its economy; liberal in its legal and constitutional structure;
bourgeois in the image of its characteristic hegemonic class; glorifying in the advance of
science, knowledge, and education, material and moral progress; and profoundly
convinced of the centrality of Europe, birthplace of the revolutions of the sciences, arts,
politics, and industry, whose economy had penetrated, and whose soldiers had subjugated
most of the world...”; thus inaugurating “the age of total war,” in which civilian
populations became expendable, an age for which Hiroshima and Nagasaki bear witness
.
4
Yet one need not deny these unprecedented developments to notice the Occidentalist
referent that informs Hobsbawm diagnosis. Rather, than problematize the idea of Europe
(incidentally, as Hobsbawm himself suggests, at the end of the twentieth century the
world ceased to be Eurocentric), and historicize its breakdown in light of its self-
fashioning from the Renaissance on, Hobsbawm’s narrative, for all its global pretensions
and memorable depictions, restricts his account of “the Age of Extremes” to calamities
explicitly related to the European process. Hobsbawm is thus able to write about six
hundred pages on the age of extremes in the twentieth century while dedicating a mere
fifty-four pages to the third world,” and largely offering a cursory look at Palestine and
the Middle East — both parts of the globe with histories that are intrinsically related to
European developments - even if the occasional reference is made throughout . 5
There is something disquieting about Occidental innocence in relation to man-
made catastrophes, especially during the nineteenth century, the time in which the second
4
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wave of European imperialism was at its apogee along with its rapacious brutality and
violence. It seems that the traveling of violence from the former Empires back to the
metropolis struck the European sensibility in ways imperial violence and devastation
could not do. Even if in the seventeenth century, from 1618 to 1648, fierce religious wars
wracked the continent, what retrospectively came to be known as this first Thirty Years
War did not have the same effect as the second, from 19 14-1 945.
6
And yet once cast as
religious, these wars could be seen as remnants of the past that secular liberal
enlightenment would soon replace - even if in reality secular objectives were entangled
with religious ones. The same could be said of the violence and brutality initiated by the
Crusades and the Inquisition. In the words of historian Amo J. Mayer: “Notwithstanding
the horrors, miseries, and terrible costs of the religiously infused warfare of the Thirty
Years War of the seventeenth century, the myth and lore of holy war — of crusading war —
were not discredited. They persisted under the surface, to be revitalized and exploited
three hundred years later, during the General Crises and Thirty Years War of the
twentieth century.”8 Yet, as I shall suggest below, it is not so much that this “lore of holy
war” stayed dormant for about three centuries, so much as that it became an intrinsic
component of the initially religiously infused, and later on secular colonization of non-
European peoples.
Indeed, the only experience of catastrophe that significantly marked the European
imagination, in ways analogous to the sack of Rome (the latter not incidentally was a
6 On this periodization see Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?, 20. See also Hobsbawm’s “War and
Peace in the 20th Century.”
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constitutive element in the then nascent Orientalist narrative of the West), was the case of
the well-known earthquake of Lisbon. This was an expenence that marked the
eighteenth-century European imagination in ways that a similar natural disaster in the
colonies failed to do. Even so, as was the case with the crusading violence, this natural
disaster took on religious connotations, so that even if it somewhat shattered the
European self-image, it did not effectively challenge it. It is the expenence of the
brutality and catastrophe of the world wars, with Auschwitz as their epitome and signifier
that brought to the forefront of the occidental imagination the violence and brutality of
civilized” European modernity. If Lisbon represented a powerful strike against ideas of
faith and providence, thus leaving its hapless victims with no existential comfort,
Auschwitz has come to represent the loss of faith in the innocence of humanity’s steady
march to progress, and a sense of discomfort. After Auschwitz solace is even more
prohibitive given the human-made nature of this human, all too human, catastrophe
.
9
Auschwitz thus came to signify the caesura in western modernity.
Even so, Auschwitz, for all its uniqueness, hardly represented a radical break with
previous forms of violence, especially the violence bred during the Imperialist ventures
that go all the way back to the sixteenth century. Both Hannah Arendt and Karl Korsch,
as early as the ‘forties and early ‘fifties, saw in nineteenth-century imperialism a
constitutive element of the violence and brutality unleashed by the Third Reich: for
Arendt it the race-thinking that stemmed from the process, that, along with the lack of
thought that marked the organization of colonization by means of bureaucracy, were two
constitutive elements of Nazi rule closely associated with Imperialism; while for Korsch
9
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“The novelty of totalitarian politics
... is simply that the Nazis have extended to
'civilized' European peoples the methods hitherto reserved for the ‘natives' or ‘savages'
living outside so-called civilization.'" 0 Actually, in the first decade of the century
Germany had already been involved in the genocide of the African Hereto. " Indeed,
from the fifteenth century on, in both Europe and America racism and genocidal politics
coexisted with ideologies of progress, freedom, and equality, even domestically,
especially in the USA, as well as in Australia where the annihilation of indigenous
populations followed the settlement of Europeans - all cases following the path of the
initial wave of European imperialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This
without dwelling too much on the first intra-European silent genocide, the “Armenian
prelude as a historian has called it, even if one committed within the bounds of the
Ottoman East - the symbol of despotism for much of the West for the past five hundred
years.
It is by going all the way back to the discourses of savagery and order that
emerged in the Renaissance that the roots of all this imperial violence, in both its concrete
See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1975); Karl
Korsch, “Notes on History: The Ambiguities of Totalitarian Ideologies,” New Essays 6 (Fall 1942), 3,
respectively. The insights provided by these two thinkers are masterfully developed in Enzo Traverso, The
Origins ofNazi Violence
,
trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 2003). Traverso summarizes his
findings as follows: “The genealogy traced in the present study emphasizes the fact that the violence and
crimes of Nazism emerged from certain common bases of Western culture. It does not show that Auschwitz
revealed the fundamental essence of the West; however, it does suggest that it was one of its possible
products and, in that sense, was one of its legitimate offspring.” See p. 150. Thus Traverso avoids
functionalist interpretations of the Judeocide. Or as Mayer, who argues for a comprehensive historicization
of this catastrophe, has put it: “But while ... rampant functional rationality contributed to the
unprecedented magnitude of the Jewish catastrophe, it was not its immanent mainspring. To overemphasize
the modernity and banality of the killing process is to risk diverting attention from its taproots, purposes,
and indeterminacies. Just as the latest weapons were not needed to feed the fury of the two world wars, so
the latest technical and bureaucratic skills were not essential to feed the fury of the Judeocide. Mayer, Why
Did the Heavens Not Darken?, 18-19.
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and symbolic dimensions, can be found. Humanity, as a species, can hardly reclaim
violence as its unique attribute in relation to other mammals; still, historically it has had a
unique “capacity for systematically experimenting with violence and for justifying the
results ” This is easily grasped in how from the Renaissance to the early twenty-first
century the only violence that disgusts and is found appalling is the one that is perceived
as senseless, violence that is seemingly without purpose
.
12
Thus, periodicals such as the
Afew York Times and Wall Street Journal at once tacitly sanctify the violence of
“Neoliberalism” and “Development,” usually by means of just silencing it, while
condemning what seems to be the senseless violence of dispossession; in fact, sometimes
even vilifying the latter by naming it “terrorism.” Indeed, the by no means unambiguous
preference to distinguish between force and brute force, or between violence, naked
violence, and power, or to sharply disassociate might from right, is very telling in itself —
it suggests a struggle to simultaneously control and disguise forms of violence that has
constantly appeared in the history of Western political thought from Antiquity to the
present
.
13
To be sure, there are different threads running through the Western tradition:
indeed, Plato’s Republic is an attempt to fly from the violence of politics and the state,
even if Thrasymachus’ position could be read as an assertion of its opposite; in manifold
ways, the question of controlling, and/or disguising violence, or simply presenting it as
constitutive of politics, is also present from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century in
the theories of Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Grotious, Pufendorf, Rousseau, Kant, Marx,
12
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Weber, Lenin, and Schmitt, among others; and liberals like Locke, and other champions
of legality and the rule of law, are anxious about unlimited power, even if they oflen
leave open the possibility for special “prerogatives.” The latter tradition represents a tacit
acknowledgement of the violence in the creation of a political order - an association that
is nowhere better seen than in the increasing coupling of the question of violence with
civilization. “Civilization is never finished and always endangered,” writes sociologist
Norbert Elias. In this account civilization is dependant on “a relatively stable level of
individual self-discipline, as well as it is also “linked to specific social structures”: "The
supplying of goods, the preservation of the accustomed standard of living are among
[these structures], and especially social pacification, i.e. the non-violent settling of
conflicts within the state.”'-1 But what is the relationship between violence and
civilization? Does one represent the betrayal of the other? Does the endangering of
civilization lead to the unwitting use of violence? Or are these two intrinsically linked to
one another, a coupling that is both semantic and historical?
* * *
Civilization, imperialism, violence, and the idea of order are constitutive of what
Horkheimer and Adorno called, in what became the founding text of twentieth-century
critical theory, “the dialectic of enlightenment.” And yet, Adomo and Horkheimer’s text
does not deal with these questions head-on. Rather, as a text belonging to what could be
called the political theory of catastrophe, it offers a theoretical reflection on the dialectic
of enlightenment that seeks to explain the caesura that Auschwitz represent in western
civilization by casting the west critically, as portending a dialectic of progress and
14
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destruction that they referred to as the d.alectic of enlightenment. But unlike other
contemporaries who saw this caesura as a twentieth-century phenomena, for the authors
of the Dialectic of Enlightenment that “caesura” has been there at least since the
seventeenth-century coupling of enlightenment with scientific-instrumental rationality.
Better still, at some points they even suggest that the dialectic of enlightenment antecedes
its modem form and could be found in what they considered the founding text of
European civilization, Homer's Odyssey. Without endorsing the latter highly
anachronistic assertion, in the reminder of this chapter I offer a reading of this founding
text and complement it with a political reading of the dialectic of enlightenment, a
reading that provides the groundwork to historicize twentieth-century catastrophes from
the perspective of the multi-dimensional coupling of civilization, violence, imperialism,
and late modem despotism.
By way of preliminaries, something needs to be said about the form and stmcture
of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, an aspect sometimes neglected by many interpreters,
even if these two authors, especially Adomo, take the question of representation very
seriously. As is the case of Adorno’s work in general, an important aspect of the political
and theoretical significance of the work arguably found dialectical expression in its form.
Also, rarely is the structure of the text, as a totality, taken together. Instead, scholars and
interpreters mostly focus on one aspect of the work and extrapolate conclusions in
relation to the main theme of the text: the historical process that the authors speculatively
called the dialectic of enlightenment. As the subtitle of DE indicates, Philosophische
Fragmente in the original German (also the original title of the mimeographed version of
the text in 1944), the text is composed of a set of philosophical fragments that experiment
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wkh different genres: in addition to the preface, there is a philosophical essay on the
concept of enlightenment that sets the theoretical foundation for the two “excursus” that
follow - its main thesis consists in an attempt “to gain greater understanding of the
mtertwinement of rationality and social reality, as well as the intertwinement, inseparable
from the former, of nature and the mastery of nature ” An essay that is meant to pave the
way for “a positive concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement in
blind domination.” 15 In this vein, the different excursuses staged the proposition that the
first essay sets forth - “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to
mythology : in the excursus on the Odyssey the dialectic of myth and enlightenment is
traced while developing a theory of sacrifice and renunciation from the perspective of
ego-formation, and the entwinement between mythical nature and the domination of
nature; the second excursus, which takes Kant, Sade, and Nietzsche as its central objects
of reflection, ponders the emergence of the sovereign rational subject at its center,
especially in relation to enlightened-abstract moral and rational formalism. The essay on
the culture industry then follows these two initial excursuses. Here Horkheimer and
Adorno delineate the contours of the dialectic of enlightenment in liberal capitalist
society. This discussion of the culture industry illustrates some of the aspects of the
domination of nature that emerged out of the abstract emancipation the enlightenment
brought about, one in which humanity repressed its own nature, and, later on, came back
to haunt humanity with the advent of fascism. A process that for the authors also finds
expression in the liberal-capitalist midst in the bogus diversity of the otherwise unitary
world of artificial sensuality and false happiness that liberal-capitalist societies often
15 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment: Philosophical Fragments , ed. G.
S. Noerr and trans. Edmund Jephcott (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), xviii; DA, 5-6
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embody. Here, in what the authors admitted was a more fragmentary section, “the
regression of enlightenment to ideology" is discussed by means of rad,o and film. Then,
the “Theses on Anti-Semitism” dealing with “the reversion of enlightened civilization to
barbarism” are found in a somewhat essayist form. And then the text ends with a set of
aphonsms that illustrate some of the themes explored and open up topics for future
reflection. In its form there is something resembling Adorno’s logic of disintegration at
work here. Rather than proceeding systematically, or deductively, the text breaks off
without offering a final statement of its main thesis, or an explicit formulation of the
positive concept of enlightenment. Rather, the text remains open, and the conception of
reason and enlightenment that informs it can only be discerned by reading and rereading
the text itself; a process that does not require the sequence in which the materials are
presented.
Interpreters of Dialectic ofEnlightenment
,
for the most part, have often privileged
the Odysseus excursus and the culture industry essay - albeit seldom read together - in
reading the text, often to praise and immanently read the former, while condemning, and
externally reading, the latter. And with few exceptions, the fragmentary form of the texts
has largely gone overlooked . 16 But there is a strangeness to these fragments that goes
back to the question of presentation (Darstellung), especially in Adorno’s critical theory.
In Negative Dialectic Adorno asserted that “the representation [Darstellung] of
philosophy is not an external matter of indifference to it but immanent to its idea.” 17
16 An important exception here is Christopher Rocco’s essay “Between Modernity and Postmodemity,” 81-
86 .
17
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics
,
trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 18;
Negative Dialektik, 29. 1 have slightly modified the translation.
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Indeed, he later refetred to this question in relation to one of the many unfulfilled aspee.s
of Hegel’s formulation of the dialectic: substance cannot be separated from form. And
even though Hegel criticized Kant on those grounds, according to Adorno, he ultimately
wound up proceeding rather methodically, thus violating its own principle.' 8 (Even if the
Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit is not necessarily vulnerable to this critique, the
mature Hegel of the Science ofLogic and the Encyclopedia ofthe Philosophical Sciences
certainly is.) For Adomo, the form in which a critique is presented, or articulated, is thus
dialectically intrinsic to the critique itself.
19 A principle that is operative in the Dialectic
ofEnlightenment.
When it comes to the form of the Dialectic ofEnlightenment there is also a larger
political principle animating the fragmentary nature of the text. In the preface of 1944/47,
Horkheimer and Adomo accounted for this fragmentary form and in doing so they also
anticipated some of the objections to the difficult and abstract language they deploy
throughout. For this authorship the task of retrieving the political import of enlightenment
imposes demands on the authors of the text as much as it does on the reader. In order to
prepare the groundwork for what they termed “a positive concept of enlightenment”
requires breaking with the demands its current positivistic formulation imposes on
language. “By tabooing any thought which sets out negatively from the facts and from
the prevailing modes of thought as obscure, convoluted, and preferably foreign,”
18 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 144.
19
Cf. Adomo, “The Essay as Form,” in Notes to Literature: Vol. I, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991); “The Actuality of Philosophy,” in The Adorno Reader
,
ed. Brian
O’Connor (London: Blackwell, 2000). Stimulating discussions of this aspect of Adorno’s critical theory are
found in Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science
;
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence
of the Dialectic (London and New York: Verso, 1990); and Marta Tafalla, Theodor W. Adorno: Una
Filosofia de la Memoria (Barcelona: Herder, 2003).
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Horkheimer and Adorno observed, “that concept [of clarity] holds the mind captive in
ever deeper blindness.”20 Undoubtedly, there are echoes here of the expenence of the
authors in the Anglophone philosophical world, where they - especially Adorno - often
found themselves forced into a mode of expression entirely alien to their intellectual
milieu
.
21
This, however, was only part of the reasoning behind their subversion of the
principle of clanty stemming from an enlightenment that has reverted into mythology. In
fact, what they perceived as the absence of “a conceptual language of opposition”22
forced the authors to steer away from the clarity that enlightenment, as a metaphor,
implies. They resisted the ideal of clarity that stems from enlightenment thinking, thus
providing the foundation of a dialectical reversal of the language of clarity and obscurity
that correlates with the dialectical reversal of myth/enlightenment. To be sure, in the
insistence on clarity there is a call for conformity with the facts. And in order to critically
engage with these facts that the language of clarity comfortably casts positively, a
subversion of such language is called for. Or as they put it,
It is in the nature of the calamitous situation existing today that even the most
honorable reformer who recommends renewal in threadbare language reinforces
the existing order he seeks to break by taking over its worn-out categorical
apparatus and the pernicious power-philosophy lying behind it. False clarity is
only another name for myth. Myth was always obscure and luminous at once. It
20
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment
,
xvii.
21
See Martin Jay, “Adomo in America,” in Permanent Exiles: Essays in the Intellectual Migration from
Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
22
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, xv.
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has always been distinguished by its familiarity and its exempt,on from the work
of concepts
.
23
But Horkheimer and Adorno’s rejection of what they see as a “worn-out categorical
apparatus never led, especially in Adorno, to a principled rejection of the conceptual
language and categones of their received intellectual tradition. Nor do they pose the need
for obscurity for its own sake, let alone the use of neologisms to replace older historical-
philosophical categories. On the contrary, the imperative of clarity they perceived in the
mostly Anglo-American analytical philosophical tradition, as well as in the positivist
social science which is often its surrogate, needed to be resisted from within. Namely, an
immanent subversion of the received conceptual tradition that at one point in Negative
Dialectic Adorno spelled out in the following terms: “Thought need not rest content in its
logical regularity; it is capable of thinking against itself, without abolishing itself
altogether, indeed, were definitions of the dialectic possible, that one might be worth
proposing. Stated differently, rather than abandoning the categories of thinking
inherited from the received tradition, Adorno asks the reader to break the established
patterns of these concepts from within, without abolishing them, but by giving these a
different configuration from the one that concepts, and the experience these seek to
capture and portray, have, thus critically engaging the status quo in both its conceptual
23
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, xvii
" 4 Adomo, Negative Dialectics, 141; Negative Dialektik, 144. Here I am using Fredric Jameson’s
translation of the passage rather than E. B. Ashton’s. In Ashton’s translation it reads: “Thought needs not
be content with its own legality; without abandoning it, we can think against out thought, and if it were
possible to define dialectics, this would be a definition worth pursuing.” It seems to me that Jameson’s
rendering better captures the meaning of the German original. Jameson’s can be found in his Late Marxism:
Adorno, or, The Persistence ofthe Dialectic (London and New York: Verso, 1990), 17.
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representations and in their concrete reality
.
25
Immanent criticism thus yields new
insights, and even new formulations of old concepts that can add a different meaning to
the concepts under scrutiny without erasing their historical nature - an operation not
easily fulfilled if the historicity of these is not reflected upon. Horkheimer and Adorno
thus gave the question of clarity a political intent. This, in turn, leads to the politically
infused reflections that follow in the rest of Dialectic ofEnlightenment. Accordingly, the
Dialectic ofEnlightenment presents a series of politically infused philosophical fragments
from an explicitly aporetic stance
.
26
But again, this aporetic stance is not as an absolute
point of departure of all reflection, nor is it a condition of possibility for reflection as
such, as in the thought of Jacques Derrida, for example; instead, the aporetic stance of the
DE is such insofar as the reality this authorship reflects on is aporetic, thus avoiding
mending and further reifying social reality by means of theory. For Adorno
unequivocally refuses to sharply distinguish nature and society or to posit one or the other
as point of departure in a monad-like way. But what is the intent of these aporetic
reflections? What is the political import of aporetic thinking other than critical
representation?
The relative merits of linguistic obscurity - and here Adorno and not Horkheimer should be taken as the
archetype - as a way to subvert the status quo has been subject of debate among different scholars in
relation to figures otherwise dissimilar from Adorno’s theoretical and political temperament. See, for
instances, the invocation of Adomo to justify the infelicitous prose of Gayatri Spivak, or the often obscure
prose of Judith Butler. To be sure, in neither Butler’s work, nor Spivak’s, does Adorno’s thinking figure at
all. On these questions see James Miller’s essay in the now defunct Lingua Franca. See Terry Eagleton’s
brilliant polemic against Spivak, which provoked a reaction from Butler in which one of the
aforementioned invocations of Adomo occurs, “In the Gaudy Supermarket,” London Review of Books, 13
May 1999. See also the recently published collection of essays on this subject, Just Being Difficult?:
Academic Writing in the Public Arena, ed. Jonathan Culler and Kevin Lamb (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
'6
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment, xvi. On the composition of the work, see G. S.
Noerr’s “Editor’s Afterword,” pp. 217-46. See also the discussions found in Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Back
to Adomo,” Telos 81 (Fall 1989): 5-29; Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe, chap. 5;
Christopher Rocco, “Between Modernity and Postmodemity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment Against
the Grain,” Political Theory 22 (February 1994): 71-97.
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As already stated, one of the professed objectives of these fragments is to
investigate “the self-destruction of the enlightenment” - something that is unequivocally
done in the name of freedom, and for Horkheimer and Adorno “freedom in society is
inseparable from enlightenment thinking.” Any investigation of the complicity of the
enlightenment with freedom needs to take as a point of departure the critical message of
the enlightenment itself in order to retrieve its utopian impulse. And rather than
unreflectively abandoning the concept, or offering a somewhat ahistorical and highly
prophylactic reformulation of it such as the one done by the self-appointed heir of the
tradition, Jurgen Habermas, or taking the enlightenment as one coherent project that
needs either to be rejected or embraced (what Michel Foucault suitably termed “the
blackmail of the enlightenment”), Horkheimer and Adorno ask for a critical-reflective
turn within enlightened thinking/ 7 In so doing, they seek to render the concept of
enlightenment self-reflective in its concrete manifestations; hence in light of a concrete
historical predicament that is contradictory, and marred by the ambiguous legacy of both
progress and regression, an aporetic stance is what is called for to reflect on the
conditions of unfreedom and domination; “The aporia which faced us in our work thus
proved to be the first matter we had to investigate: the self-destruction of the
enlightenment.” To do otherwise, would be to masquerade the reality of suffering, and
thus be tacitly complicit with it. The aporetic stance is historically and politically infused,
not a philosophical axiom.
Indeed, Horkheimer and Adorno vehemently maintained that the “self-destruction
of the enlightenment” in its concrete historical articulations, especially in its despotic
27
Cf. Patricia J. Mills, Women, Nature, and Psyche.
191
modem political and cultural forms, need not to lead to its rejection. Rather, to
comprehend this dialectic requires a critical reflection on the historical double character
of this concept, in both its progressive and regressive tendencies. In its historical
articulations the concept of enlightenment has had both a radical political import
inasmuch as it argued for the emancipation from hierarchies of birth and tradition that
were perceived as naturalized and a regressive element complicit with domination. Its
element of regression presents a sharp if untenable distinction between myth and
enlightenment that oftentimes conceals domination not only of one class over another in
the current historical constellation of power, capitalism, but also of identity over
difference - over the others that escape its binaries of self-other, humanity and nature.
Both tendencies, as the argument of Dialectic of Enlightenment shows, are historically
located under the rubric of enlightenment. Hence, such appraisal of the enlightenment is
not only conceptual, or philosophical, but also deeply political. That is, it provides a
reflection whose genre has elicited debate among its interpreters: is it a new philosophy
of history and, thus, tainted with the stigma of this discredited genre? Or is it a social
myth, the true historical behind the history of civilization?28 Bearing the imprint of their
World War II predicament of exile - a crucial experience for Adorno’s version of critical
theory - Adomo and Horkheimer write:
We believe we have perceived with equal clarity ... that the very concept of that
thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions of society with
which it is intertwined, already contains the germ of the regression which is
28
For a stimulating discussion of these possibilities see Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), chap 1. Alongside Gillian Rose’s The Melancholy Science: An
Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Jarvis’
is the other best single volume on Adomo to appear thus far in English.
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taking place everywhere today. If enlightenment does not assimilate reflection on
this regressive moment, it seals its own fate. By leaving consideration of the
destructive side of progress to its enemies, thought in its headlong rush into
pragmatism forfeits its sublating [aufhebenden] character, and therefore its
relation to truth
.
29
By calling attention to this regressive moment in its concrete historical manifestations
this authorship of Horkheimer and Adorno embarks on a “primal history of subjectivity”
(Urgechichte der Subjektivitat), a genealogy of reason that speculatively comprehends
the coexistence of myth and enlightenment, and how enlightenment has reverted into
mythology. And in doing so not only do they seek to dispel the illusion portrayed in the
binary enhghtenment/myth but also in the historical-temporal categories such as
ancient/modem, rendering enlightenment self-reflective about its own relation to myth
and tradition, as well as bringing to bear the enlightening elements that the sharp binary
neglects in the historical practice labeled mythology . 30 Odysseus is thus called bourgeois;
and enlightenment, the self-image of its proponents notwithstanding, partakes in the old
practice of sacrifice. The regression to mythology and barbarism is accordingly not
external to the enlightenment as a historical process, or cast as a remnant of a primitive
past; rather, these are already contained within the historical and concrete manifestations
of enlightenment itself. And as a commentator has correctly noted, pure notions of
culture, nature, myth or enlightenment are unthinkable, especially for Adorno . 31
‘ 9
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment , xvi. Quotations from the original come from
Dialektik der Aufklarung: Philosophische Fragmente (Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), 5.
30
Cf. Jarvis, Adorno
,
21-24.
31
Jarvis, Adorno
,
especially chaps. 1, 3, 8.
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But the regressive element hardly exhausts the concept. On the contrary, its
complicity with historical forms of domination and unfreedom calls for a critical
genealogy of its formulations in both their institutional and political complicity. It is the
destructive aspect of enlightenment’s faith in progress that needs to be critically
pondered. In doing so, the authors delineate the task pertaining to critical theory: for
critical theory to be critical, and avoid forfeiting its critical and emancipatory promise, it
has to epistemologically inquire into both the conceptual and the concrete historical
formulations of the enlightenment and its betrayal of the promise of emancipation
emerging from it. Accordingly, “What is at issue ... is not culture as a value ... but the
necessity for enlightenment to reflect on itself if humanity is not to be totally betrayed.”
A reflection in which the memory of suffering provides the guise for critically theorizing
from what in Minima Moralia Adorno referred to as the standpoint of redemption: “What
is at stake is not conservation of the past but the fulfillment of past hopes.”32 And such
fulfillment entails more than the imposition of imperatives for future human relations. On
the contrary, in order to fulfill past hopes, one of the pressing tasks is to look at the
history of concepts that, in important ways, both enacted and constrained those hopes; in
this case, the concept of enlightenment itself, and to comprehend the concept in its
paradoxes and changing historical significations in specific historical periods. But to do
so involves more than a purely conceptual analysis such as the one Hegel carried on in
his Science ofLogic
,
an impossibility from Adorno’s epistemological perspective. It also
involves more than a historiographical narrative of the different misgivings of the
enlightenment in different episodes of European history. Instead, episodes of both are
32
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, xvii.
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entwined in a series of philosophical fragments that approach the main quest.on - “the
self-destruction of enlightenment” - from different perspectives, shedding light on this
question without seeking to sort out the question in all its manifestations, each section
thus comprising an element in a constellation of meanings. Hence, the fragmentary nature
of the text attests to its epistemological intent.
This preliminary reading hardly exhausts all the complexities interpreters identify
with this text. Long considered as the founding text of the critical theory tradition in the
twentieth century, Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic ofEnlightenment is at once one of
the most discussed and least understood text within this tradition. This complex and rich
text has been depicted in a variety of ways with different degrees of approval. It has been
described as: “a radical critique of reason denouncing the union of reason and
domination” (Habermas); “a difficult book to criticize, for it is a series of hit-or-miss
aphorisms rather than a sustained argument” (Rorty); Horkheimer and Adorno’s
response to Marx’s critique of political economy,” one that sought “to decode the
history of the philosophical subject as the domination of nature whether under the guise
of myth or of enlightened reason” (Rose); a text that provides a kind of dual vision, “a
mediating text, that “is uniquely situated” to asses the now seemingly defunct
modem/postmodem divide, thus offering a sort of theoretical “third way” that in turn
shows the limitations of the first two (Rocco); a “genealogy of reason, whose effect was
...to unsettle philosophy by exposing its complicity with the forces of anti-philosophy”
while retaining a critical concept of reason and tradition that reverses Friedrich
Nietzsche’s will to power into a “will to powerlessness” (Wolin); a text that continues
Hegel’s critique of the dialectic of enlightenment and superstition in the Phenomenology
195
°fSpirit
'
bUt d0GS S° by combmmg the Webenan theme of rationalization with a concern
with the domination of nature, thus reclaiming “the utopia in the concept of reason”
(Wiggershaus); its authors’ multilayered “attempt to enlighten enlightenment and
rationality
... first
,
against the myth or fetishism of technology and the absolution of
mere technological or scientific rationality; second
,
against rationality in the service of
class domination; third, against the repressive exclusion of the other, the alien, the idiot,
the outsider, and last but not least, ‘undomesticated’ nature or life” (Brunkhorst).
33
Intriguingly, this text still remains uncharted territory for contemporary political
theorists. Out of the aforementioned readings, the ones that either pose its irrational core
(Habermas) or its irrelevance for the twentieth- first century (Rorty) turn out to be the
more widespread in Anglo-American contemporary political theory. This may be due in
part to at least two distinct features of this activity as it is practiced in the Anglo-
American West: liberalism, as a tradition, has become hegemonic in the last quarter of
the last century, and seems to continue to be so in the early twentieth-first; and what
passes for critical theory is mostly Habermas’ version, which along with post-structuralist
currents of thought, often reclaim critical credentials but what is critical in their
formulations oftentimes remains a mystery. These commonly held charges, however,
33
Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (MIT Press, 1981); Richard Rorty, “The
Overphilosophication of Politics,” Constellations 7 (March 2000): 128; Gillian Rose, The Melancholy
Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 4-5; Christopher Rocco, “Between Modernity and
Postmodemity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment Against the Grain,” 72; Sheldon S. Wolin, “Reason in
Exile: Critical Theory and Technological Society,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition
,
ed.
Arthur M. Melzer, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 167; Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt
School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1994), 327, 331; Hauke Brunkhorst, “The Enlightenment of Rationality: Remarks on Horkheimer and
Adorno’s Dialectic ofEnlightenment,” Constellations 7 (March 2000): 134, respectively.
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to willful misreading or perhaps just plain
wildly miss the mark, either due
disingenuousness
.
34
What seems to be lacking is a political reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment in
order to critically discern its political import. In other words, even when the authors’
reading of the dialectic of enlightenment is politically infused, the political aspect of this
dialectic remained untheorized. This is especially so given that in the few instances in
which the Dialectic of Enlightenment, or Adorno’s reflections in general, are read from
the perspective of their political significance, the verdicts are often negative. For
instance, in a careful and complex reading from the perspective of the tradition of
western political theory, Sheldon S. Wolin has suggested that the text, and the vocation of
critical theory it exemplifies, ultimately lacks political import - its call for theoretical
distance has led to an uprooted distance from both politics and the political. Or as
Christopher Rocco, a more sympathetic reader, has put it, the form of the text and the
intersecting voices of its authorship, suggest an openness that is in tune with democratic
politics. Formally speaking this might be accurate. And yet, democracy is not a theme in
the text, let alone the political aspect of the dialectic of enlightenment — even when
thinkers such as Kant and Hegel are discussed, their political writings are seldom
mentioned. Illustrative also, is the fact that the authors managed to discuss Bacon and
34 Most of these charges have been countered by serious scholarship and some terrific readings of the text
have emerged. On Habermas’s misreading, see the conclusive rebuttal by Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Back to
Adorno,” Telos 81 (Fall 1989). See also Hullot-Kentor’ s introduction to his re-translation of the Odysseus
excursus of the Dialectic of Enlightenment in “Notes on Dialectic of Enlightenment : Translating the
Odysseus Essay,” New German Critique 56 (1992), 101-108. Other interpretations of the text that are
critical of Habermas’ are found in Romand Coles, Rethinking Generosity (Cornell University Press, 1997);
Rocco, “Between Modernity and Postmodemity”; and Martin Morris, Rethinking the Communicative Turn
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2001). The most stimulating readings of the text can be found in the aforementioned
essays by Rocco and Wolin, and in Anson Rabinbach, “Why Were the Jews Sacrificed?” New German
Critique 8 1 (Fall 2000).
197
Descartes while never mentioning Hobbes, even if, arguably, it is this triad of thinkers
who most influentially constituted the discourse of science and domination that led to
enlightenment’s demise. Finally, there is no sustained analysis of modem power in this
text. All these seemingly adding ammunition to Wolin’s ultimately negative verdict.
Even so, the political import of the text might lie somewhere else. In what
follows, I would like to offer a reading of the text that contrasts with these readings. But
instead of offering yet another corrective exegesis - which far exceeds the bounds of this
dissertation - in what follows I rather pose the question of how to read the Dialectic of
Enlightenment politically. This question is pursued by taking on some of its central
themes and offer a reading of how the process Horkheimer and Adorno spelled out in
relation to theoretical philosophy and cultural theory could be cast politically. Stated
somewhat differently, instead of trying to find the political implications of the text itself,
the present reading endeavors to find the political correlates to the process this authorship
reflected on in order to spell out its political dimension. And thus to offer what could be
considered a political excursus of the dialectic of enlightenment - an excursus that
includes both an exegesis of certain sections of the Dialectic of Enlightenment and an
extrapolation of its themes by means of reading other traditions within Western political
thought.
* * *
A theme that emerges prominently in the Dialectic of Enlightenment is the monotheistic
aspiration of reason. In the second excursus Horkheimer and Adomo write: “The demise
of idolatry follows necessarily from the ban on mythology pronounced by Jewish
monotheism and enforced against the changing objects of adoration in the history of
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thought by that monotheism’s secularized form, enlightenment.”35 Enlightenment’s
concept of reason emerges as a suitable candidate for a similar place to the one once
clamed by Judeo-Christian monotheism, even if despoiled of its mythic attributes. “Just
as myths already entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment entangles itself
more deeply in mythology.” 36 Furthermore, they write: “In their mastery of nature, the
creative God and the ordering mind are alike. Man’s likeness to God consists in
sovereignty over existence, in the lordly gaze, in the command .”37 Here resides what they
conceived as enlightenment’s totalitarian moment
.
38
Also,
Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has
always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters.
Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity.
Enlightenment’s program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to
dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge. Bacon, “the father of
experimental philosophy,” brought these motifs together
.
39
Although not noticed by Horkheimer and Adorno, it is in Hobbes where fear and mastery
are theorized together as part of a political theory, which alongside Bacon and Descartes,
constitute the triad of thinkers that are constitutive of the culture of instrumental reason
and despotism that Horkheimer and Adorno identified in the Dialectic ofEnlightenment,
and with the form of modem power that came along with it. And fear and necessity are
35
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 89.
36
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 8.
37
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 6.
38
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 4: “Enlightenment is totalitarian.”
39
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 1
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also constitutive of the culture of despotism that emerges as part of the political logic of
the dialectic of enlightenment. Within enlightenment, freedom is increasingly understood
with scientific necessity, while superstition becomes it opposite
.
40
“But the
Enlightenment discerned the old powers in the Platonic and Aristotelian heritage of
metaphysics and suppressed the universal categories’ claims to truth as superstition .”41
In this formulation of the enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno found a
complicity of identity thinking - which in Adorno’s philosophy translates into a remnant
of idealism that is complicit with domination - with the abstract discourse of science and
mathematics preferred by the enlightenment. “For enlightenment,” they write, “anything
which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with
suspicion.”42 And a correlate of this process is found in the hostility to multiplicity and
contingency in this discourse: “The multiplicity of forms is reduced to position and
arrangement, history to fact, things to matter.”43 Abstract discourse had at once two
implications: in the epistemological realm, “[formal logic] offered Enlightenment
thinkers a schema for making the world calculable”; while, politically, “The same
equations govern bourgeois justice and enlightenment’s canon .”44 This is nowhere more
evident than in Descartes understanding of freedom as emancipation from prejudice and
opinion, but a conception of freedom that is indifferent to history, and that paves the way
40
See the highly suggestive reading of Hobbes and despotism found in Sheldon S. Wolin’s essay “Hobbes
and the Culture of Despotism,” Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory
,
ed. Mary G. Dietz (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 1990), 9-36.
41
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 3.
42
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 3.
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Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 4.
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for a culture not only of individual doubt and skepticism that is dogmatic in itself, but one
that partakes in a particularly modem constellation of power, where political and
economic liberalism coalesce
.
45
Stated somewhat differently, as in Kant’s philosophy, where the subject offers the
schemata and categories to apprehend the world, and thus the mind is conceptualized as
the “lawgiver" of nature, the principle of abstraction plays a part in the understanding of
rights and justice of bourgeois liberalism. Both procedural-instrumental reason and an
abstract discourse of rights, liberty, justice, and tolerance are part of the dialectic of the
enlightenment - it offers an emancipatory promise that is not attainable from within its
own terms, given its historical complicity with its opposite. Both also present signs of
hostility to substantive difference, and thus attempts to colonize it by means of its
abstract language: “Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things
comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities. ... Unity remains the watchword
from Parmenides to Russell. All gods and qualities must be destroyed.”46 A principle of
equivalence that is at once present in contractarian versions of liberalism, as well as in
recent versions that are presumably more egalitarian, such as Ronald Dworkin’s, or in
difference-living liberalisms of John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin, and George Kateb, where
individuality is praised, albeit it also in an utterly abstract way . 47 Here abstraction is a
45
See the discussion in Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 354-57.
46
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 4-5.
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William E. Connolly’s liberalism is an exception to this, though it has other significant problems.
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correlate of colonization, in which substantial differences are subsumed. “Whatever
might be different is made the same ”48 Accordingly:
Thinking, as understood by the Enlightenment, is the process of establishing a
unified, scientific order and of deriving factual knowledge from pnnciples,
whether these principles are interpreted as arbitrarily posited axioms, innate ideas,
or the highest abstractions. The laws of logic establish the most universal
relationships within the order and define them
.
49
Politically, the dialectic of enlightenment translates into the standardization of difference
coupled with indifference and lack of meaningful political participation. “Only the total
identification of the population with these monstrosities of power [‘armed power
blocs ], they write, so deeply imprinted as to have become second nature and stopping
all the pores of consciousness, maintains the masses in a state of absolute apathy which
makes them capable of their miraculous achievements .”50 Admittedly, this is a rather
isolated formulation, even if a very striking one, due to the sensibility for the political
that is found in embryonic from. But what is significant is that difference is not denied in
any of these formulations; it is rather standardized and subsumed in ways such that their
recognition does not translate into a threat to the system of power that both economic and
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 8. For as Horkheimer and Adorno spell it out:
“Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment stands in the same relationship to its objects as fate, whose
concept it eradicates: as liquidation. Under the leveling rule of abstraction, which makes everything in
nature repeatable, and of industry, for which abstraction prepared the way, the liberated finally themselves
become herd ( Trupp ), which Hegel identified as the outcome of enlightenment.” Ibid. 9.
49
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 63.
50
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 169. They further write: “The reification by virtue
of which the power structure, made possible solely by the passivity of the masses, appears to those same
masses as an iron reality, has been consolidated to the point where any spontaneity, or even the ability to
conceive of the true sate of affairs, has necessarily become an eccentric utopia, an irrelevant sectarianism.”
Ibid., 170.
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political liberalism constitute. Indeed, the affixation of d.fference is constitutive of the
status quo.
Even so, as is the case with other concepts, such as “progress” and
“enlightenment,” there is a double character to the historical articulation of the concept of
reason, which for Horkheimer and Adorno manifests itself in the ambiguity the concept
bears in Kant’s philosophy. Also in that ambiguity, the utopian moment of thinking
emerges Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, even if it is ultimately
sabotaged by its own entwinement with domination by means of the instrumental
understanding of reason that accompanies it. In Kant’s formulation: “The whole
represents the idea of true universality, utopia.” Yet, alongside this utopia emerges the
other aspect of reason: “reason [as] the agency of calculating thought.”51 And this
dialectic of reason is hardly innocent to the emergence of capitalism in Europe. On the
contrary, these two processes are pretty much intertwined, as the speculative presentation
of the identity-non-identity of these shows: “The true nature of the schematism which
externally coordinates the universal and the particular, the concept and the individual
case, finally turns out, in current science, to be the interest of industrial society.” In other
words, insofar as enlightenment “equates truth with scientific thinking” it ends up in
complicity with an economic system, capitalism, and its historical political logic,
liberalism, and its critical import is thus nullified . 52 Or to state it somewhat differently,
according to Horkheimer and Adorno, capitalism, whose emergence in Europe coincided
with enlightened views of freedom and progress, especially through the establishment of
51
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 65. See also, 66, 68-74, 93.
52
Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 65, 66, 73-74.
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commerce, is everything but innocent in this dialectic. In its historical form, close to the
aftermath of World War II, in liberal-capitalist societies, such as the USA, the principle
of commodity exchange further contributed to the disappearance of the individual and the
pliability of the masses
.
53
This is what later on Adorno would refer to as the fascist
tendencies of post-war liberal democracy in the following stark terms: “I consider the
survival of National Socialism within democracy to be potentially more menacing than
the survival of fascist tendencies against democracy.”54 Indeed, capitalism’s complicity
with an abstract liberalism renders suspicious the self-satisfying disassociation of liberal
capitalism from the dialectic of enlightenment in its extreme forms: Stalinist and fascist
totalitarian regimes, which became the trademark post world war II liberal orthodoxy.
By casting capitalism as part of the dialectic of enlightenment the authors were
not merely reasserting the Marxist bent of their reflections - Marx’s analysis of the
commodity form and the exchange principle figure too largely in the analysis to merit
further reassurance - nor were they simply asserting that enlightenment is totalitarian,
therefore nothing stands outside of it . 55 Rather, by comprehensively, and speculatively,
looking at the intersection of the catastrophes of the Great War with liberal-capitalism,
the authors are able to break the spell of the ideological divide of East/West and show the
common ancestry of these catastrophes and liberal-capitalism, along with their mutual
complicity. Thus a more comprehensive critical theory can emerge, one in which the
53
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, xvii; DA, 4
54
Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry Pickford (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998), 90.
55
For a critical appraisal of Adorno’s relation to Marx see the Rose’s The Melancholy Science and her
essay “From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking,” in Judaism and Modernity (London: Blackwell, 1992).
See also Jarvis, Adorno, especially chap. 2.
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entanglement of instrumental reason, power, and domination can he discerned, which
allows them, for instance, to see the complicity of the dialectic of enlightenment in anti-
Semitism, as well as its critique in the name of the discourse of universality that is also
present in enlightenment’s utopia: “Only the liberation of thought from power, the
abolition of violence, could realize the idea which has been unrealized until now: that the
Jew is a human being. This would be a step away from the anti-Semitic society, which
drives both Jews and others into sickness, and toward a human one .”56
Enlightenment itself, having mastered itself and assumed its own power, could
break the limits of enlightenment ”57 The Dialectic of Enlightenment thus attempts to
recast the concept of “enlightenment” as a critique of suffering and domination that
seeks to retrieve the critical import of enlightenment from its modem manifestations as
instrumental rationality, the imperatives of formalistic organization, and the principle of
identity. As Horkheimer and Adorno formulate it in a passage conveniently bypassed by
some of their critics, “The critique of enlightenment ... is intended to prepare a positive
concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement in blind domination .”58
Or as Adorno later on articulated this critical impulse: “An adequate philosophical
thinking is not only critical of the status quo and its reified replica in consciousness but is
equally critical of itself. [...] Only in this way does reflective thought become more than
56
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 165. The best treatment of anti-Semitism in the
Dialectic ofEnlightenment is found in Rabinbach, “Why Were the Jews Sacrificed?”
57
Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, 172.
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a repetitive presentation of wha, is experienced. Its rationality, as a critical one,
transcends rationalization.”59
At this point crucial questions emerge: What does such a posttive account of the
enlightenment entail? What exactly is its relationship with the cause of freedom? How to
translate that commitment to freedom politically? But perhaps a more important question
is what such a reckoning might look like in the contemporary world, more than fifty years
after Adorno and Horkheimer formulated their critique? Is reason still in exile in relation
to the contemporary world? Or to state the question somewhat differently, is exile a
metaphor for the critical distance needed to preserve the critical dimension o( reason? Or
is exile what truncates the political import of critical theory?60
Yet, even while in exile, reason’s concern with domination has a political
dimension that manifests in the authors’ concern with indifference and the lack of
political culture of democratic participation that they conceived as characteristic of the
reign of instrumental rationality in the catastrophes of the age of Auschwitz, Hiroshima,
Gulag, and Dresden. It is this particular political dimension that I shall explore in the
reminder of this chapter by means of the political correlate of the monotheistic and
abstract aspirations of reason, which have found expression in a culture of despotism, in
' 9
Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Philosophical Thinking,” in Critical Models, 133.
60 On the contrasting views of the critical import of exile in Adorno see Edward W. Said, Representations
of the Intellectual (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), especially pp. 47-64; and his essay “Reflections on
Exile, in Edward W. Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000). For a different view, see Sheldon S. Wolin’s essay “Reason in Exile: Critical Theory and
Technological Society,” in Technology and the Western Tradition, ed. Arthur Melzer, et al. (Cornell
University Press, 1993). For Wolin, the notion of exile in Dialectic of Enlightenment became to signify a
lack of political engagement, the “loss of political context”: “To wander is to have no context. We might
think of exile, therefore, as signifying a certain kind of loss, loss of political context,” p. 172. Thus, for
Wolin, the Dialectic of Enlightenment, despite its trenchant critique of instrumental reason, or perhaps
because of it, leads the authors to rehearse the ancient quarrel between philosophy and politics with anti-
political results.
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the despotism of liberal democracy, and the understanding of v.olence and civilization
that are also intnnsic to the dialectic of enlightenment. Even if Horkheimer and Adorno
conceptualized the dialectic of progress and barbarism that stems from the enlightenment
as a response to the caesura that Auschwitz represented for Occidental civilization, the
fact that they try to do so historically allows for the self-reflective turn that follows. In
doing so, I would like to first explore the coupling of civilization and barbarism, and then
explore how this coupling is operative in the constellation of power inaugurated in the
Renaissance. Even if an analysis of power as such hardly figures in Horkheimer and
Adorno’s text, the emergence of a new form of power intrinsic to the dialectic of
enlightenment should not be overlooked. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels
immortalized this image of unprecedented power: a seemingly permanent revolution, “a
constant revolutionizing of society
... [and of] production,” was perceived as trademarks
of the new kind of power that the bourgeoisie has brought about, and that was indeed
intrinsic to it.
61
. Intrinsic to this new form of power was a culture of despotism. And
intrinsic to its origins was imperialism and the discourse of political sovereignty. All of
these are important components of the constellation of power that the dialectic of
enlightenment constitutes.
* * *
As part of the dialectic of enlightenment, civilization and order are coupled in ways that
simultaneously conceal the violence in the discourse of civilization, while being
explicitly concerned with violence. But as a historical concept, civilization entails
“notions such as improvements in comfort, advances in education, politer manners,
61
See Karl Marx and Fredric Engels, The Manifesto ofthe Communist Party.
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cultivation of the arts and sciences, growth of commerce and industry, and acquisition of
material goods and luxuries .”62 In contrast to an earlier, primarily linguistically based
formulation, the discourse of civilization carries with it an ideal that stands in contrast to
what were considered primeval states of humanity, whose attributes were the negation of
what the content of civilization stood for. Even before “natives” were stumbled upon in
the sixteenth century, Europeans had this image of the uncivilized, the barbarian.
In the modem world, civilization thus becomes a Unitarian discourse that
describes “a fundamental process of history, and the end result of that process established
an antithesis between civilization and a hypothetical primordial state (whether it be called
nature, savagery, or barbarism)”63 It also portends ideals of cleanliness, politeness,
refinement, and civility, ideals that would be coupled with the intellectual and political
discourses of modernity: science and liberalism. The first modem articulations of this
concept of civilization are found in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; formulations
that would later on take full shape in the eighteenth century’s philosophies of history of
such thinkers as Adam Ferguson and Condorcet. Yet, the transmogrification of the
concept in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance had important implications for its usages
from the eighteenth century on, which is when the term “civilization” is actually coined .64
Accordingly, in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century political thought, figures
such as Condorcet, Adam Ferguson, Benjamin Constant, and John Stuart Mill finally saw
Jean Starobinski, “The Word Civilization,” in Blessings in Disguise
,
trans. Arthur Goldhammer
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 3.
63
Starobinski, “The Word Civilization,” 5.
64
See Anthony Pagden, “The Defense of Civilization in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory,” History of the
Human Sciences 1 (1988), 35. See also, Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires (New York: The Modem
Library, 2001), especially chaps. 7-10; Starobinski’s “The Word Civilization”; and Raymond Williams’
discussion in Keywords: A Vocabulary ofCulture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
208
the path to civilization secured: even if Constant deplored “the spirit of conquest” still
latent in Europe, in the emergence of commerce he saw alternative means to acquire the
same end that was pursued through war, “that of possessing what is desired”; meanwhile,
Condorcet and Mill could foresee only a few scattered impediments to the otherwise
“natural flow of knowledge,” in European’s civilization path of history as progress; in the
case of Mill, even the possibility of a “stationary state,” a notion deplored by classical
political economists, was something both achievable and desirable
.
65
Indeed, the idea of a
commercial society” was an intrinsic component for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
European political thought. Constant’s liberalism is archetypical here: for him, the
commercial society became a premise that imposed constraints on political
understandings of rule. Constant thus associated progress with the emerging “commercial
society. In this view he echoed the anti-Spaniard sentiment of eighteenth-century Europe
that saw commerce, as opposed to conquest, as a more legitimate form of imperialism - a
view that even though not uncritical in relation to the possible vices commerce can bring
to Europe, was entirely silent about an intrinsic element of it: the violence, brutality, and
pillage accompanying Europe’s newly fashioned commercial empire
.
66
Still, in its historical formulation, the term “civilization” is hardly unequivocal
and has had a double legacy that needs to be dialectically understood. On the one hand,
6 On Condorcet, see Pagden, “The Defense of Civilization,” 36; see also, Benjamin Constant, “The Spirit
of Conquest and Usurpation and their Relation to European Civilization,” in Political Writings, ed. and
trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 53.
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dunng the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries i, was been deployed as a criterion to
judge those who were considered barbarian, savage, and uncivilized; on the other hand,
civil,zahon became a critical concept within those already civilized. As Jean
Starobinski's semantic history of the tern, suggests, at this particular historical juncture
“it is no longer enough for a civilization to be a civilization, it must be a true
civilization.”67 Accordingly, when deployed in relation to those who where considered
part of the general concept of civilization, it performed a critical task in denouncing
irregularities and injustices. By the same token, in the hands of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
and others, it signified a negative process that was detrimental for humankind.
Rousseau s discourses, for instance, do not break with the contrast between the savage
and the civilized. Instead, in his writings the comparison is merely inverted, and the
civilized is cast in a negative light from the perspective of an idealized conception of the
savage. Civilization also has had the function of a normative concept deployed in order to
discriminate between the civilized and its opposites, leading thus to the two shapes that
the critique of the discourse of civilization has taken: “a critique of civilization and a
critique formulated in the name of civilization .”68
Still, civilization as a discourse became an increasingly unitary concept, as “it
took on a sacred aura,” and preeminence in the Enlightenment
.
69 As such, it demonized
its antonyms. Thus infused with monotheistic pretensions, the acceptance for different
modes of being - already very much constrained by the representation of its others as
67
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barbarians and savages- declined, and the sanctification of its defenders grew in
proportion to the vilification and demonization of its detractors; a relationship that, in
turn, provided a mantle of legitimacy for the violence of civilizational discourse. To be
sure, within the Enlightenment, the colonial discourse of conquest that took place in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was criticized by figures such as Condorcet and
Herder.™ And yet, as the case of Condorcet suggests, this condemnation was in turn
marred by a secular equivalent of religiously saturated colonization: rather than
evangelize the savages, it is time to civilize and emancipate them, the new euphemism for
colonization and assimilation
.
71
While the sacred connotation was rejected its
monotheistic ambitions were retained.
Different degrees of variation notwithstanding, in the West, from the imperial
adventures of the Greek city-states to the American empire, the peace and prosperity at
home has been secured by external expeditions that often do not guarantee the same
principles abroad, thus creating a dual conception of power and sovereignty that has
allowed the West to sustain a civilized way of life, while brutally civilizing abroad . 72 hi
one of his most acute observations, Max Weber tacitly identified imperialism, along with
the French Revolution, at the root of modernity: “The historical origin of modem
70
For an argument on the presence of an anti-imperial strand in the Enlightenment, which includes Kant’s
and Herder’s accounts, see Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment and Anti-Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
71
Starobinski, “The Word Civilization,” 18.
72 From a historical point of view, it is important to distinguish modem European imperialism in its two
distinct phases, and its Roman roots, from the Athenian experience. Helpful discussions are found in
Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires. See also Pagden’s earlier book, Lords ofAll The World. In the past
year, a plethora of books dealing with the new American imperialism have been published. In my
judgment, Michael Mann’s book constitutes the most lucid account yet published. See Michael Mann,
Incoherent Empire (London and New York: Verso, 2003). Mann’s book should be read alongside Ellen
Meiksins Wood, Empire ofCapital (London and New York: Verso, 2003).
211
freedom has had certain unique preconditions which will never repeat themselves. Let us
enumerate the most important of these: First, the overseas expansions. In the armies of
Cromwell, in the French constituent assembly, in our whole economic life even today the
breeze across the ocean is felt ...»” Also, as Richard Tuck has put it, Weber's
formulation attests to "The historical conjunction between liberal politics at home and the
‘expansion of Europe’ overseas ...”74 In fact, the origins of liberalism cannot be
disentangled from this imperial context of war and violence: “a period of astonishing
violence and political transformation, comparable to anything seen in the twentieth
century.”75 Even so, most twentieth-century liberal theories, from Judith Shklar to John
Rawls, Charles Taylor, and beyond, have conveniently silenced this history
.
76
Undoubtedly, there have been scattered divergent voices that have questioned this duality
from within the western tradition. And these questionings that have taken shape by means
of political, secular and eschatological languages, though these have almost always been
marginal
.
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But what then is the precise relationshtp between imperialism, the discourse of
political sovereignty, the French Revolution and the nation-state, with the dialectic of
enlightenment? Also, where does the civilizational discourse of the west fit within this
constellation of power?
* * *
In the historical juncture of the Renaissance, a constellation of ideas and practices
coalesced to shape the intersection between violence, modem reason, anti-democracy,
and capitalism. If 1492 signified the beginning of the first phase of European
imperialism, Europe’s expansion to its West, the presence of the East as a constitutive
other of the European imagination was already present in the Greek and Roman world -
an insight that in the early modem period did not escape Montesquieu’s attention. 78
Herodotus’ barbarians found equivalents in Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. “Without the
Greek there is no barbarian. 79 According to the Greeks, a barbarian was someone who
was perceived as incapable of speech — a raw understanding that does not immediately
translate into a gradation of the barbarian’s humanity or lack thereof. Historians have
pointed out that the Egyptians of the seventh century BC were considered barbarians
under this definition, and the Greeks evidently did see them as inferiors. Even so, the
common thread running through all these conceptualizations was the sense of inferiority
of the barbarian vis-a-vis the civilized, at least from the fourth century BC on, when
“barbaros had become, and was forever to remain, a word which was used only of
78
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213
cultural or mental inferiors”*" Indeed, it is in Aristotle's philosophy where the
concept,on of barbansm that informed the Roman and Christ,an worlds until the
Renaissance will be found. Here, too, barbarism would be initially equated with the
natural slave.” But it is not until the eighteenth century, in its discursive coupling with
civilization, that the discourse on barbarism goes back to center stage in the European
imagination
.
81
Political theories emerging in the Renaissance, such as those of Jean Bodin and
Niccolo Machiavelli, were infused by comparisons of European and Asian social
formations, especially due to the relative closeness of Turkish power, which increasingly
became the preferred point of contrast for the West . 82 As barbarism had played a
delimiting role for the ancients, and as Aristotle’s philosophy provided the initial
framework to understanding the new world - as the debates amongst Spanish theologians
and jurists in the sixteenth century attest - Asian social formations and institutional
structures served as the “other” through which the increasingly conscious European
identity was increasingly constituted. In other words, during the Renaissance both east
and west, along with the rediscovery of antiquity, were crucial for the construal of the
See Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative
Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 14ff.
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European imagination
.
83
Indeed, within Feudalism - which in its European variant is best
described as a somewhat decentered system of parcellized sovereignties - there was a
significant level of transnational interaction, even if mostly based on conquest rather than
commerce. And such interactions informed these contrasts. By the same token, as
commerce increasingly replaced conquest as the axis of imperial power in the eighteenth
century, the Spaniards - mostly due to Bartolome de Las Casas’ A Short Account of the
History of the Indies
,
which made the brutality of the Spaniard conquest famous through
Europe - came to symbolize the destruction and brutality associated with the principle of
conquest, and were thus identified with the Turks
.
84
Incidentally, the Turks also
symbolized Europe’s image of despotism. An intrinsic component of the dialectic of
violence and progress was the constant invocation of oriental imagery - invocations that
at once caution against excesses of violence at home while legitimizing them abroad,
especially in the newly found American continent. Progress at home was secured by a
counter-violent state while barbarism abroad was secured by its crude exercise. In the
twentieth-century, with the Great War, this process was significantly reversed. This is not
to deny that armed conflict was ceaseless in Europe from the sixteenth-century religious
wars until the treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, and that from the
seventeenth century on, all European wars were to have an internal and an external
component. And yet, the brutality and violence outside
,
in the zones of exception to the
83 As Perry Anderson puts it: “The Renaissance remains ... the crux of European history as a whole: the
double moment of an equally unexampled expansion of space, and recovery of time. It is at this point, with
the rediscovery of the Ancient world, and the discovery of the New World, that the European state-system
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European domestic rule that comprised the colonial worlds, albeit sometimes correlating
with internal violence, hardly parallel it.
But the significance of the Renaissance for imperialism and the dialectic of
enlightenment hardly ends in the contrast of east and west, and the dual nature of the
language of barbarism, and as I shall argue shortly, despotism. With Columbus stumbling
upon the Caribbean in 1492, the archetypical example of Europe’s construction of its
others began to take place: the conquest of America. 85 If the European order was
historically constituted by a series of oppositions to barbarism, which increasingly took
shape in reference to the Ottoman Empire in the East, along with the interplay of utopia
and savagery, this encounter provided Europeans with a concrete and historically existing
“database” for the latter. But as historical anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot has
argued, the significance of 1492, “from the point of view of contemporaries,” resided in
the conquest of Granada that represented its annexation to Castile and the downfall of the
Muslim kingdom, and in the expulsion of the Jews from the newly Christian territory. 86
“Indeed,” Trouillot writes, “nascent Europe could turn its eyes to the Atlantic only
because the consolidation of political borders and the concentration of political power of
85
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the Christian God presaged the advent of internal order.”87 The internal order that
Trouillot detects found its correlate in the outside in an imperial order that by the
eighteenth-century has supplanted conquest with commerce its dnving force. In this new
configuration of external and internal power the triad of savagery, utopia, and order
became a crucial component. Although it was initially conceptualized in the sixteenth-
century, this triad was hardly innocent to the scientific racism and the civilizational
impulse of nineteenth-century imperialism. In this juncture, Thomas More’s Utopia
became the representative text. At once it contained the main “slots” that where
constitutive of European utopian thought: the element of non-place, an outside was
constitutive of the utopian ideal, along with order, and the colonization of the savage
.
88
Out of these senes of slots emerged different constellations of power and ideology that
gave birth to a plethora of intersections between European ideologies and the new world
across the axes of class, race, and gender
.
89
In fact, as scholars of imperialism have
shown, not only gendered and familial metaphors (i.e. “virgin lands” and “the savage as a
child ) pervade the apprehension of the new world, but gender dynamics were intrinsic
to, and constitutive of, imperialism in both its discursive and institutional forms . 90 And
there is no “last instance” here - race, gender, and class were mutually constituted in the
87
Trouillot, “Anthropology and the Savage Slot,” 30-31.
88
Trouillot, “Anthropology and the Savage Slot,” 3 Iff. See also Pagden, Lords of all the World, 76-77.
According to Meiksins Wood, More was “the first major English writer to revive the ancient Roman
concept of colonia to designate the settlement of foreign lands.” See her Empire of Capital, 74-75.
On how modem understandings of gender, race, and class emerged as part of the dialectical relationships
between Europe and its Others, see Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's
History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Carnal
Knowledge
;
and Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest
(New York: Routledge: 1995).
90
See McClintock, Imperial Leather, 1-17.
217
different htstorical articulations of European imperialism.” Once again, an
-order” tha,
by the eighteenth century would mostly be based on the substitution of commeree for
conquest as the guiding forces of overseas expansion. Thus Kant’s and Constant’s rather
naive invocations of world peace and the end of the spirit of conquest, respectively, can
be cast in a different light: Constant was entirely oblivious to the effects of the
commercial society in the non-European world; Kant, his self-professed anti-imperialism
notwithstanding, winds up endorsing the narrative of historical “stages” that served so
well imperialist adventures, and, like Constant, was oblivious to economic and
constitutional imperialism
.
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But the true significance of this constellation perhaps lies in the epistemology of
power that it brought about, one similarly predicated on an identitarian principle that took
many forms: as colonization [liberalism at home], as a process of assimilation, as a
principle of attachment, and as a “savage” slot in all its different configurations.
Europeans tried to bring the increasingly abundant newness of the new world into its
modes of thought, and thus tried to accommodate it by reference to Christendom’s ideas
of order, harmony, unity in diversity,” etc. For sixteenth-century Europeans, as
historian J. H. Elliot has put it, “Everything that could be known about America must
have its place in the universal scheme.”93 Or as intellectual historian Anthony Pagden has
suggested, in the very term “discovery” resides the idea that something new presents
As Ann Stoler puts it in relation to the often-neglected role of sexuality in discussions of imperialism:
“Colonial discourses of sexuality were productive of class and racial power, not mere reflections of them.”
See Stoler, Race and the Education ofDesire, 174.
9
" See James Tully, “The Kantian Idea of Europe,” in The Idea of Europe, 332-33, 335. Cf. Muthu,
Enlightenment Against Empire, chap. 5.
93
Elliot, The Old World and the New, 3 1
.
218
.tself ,0 one’s gaze, and for Europeans, “A ’New World’ had now ,o be incorporated into
their cosmographical, geographical, and anthropological understanding.” And an intrinsic
component of such a perspective was the Christian axiom of “the integrity of the human
race.”
94
The encounter with the new thus entailed its recognition within this universal
framework, leading to a principle of attachment in which the Amerindians were
recognized without a process of re-cognition taking place. In typical identitarian logic,
the unfamiliar was transplanted to the familiar by means of a principle of attachment that
easily provided a “content” for the savage and utopian “slots" of early European
modernity. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the descriptions varied, even if
almost always anchored in Aristotelian categories: from “barbarian” to “natural slave,”
and from “nature’s slave” to “nature’s children.”95 While in the British Empire of the
nineteenth century, infused by scientific racism, the discourses of gender and race both
abroad and at home were mutually constituted by these encounters with the new. In this
way, racial discourse started to permeate conceptions of class within Europe, while
conceptions of family and domesticity started to mutually constitute European discourse
at both levels
.
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Still, it is in the first phase of imperialism, which was primarily based on
conquest, with Spain as the main imperial power, when unprecedented discussions of the
justice, or lack thereof, of imperialism, and the status of the Amerindians took place in
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Europe. And these discussions had no equivalent in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century imperialisms
.
97
Indeed, by shifting the grounds for imperialism from conquest to
commerce in both France and England, questions of legitimacy took a different form
.
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By the nineteenth century the discourse of science had effectively bestowed legitimacy to
civilizational discourse, first by means of commerce, then by peripheral activities linked
to the emergence of capitalism as a global phenomenon, and the increasing
rationalization of genocide of the "brutes,” of the “dying races .”99 Medieval Aristotelian
categories were thus displaced by abstract scientific discourse, even if the violence and
brutality of the civilizational imperative remained the same, albeit disguised by the
account of civilization and progress anchored on the idea of commerce and a culture of
despotism. Even if in contrast to Spain, France and England, for instance, saw the
Amencan colonies as “objects of commerce” rather than as “objects of conquest,” it was
the spread of commerce, as much as the nationalism brought about by Napoleon’s
”
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Empire, perhaps even more, that eventually yielded to the imperialism of the age of
capital
.
100
Yet it is with the advent of the absolutist state that commerce started to eventually replace
conquest as the principle of transnational relationship, as the economic increasingly took
primacy over the political. At its point of transition, as Perry Anderson suggests,
“Economic centralization, protectionism and overseas expansion aggrandized the late
feudal state while they profited the early bourgeois.” 10 ' Actually, it is with the rise of
absolutism that the centralization of power becomes constitutive of political theory. And
with the split of the economic and the political it became possible for a centralized state
to coexist with a deregulated market, or at least the idea of it. Indeed, with the increasing
centrality of administration in both the absolutist and the modem liberal-democratic
states the role of state power as a regulator and administrator, as well as facilitator, of an
increasingly systematized and procedural understanding of politics and the market was
finally consolidated. And with absolutism also emerged a despotic conception of
sovereignty. Its theorists, who were very much aware of both east and west, would
theorize absolute power accordingly. Yet as a historical phenomenon “the very term
Absolutism’ was a misnomer.” 10^ That is, absolutist monarchs never enjoyed the same
prerogatives that where associated with total absolute rule — the latter was associated with
tyrannical and despotic rule. Still, the despotic element of absolute obedience, of
Cf. Pagden, “Introduction,” The Idea ofEurope, 13-20. On the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
see Eric Hobsbawm, The Age ofCapital (New York: Vintage: 1994) and Amo J. Mayer, The Persistence of
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necessity, made its way, even if only in embryonic form, into the understanding of
sovereignty defended by the most eloquent theorist of absolutism: Jean Bodin.
According to Bodin, “sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual power vested in a
commonwealth ...” 103 But Bodin quickly qualified his statement by suggesting that
"absolute” in absolute power cannot be taken too literally: “If we insist however that
absolute power means exemption from all law whatsoever, there is no prince in the world
who can be regarded as sovereign, since all the princes of the earth are subject to the laws
of God and of nature, and even to certain human laws common to all nations .” 104 Bodin,
however, was clear that the preferred structure for such absolute power needed to be
centralized. And when it came to express his dislike of democracy he was not short of
words: "... a popular state is always the refuge of all disorderly spirits, rebels, traitors,
outcasts, who encourage and help the lower orders to ruin the great.” “The ability to
command cannot be made equal, as the citizens of popular states desire, for all we know
that some have no more judgment than the brute beasts.
. . Yet those who want to make all
things equal want to give sovereign authority over men’s lives, honour, and property, to
the stupid, ignorant, and passionate as well as to the prudent and the experienced .” 105
With Bodin, the discourse of sovereignty is tacitly linked with the notion of political
borders: a monarch has absolute power over a delimited territory. The “territorialization
of sovereignty” provided a link that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would
become intrinsic to the triad nation-state-territory — in turn, one of the enduring legacies
103
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of the French revolution.'* And yet, also with Bodin, the split between a centralized and
absolute power that holds a monopoly of political action, and a privatized sphere of
individual opinions, as opposed to actions, starts to hold sway. And the last two are found
in the social contract tradition from Hobbes to Rousseau, and in the liberal tradition of
Locke and Spinoza, especially in the latter’s Theologico-Political Treatise.
After Bodin, this conception of sovereignty found expression in Thomas
Hobbes’s political theory. In Hobbes, the idea of popular sovereignty is found in
embryonic form alongside a conception of power and sovereignty with absolutist
pretensions. For as Hobbes make clear, popular sovereignty is compatible with any type
of political regime. Or to state his arguments differently, popular sovereignty is confined
by means of the necessary reasoning that leads from the state of nature, where there is no
sense of collectivity or collective endeavors, to its temporary abdication to a sovereign
authorized by the consent of the same individuals that live within the borders of the
commonwealth. A sovereign could be organized as a monarchy, an aristocracy, or as a
democracy
.
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Also, it is not until the seventeenth century that the discourse of despotism
found its way into the new scientific language of politics; not incidentally, in Hobbes’
Leviathan — perhaps the modem testament of the confluence of an absolutist
understanding of sovereignty, a despotic political culture, and an institutional apparatus
that both centralizes the legitimate use of violence and has a predisposition to
counterrevolutionary violence built in at its core.
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* * *
The most arresting contemporary theoretical formulation of the emergence of this new
form of power consonant with the dialectic of enlightenment is found in Sheldon S.
Wolin’s theoretical reflections - where questions of power are always thought of
politically and from a democratic perspective. 108 In reference to the formulation of
modem power found in the Communist Manifesto
,
Wolin writes: “Modem’s power
greatest achievement is the production and reproduction of change” - a conception of
power that found theoretical and political expression in the writings of Descartes, Bacon,
and Hobbes. Its main elements are (1) the cultivation of scientific knowledge for its
political utility, (2) the State having an important role in supporting research,
technological and economic invention, and an education geared towards technical
knowledge and training, (3) and a different kind of power, if compared with traditional,
political, economic, and military power, as this form of power is able to reproduce itself
with no foreseeable limits and appears non-coercive, as geared towards improving the lot
of humankind. 109 Wolin summarizes this process in the following formulation: “The
growth of modem science, the organization of it around technological applications, the
phenomenological expansion of economic production, the development of ever more
destructive weaponry, and the growing penetration by Western nations of the non-
Westem world all meant that powers of unprecedented magnitudes were reshaping the
108
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world, uprooting traditional social and political forms, and reconstituting nature ”" 0 As in
the dialectic of enlightenment, in this conception of power, an abstract and ahistoncal
conception of reason reigns; a concept of reason that portends an equality that is blind to
historically ingrained differences, one that finds a fertile terrain in a privatized political
culture that is hardly participatory and only superficially egalitarian." 1 In Wolin’s
rendering of this dialectical process: “A distinctively modem revolutionary tradition was
forged in which destructiveness and innovation were inseparable, the one the necessary
condition of the other.”"' And with it came a new conception of political culture: a
managerial and technocratic culture was privileged, rather than one that was “shared and
publicly accessible,” thus formulating an elitist technocratic discourse that became
increasingly at odds with the democratic ideal that it paid lip service to; that is, a
specialized discourse that was not accessible to ordinary individuals, especially when the
citizenry is not educated to have a critical attitude towards power
.
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When combined, all these elements of the dialectic of enlightenment and modem
power led to what Wolin has aptly called “a culture of despotism.” This culture of
despotism is yet another facet of the dialectic of enlightenment, the despotism of
scientific knowledge and instrumental rationality. Its political correlate is also found in
the emergence of the discourse of sovereignty within modernity. And this new despotism,
as already mentioned, emerges in modernity and is articulated by Hobbes. If the
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philosophical essay on the concept of Enlightenment, in the Dialectic of Enlightenment,
relies heavily on a critique of Bacon’s concept of scienee and the formalism and the
conceptions of progress and knowledge that he exemplify, the political thinker in which
both the scientific and epistemological dimensions of the enlightenment are intertwined
with a new form of political despotism is Hobbes. Indeed, it is in Hobbes where the new
political despotism associated with the paradigm of science is found. If there were a
quintessential^ modem author and a book that exemplify the intersection between
violence, power, and despotism, the author would be Hobbes, and the book Leviathan.
Furthermore, when it came to despotism as such, Hobbes was very unapologetic, to the
extent that he not only recognized it as a legitimate form of rule, but a despotic element
was built into his conception of sovereignty. In chapter XX of part II of Leviathan.
entitled “Of Dominion Patemall, and Despoticall,” Hobbes introduces the distinction
between commonwealths by acquisition and by institution. Although fear provides the
foundations for both types of commonwealths, in the former subjects fear the one they
ceded power to, while in the latter “men who choose their Sovereign, do it for fear of one
another, and not of him whom they institute.” 114 It is precisely this equation of rule and
fear that, in the eighteenth century, Montesquieu identifies as the sole domain of
despotism — a conception that would prove crucial for the other great theorists of
despotism, Alexis de Tocqueville.
In its pre-modem formulations, despotism, as a concept, resonated with the
conception of monotheism. In more than one sense, both were predicated on a totalistic
and centralized conception of theological and political power. But this intertwining of
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despotism and monotheism seems to suggest something else that is intrinsieally related to
the dialectic of enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno forcefully identified. This is so
because the basis for the enlightenment’s challenge to myth and tradition rested on the
basis of a political theology sharing attributes with biblical monotheism, further
suggesting the entwinement of myth and enlightenment: in other words, rather than a
omnipotent god, what is in place is a omnipotent reason and a faith in its entwinement
with power and knowledge, as Bacon’s philosophy attests to. But in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, the challenge to myth and tradition was, ironically,
predicated in the political theology it sought to challenge, thus further contributing to the
dialectic of myth and enlightenment. Or stated differently, the secularization of despotism
led to an affirmation of its rational aspect within a similar structure to the one that served
to affirm the despotism of science.
What takes place in Hobbes’s political theory is not the abolition of myth and
tradition, and its replacement with enlightened reason; instead, what emerges from his
scientific reflections on politics is the intellectualization of despotism, an activity that, as
Wolin suggests, entailed dissolving the figure of the despot and reconstituting it as an
abstraction - absolute reason, a combination of power and reason that disguises power as
rational legislator. In this way, the concept of freedom became increasingly defined
by an ideology of rational necessity - which often times found expression with the idea
of progress — thus leading, in Hobbes’s texts, to “the science of despotism”:
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The laws of nature were the decrees of a rational despot-God^ir of a rational
despotism—Nature. The science of despotism was the despotism of science, and
each had a common opposite: not freedom, because freedom became assoc,ated
with accepting rational necessity, but prejudice. Thus modernity takes shape as
the struggle not simply between scientific rationality and science/ignorance but
between despotism/science and inherited prejudice
.
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By means of the language of natural law, the problematic of freedom and necessity is
displaced for a dichotomy, freedom/prejudice. Accordingly, the question is no longer one
of identifying despotism as an enemy of freedom. Rather, the need to eradicate prejudice
- often articulated as mythical or as part of pre-enlightenment notions of tradition - is
privileged, and the new “rational despotism” becomes the landmark ofmodem thought in
the writings of Bacon and Hobbes. Stated differently, it later on led to a “culture of
despotism.” And this culture of despotism consists in “a social mentality and practice that
enable power to operate unhindered .” 117 In this culture of despotism, the sovereign holds
sway public discourse, even if mildly so.
In Hobbes, this culture of despotism is coupled with the language of abstraction
and calculability, as well as with an ahistorical bent, that Horkheimer and Adomo
identified with reason’s demise into its instrumental form. “The skills of making, and
maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithemetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practice onley: which Rules, neither poor men have
the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the
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method to find out."" 8 This method takes the form of an ahistorical state of nature that
suspends differences for the compact to be made, one out of which subjects emerged
equally powerless. In light of this, Hobbes’ tacit way of depriving memory of polittcal
import is remarkable and worth mentioning. In Hobbes’ account, memory is closely
associated with imagination, which for him consists in “This decaying sense, when wee
would express the thing it self (I meanfancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination
... But when
we would express the decay, and signify that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called
Memory. So that Imagination and Memory are but one thing, which for divers
considerations, hath divers names.” 1 19 In contrast to Machiavelli, where the memory of
the political is crucial for the accumulation of experience that is needed for successful
ruling in The Prince, and for virtuous citizenship in the Discourses on Livy, Hobbes
suggests that “The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in
Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of
the mind, applying the sequels of action Past, to the actions that are Present; which with
most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty
enough.” In this way, Hobbes neutralizes the potential political import of memory,
which would later on become one of liberal theory’s character traits: its abstract equality
and the drive to forget.
This culture of despotism finds expression in the contemporary world
accompanied by its political logic. If Hobbes is the theorist of the culture of despotism, it
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iS AleXiS de T0CqUeVille Wh0 would “Scutate the despotism of liberal democracy.
Writing in post-revolut.onary Europe, and largely informed by the American experience
in the new world, Tocqueville would reclaim the notion of despotism, what he refers to as
“democratic despotism,” and in his conception traces of this culture of despotism find
political expression. Both are constitutive of the constellation of power that embodies the
dialectic of enlightenment in its present form.
* * *
An excursus through Montesquieu’s notion of despotism is necessary in order to fully
comprehend the political import of Tocqueville’s conception. In the Spirits of the Laws,
Montesquieu makes an explicit association between despotism, simplicity, and emptiness.
In one of the most well-known formulations, “Despotism is self-sufficient; everything
around it is empty” - an assertion that for Montesquieu signifies the absence of a
complex set of civil laws, or of a rich and complex political culture whose attributes may
be plurality and multiple sites of power. In other words, despotism is at once the
antithesis of decentralized power, structured government, and institutionalized civil codes
and procedures. “Thus when travelers describe countries to us where despotism reigns,”
he continues, they rarely speak of civil laws.”'" 1 There is a link between emptiness and
the lack of civil law: the despot reigns in a Hobbesian state of nature where there is no
recognizable civic code. But unlike Hobbes, as already suggested, Montesquieu only
makes the connection between despotism and fear - which is found in the often-cited
Book 3, of Part I. In chapter 9 he writes: “Just as there must be virtue in a republic and
121
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monarchy, there must be FEAR in a despotic government.” 122 And in such a
state “extreme obedience” is demanded from the subjects.
It is in this connection between obedience, a culture of fear, and the pretension of
infallibility that Montesquieu points to an important aspect of the culture of despotism: a
simplified political culture, privatized citizens, and obedience to “rational” laws in a
highly legalistic culture. Ironically, power not only operates unhindered in such a
formulation, but power appears as decentralized. And similarly to the absence of civil
laws, in a despotic state there is no civil strife, which is largely the offspring of the
absence of a complex political culture, nor is there present an institutional structure that
might be up for grabs, thus making civil war a very unlikely occurrence. Even so, a
despotic government driven by fear is, according to Montesquieu, one “where everything
leads abruptly and unforeseeably to revolutions.” Accordingly, the lawlessness of
revolutionary upheavals is presented as a correlate of the simplified absence of law in a
despotic state.
But by the time of the French Revolution - in many ways the watershed of
modem political theory - the uses of these categories was questioned vehemently, or at
least significantly transformed. “Despotism” was polemically used in order to tacitly
compare the monarchy of Louis XIV with the Turkish Grand Seigneur; namely, the
image of eastern backwardness was deployed to cast the ancient regime negatively
.
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Orientalist perspective that in Hegel's Philosophy of History finds express,on in h,s
infamous characterizations of the “Oriental despotism” of the “unhistorical” East.' 2"
Occ,dental biases aside, at least since Montesquieu’s formulation of it, despotism
became a signifier for arbitrary, absolute rule, even if its applications were sometimes
misguided. Within the French Revolution, despotism became at once a self-description of
revolutionary terror and a condemnation of it . 125 This had, however, the unwitting effect
of further problematizing the relationship between violence and representation, which
modem political thinkers had been coping with since Hobbes. And it did so by reference
to the eastern equivalent of the savage slot - the discursive space occupied by the oriental
despot. But in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution the cognitive import of
despotism seemed to be a thing of the past. In The Spirit ofConquest and Usurpation
,
for
instance, Constant associates despotism with an antiquated form of rule, with a thing of
the past. In its place he established “usurpation” as a more adequate term to explain the
reign of terror and Napoleonic domination following the French Revolution. In contrast
to despotism, which “stifles freedom of press,” usurpation “parodies it”; and while
despotism ... rules by means of silence, and leaves man the right to be silent...
usurpation condemns him to speak ...” 126 According to Constant, “despotism is a
government in which the will of the master is the only law; where political bodies, if they
exist, are simply his instruments; where the master regards himself as the exclusive
owner of his empire... where liberty can be taken away from the citizens without the
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authonties deigning to explain their motives, and without citizens having any nght to
know them; [and] where the courts are subjected to the whims of power ...” 127 Still, there
are attributes “which are specific to modem civilization” that make despotism an unlikely
occurrence in the present. And these attributes Constant associates with the emergence of
a commercial society. Despotism is associated by Constant with slavery, the spirit of
conquest, and monarchy - all of them institutions of a bygone era
.
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The most original formulation of the intersection between revolution and
despotism emerges in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville. Much of the discussion of
despotism that takes place in the first volume of Democracy in America is done in terms
of Montesquieu’s conception, or at least following the traditional understanding of
despotism. It is not until the second volume that Tocqueville offers a full-fledged
conception of despotism, even if in assertions such as the following intimations are
already found in the first: “In the French Revolution there were two movements in
contrary directions that must not be confused: one favorable to freedom, the other to
despotism .” 129 Towards the end of the first volume Tocqueville warns his fellow
Europeans and encourages them to establish a “peaceful empire of the greatest number”
in order to avoid “the unlimited power of one alone.” This is required to educate “all
citizens” in the “ideas and sentiments that first prepare them for freedom and afterwards
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permit them the use of it” to avoid “an equal tyranny of all But this opfimism is
significantly shattered by the sobering reflections advanced in the second volume.
In the chapter titled, “On the Philosophic Method of the Americans,” Tocqueville
rehearses the common view of the origins of enlightenment thinking and the protestant
revolution in Europe. In the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes
fulfilled the promise of the sixteenth-century reformers in seeking to “abolish the
received formulas, destroy the empire of traditions, and overturn the authority of the
master.” But as already suggested in relation to Hobbes, rather than the overturning of
authority, what took place was a shift in authoritative discourse, or a changing in the
master, received tradition was supplanted by a scientific conception with similar
monotheistic ambitions, albeit disguised under the banner of secularism. For Tocqueville,
the political correlate of this process did not take place simultaneously with it. Rather,
politically, the process entailed breaking with the decentralized power that characterized
the parcellization of sovereignty associated with feudalism, or the political complexity of
the early absolutist state .
132
It had to wait for the advent of equality, “when conditions
had become nearly the same and men almost alike.” 13 ' Ironically, the complexity that
accompanied the new language of science and reason was politically in tune with a more
simplified political culture, one more suitable for despotism - albeit of a new type.
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“Despotism,” in a formulation still echoing of Montesquieu’s, Tocqueville writes,
“which in its nature is fearful, sees the most certain guarantee of its own duration in the
isolation of men, and it ordinanly puts all its care into isolating them. There is no vice in
the human heart that agrees with it as much as selfishness: a despot readily pardons the
governed for not loving him, provided they do not love each other.” Furthermore,
“despotism makes a sort of public virtue of indifference ” 134 Accordingly, in modernity
despotism relies on both isolation and indifference. And both are attributes he identifies
with the emerging combination of liberal-democratic principles. In conditions of equality,
in which simplicity and a propensity towards sameness reign, there is a fertile ground for
despotism to emerge. And yet, according to Tocqueville, democratic nations zealously
defend equality, sometimes even to their own detriment, thus it is very unlikely that a
despotism embodied in the figure of one individual with claims of absolute power might
emerge. On the contrary, the menacing prospect of equality is for a new kind of
despotism. But this is a despotism that exploits indifference and individual isolation, the
offspring of the simplified political culture that is the ironic outcome of a technologically
complex society in which instrumental reason reigns, which is also a correlate to the
culture of despotism that the dialectic of enlightenment bred: what he calls “democratic
despotism.”
In “What Kind of Despotism Democratic Nations Have to Fear” Tocqueville
spells out the nature of this despotism. Right away, he warns his readers not to expect this
new kind of despotism to take a familiar shape: “It seems that if despotism came to be
established in the democratic nations of our day, it would have other characteristics: it
134
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would be more extensive and milder, and it would degrade men without tormenting.”>«
In other words, even if it would be more widespread, its operations would be unhindered,
largely due to its capacity to coalesce well with the simplicity, indifference, and isolation
of democratic societies. Equality is thus entangled in the dialectic of enlightenment: “the
same equality that facilitates despotism tempers it.” Furthermore, equality makes for
fertile ground for despotism: “I believe that it is easier to establish an absolute despotic
government in a people where conditions are equal than in any other. ,” 136
But this is a form of despotism of a different kind. One of its attributes is the
absence of a strong sense of collective purpose in which each individual is “withdrawn
and apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all the others ...” And yet, “above these an
immense tutelary power is elevated, which alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyment
and watching over their fate.” Tocqueville’s characterization of this power is remarkable
for the way that it captures an aspect of modem power that many before him have hinted
at but were not able to fully articulate. Although this power is “absolute,” it is also
detailed, regular, far seeing, and mild.” But the mildness of this centralized state hardly
signifies lack of power. On the contrary, “it provides for their security, foresees and
secures their needs, facilitates their pleasures, conducts their principal affairs, directs their
industry, regulates their estates, divides their inheritances; can it not take away from them
entirely the trouble of thinking and the pain of living?” Furthermore, in this new form of
despotism “the sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole ... it does not break
wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it
135
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constantly opposes itself to one's acting; [...] i, does not tyrannize, i, hinders,
compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nat.on to being
nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the
shepherd .” 137 So significant was this notion for Tocqueville that he recapitulated it in his
The Old Regime and the Revolution. In two arresting formulations he spells out its main
features. In the first Tocqueville laments the passing of the ancient regime and the ties
that it provided:
People today, no longer attached to one another by any ties of caste, class, guild,
or family, are all too inclined to be preoccupied with their own private interests,
too given to looking out for themselves alone and withdrawing into a narrow
individualism where all public virtues are smothered. Despotism, rather than
struggling against this tendency, makes it irresistible, because it takes away from
citizens all common feeling, all common needs, all need for communication, all
occasion for common action. It walls them up inside their private lives. They tend
to keep themselves apart from one another: despotism isolates them; it chills their
relations; it freezes them.
Tocqueville s lament aside, here he formulates an important aspect of this new
despotism: it effaces the sense of commonality of purpose, of political collectivity
associated with democracy. Despotism privatizes and does away with the any sense of
political identity. Accordingly, any experience of the political is hardly present.
This particular form of tyranny, which we call democratic despotism, of which the
middle ages had no idea, was already familiar to the physiocrats. No more
137
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hierarchy within society, no more classes, no more fixed ranks; people composed
of almost identical and entirely equal individuals, this jumbled mass recognized as
the sole legitimate sovereign, but carefully deprived of all the faculties which
might permit it to direct and even oversee its own government
.
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And a culture of pnvatism emerged from within democracy as an offspring of despotism
that eventually replaced a participatory democratic culture
.
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Interpreters have tried to make sense of this original formulation in a variety of
ways. For instance, according to Raymond Aron, this formulation points at Tocqueville’s
diagnosis of modem society. As he states it: “Tocqueville was both right and wrong. He
was perhaps right on the point that highly developed democratic societies are more
disputatious than revolutionary. But he was wrong to underestimate the principle of the
movement that carries along modem democratic societies: the development of science
and industry. [...] Apart from the fundamental social conservatism of democratic
societies, a revolutionary principle is at work: science.” 140 Meanwhile, Jean-Claude
Lamberti displays a more poignant awareness of the stakes in Tocqueville’s formulation,
even when his conclusion remains unsatisfactory: “Before Tocqueville’s day, Edmund
Burke, Madame de Stael, and Benjamin Constant were critical of the links between
democracy and despotism. Yet all cast their aspersions essentially on revolutionary
despotism, and their works ceased to provide effective support to the liberal cause and
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became increasingly outmoded as the risk of a great revolution seemed to diminish. It
was left to Tocqueville to develop the theory of democratic despotism by drawing a
careful distinction between it and the ancient and revolutionary forms of despotism.”
Indeed, according to Lamberti it is a deficit in liberalism what leads to despotism. In
contrast, for Wolin is the other way around
.
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According to Wolin “the theory ofmodem
despotism was perhaps a greater theoretical achievement: the intimation of a
postdemocratic ‘beyond that did not yet exist .’” 142 “Despotism is the abnormality of
power.” 143 It is thus worth considering the image of despotism that emerges in these
reflections, and ponder its relationship with the dialectic of the enlightenment. In Wolin’s
interpretation, the despotism that Tocqueville hints at is of a different order not only
because it is something ostensibly new, but also because contrary to the classical
understanding of “cycles of regime change” the emergence of the new despotism was not
cast as a corruption or degeneration of a previous form. Rather, despotism was
conceptualized as growing “out of [American democracy] rather than imposed on it.”
Wolin rightly suggests that the image that emerges from this conception of despotism is
one of “depoliticized man, of the citizen as archaic.” In other words, despotism
encourages at once a complex and a simple culture: in late modernity even a highly
technological culture but one that is politically simple. “[Despotism] becomes ...
institutionalized, grounded in a congenial - because depoliticized - culture and
Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two Democracies
,
trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1988), 223, 238-42.
I4
“ Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds
,
399. Cf. John Keane, “Despotism and Democracy,” in Civil
Society and the State: New Europeans Perspectives, ed. John Keane (London and New York: Verso, 1988),
35-71.
143
Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, 340.
239
camouflaged by modernity.”'* If despotism seems to be the antithesis of democracy,
how did it emerge from it?
In Tocqueville’s oeuvre
,
as more than one commentator has argued, the tension
between democracy and liberalism emerges in a particularly revealing way. For instance,
both Wolin and Lamberti identify in this tension the root of Tocqueville’s account of
despotism. But as already suggested the valuation of the tension radically differ: for
Lamberti it is a deficit of liberalism, while for Wolin it the opposite
.
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Wolin thus casts
what elsewhere he has called “the liberal/democratic divide” in a different light:
Despotism, in Tocqueville’s depiction, is not the result of crises produced by political
democracy but a crises in its liberal variant.” It is the self that emerges out of a liberal
society, which increasingly became articulated as self-interested in the discourse of
political economy. And the complex political culture that is constitutive of democracy, a
kind of political education, is at odds with the simplicity, relative apathy, and solipsistic
conception of individual rights that ensues from it - the kind of “negative freedom” that
liberals from Constant to Berlin cherished so much, which finds contemporary expression
in an increasingly dwindled and apathetic conception of political participation. This is a
diluted conception of citizenship that is in tune with the discourse of consumerism and “a
social mentality and practice that enable power to operate unhindered.” It is a part of the
constellation of power around the notion of the individual: individual rights and
solipsistic self-interest are thus coupled. And “democratic despotism” is yet another name
for the political correlate of the dialectic of enlightenment.
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When combined, the insights from Hobbes, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Wolin
can provide an illustration of the entwinement of the culture of despotism in the political
logic historically associated with the dialectic of enlightenment. For as Hobbes' and
Montesquieu's accounts suggest, regularity, simplicity, and instrumental rationality are
some of the trademarks of traditional despotism that made their way into the modem
culture of despotism. Simplicity, not to be misled here, is political - an imperative that
one clearly sees in the late twentieth-century coupling of liberal democracy with
neoliberalism - even if more often than not coupled with the language of complexity that
accompanies a managerial understanding of politics, which is one of the political
correlates of instrumental rationality. In other words, while contemporary western
societies are technologically and sociologically complex their political culture is one of
simplicity. The role of the citizen is reduced to that of the consumer, and a centralized
power facilitates the unhindered operations corporate-despotic power. In the meantime,
average citizens are powerless spectators with a rather naive attitude towards power.
Neoliberalism and liberalism both participate in the despotic element ofmodem power.
* * *
Tocqueville’ s depiction of democratic despotism is striking for its resemblance to the
contemporary liberal-democratic regime in the USA, even if its imperial ambitions are
not anticipated. However, it is perhaps because of those imperial ambitions that the
answer to the question is not unambiguous: superpower liberal democracy has certainly
taken away “the trouble of thinking” (for instance, as in the incitation to “keep America
rolling” in the immediate aftermath of 1 1 September) even if hardly the pains of living.
This new despotism constrains the possibility for political action: “it confines the action
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of the will in a smaller space and little by little steals the very use of free will from each
citizen.” The last part of this statement might be an exaggeration, while the former is
hardly so.
At least since the drive to expansion in the early American republic, the
democratic identity of the collectivity has been increasingly compromised. Aristotle’s
depiction, in The Constitution of Athens, of Pisistratus’ seizure of power in democratic
Athens captures this element rather nicely. The tyrant’s seizure of power represented not
merely a change in office but a change of “constitution.” This is how Aristotle described
it. once Pisistratus called for an assembly to discuss matters of importance for the
collectivity, but he monopolized the conversation, he “talked and talked,” as his soldiers
collected all the weapons from the people. Only then, he told the people to “go home and
take care of their private affairs, since in the future he would attend to all the business of
the state, thus effectively monopolizing public discourse and constraining the realm of
action for the citizens. In liberal-democratic regimes such as the United States, Pisistratus
can become an allegory of corporate power and the State. Also, in the contemporary
formulation of liberal-democracy, in both its theoretical and political manifestations, the
liberal is privileged while the democratic is constantly undermined.
From the eighteenth century on, and especially after the French revolution,
despotism became increasingly perceived as a secularized form of power one of whose
attributes is its boundlessness - a boundless power that blindly crushes any local or
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independent impediment to its movement, to holding away of society. 147 But with the
exception of Tocqueville - and in his case the insight occurs somewhat unwittingly -
what the eighteenth and nineteenth century theorists of despotism failed to see was that
the new despotism is not predicated in lawlessness. On the contrary, in the twentieth
century, especially after 1945, it would operate within a culture of despotism both within
the West and outside of it. The despotism of liberal democracy was entwined with the
despotism of the market. Both are perceived as decentered forms of power. The apparent
paradox of the twentieth century being, to borrow Lutz Neithammer’s phrase, “the rulers
have ceased to rule, but the slaves remain slaves” 148 But under closer scrutiny there
exists complicity between the two. This might explain the ideological and hegemonic
centrality of a formulation such as today’s liberal democracy: it has emerged as a consensual
integrating political mechanism in advanced industrial societies, but one not coming from
below, or as the outcome of democratic struggle. 149 Rather it is imposed from above from
political and financial institutions such as the UN and the IMF. Also, at least since the 1980s on,
the coupling of liberal democracy and neoliberalism have become the finest products the
American Economic Polity has exported to the rest of the world. 150 Indeed, neoliberalism has
increasingly found anchorage in liberal democracy, by means of deflating the democratic choice
of this couple while imposing its liberal component.
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* * *
By way of conclusion, it is worth looking a bit closer - albeit hardly exhaustively - at
how the question of violence emerges from the formulation of the dialectic of
enlightenment here put forward. Auschwitz, Dresden, the Gulag, and Hiroshima - these
urban locations have become archetypes of catastrophic moments of the twentieth
century. However, oftentimes the brutality and violence associated with these cities are
solely associated with savages, with animals, brutes, and with barbarism. But as the
preceding discussion has shown, the picture is more complicated than that.
Anthropologists have long insisted that every human society - occidental societies
included - has its rituals of violence, and in the ancient world of western, and even non-
western, civilization violence has been linked in important ways with sacrifice and with
the sacred. That is, rituals of sacrifice are actually intertwined with practices of violence:
in one influential account, “a sacrifice is an act of violence without risk of vengeance.”
Historically [t]he function of sacrifice is to quell violence within the community and to
prevent conflicts from erupting.” 151 The goal is to prevent perpetual vengeance by
translating the language of vengeance into one of retribution to avoid the “vicious cycle
of vengeance,” as in Aeschylus’ Oresteia, where a fragile compromise is reached to
appease the menacing furies - largely a prudential calculation rather than a bold moment
of democratic inclusion - by means of the legitimacy of the new order, even if with a
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strong reminder of its monopoly of violence embod.ed in Athena’s threats and reminder
that she holds the keys to Zeus’ thunderbolts box. 152
As the previous discussion suggested, in the confines ofmodem political thought,
when one thinks of efforts to keep vengeance in check, the first image that comes to mind
is Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651): a modem text that in the midst of the English civil war and
the state of violence and masterless men proposed the centralization and organization of
violence in the Leviathan: a constant reminder of that “brutish, nasty, and short” state of
nature. Retribution and “revenge” need to be centralized in a collective power in order to
preserve the commonwealth and to deflect the cycle of violence that will be perpetuated
if each individual carries out his or her own retribution.
This is what Etienne Balibar, also in reference to Hobbes, has called a strategy “of
preventive counterviolence” that in the contemporary global predicament takes shapes as
the forms of violence sanctioned by “the politics of global preventive counterrevolution
or counterinsurrection.” 153 And as already shown, the modem culmination of this effort is
to be found in the classic, and still very much relevant, Weberian depiction of the state:
the state is that human community which
. .
.
(successfully) claims or exercises the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence or force within a given territory.”
Indeed, following this Weberian definition, we can even take a step further, with Walter
Benjamin, and present yet another dimension of the question of violence in the modem
world as either one of law founding, or of law preserving violence. Perhaps more
importantly, modem sovereignty is predicated on the presence of wild zones of power, or
1 52
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so we could leam from the Cold War: wild zones of power that const,tute states of
exception in which the language of violence, terror, and despotism rule (Buck-Morss); or
in spaces of death situated “in the land of the living where torture’s certain uncertainty
[feeds] the great machinery of the arbitrariness of power, power on the rampage - that
great steammg morass of chaos that lies on the underside of order and without which
order could not exists” (Taussig); or as it manifests in the so-called moment of decay of
national sovereignty, globalization, which in turn “has produced a growing division of
the globalized’ world into life zones and death zones” that correlate the dichotomy of
North and South , 154
In the aftermath of 1 1 September, with liberal democracy turning its aggressive
side back inside, while relentlessly pursuing war and terror outside, calls for alliance and
unity shows attest to this dynamics of sovereignty as these crystallized in the current
histoncal juncture. One could argue that in an important sense, USA citizens’ sense of
collectivity depends on the presence of an enemy; an enemy that after the disappearance
of the Soviet block took the rather amorphous shape of a war on drugs. Now terrorism
has come to play this role. Yet it is unclear how this would not lead to the perpetuation of
a cycle of vengeance in which more and more human lives are going to be lost. Once
again, power is blind. Until very recently we had been told that traditional understandings
of war have been rendered anachronistic in light of the “new wars” that characterized the
last decade of the twentieth century. 155 Still, these so-called new wars are intertwined
154
See, respectively, Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, especially chap. 1; Michael Taussig,
Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 4; Balibar,
We, The People ofEurope?, 126ff.
155
See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in the Global Era (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1999).
246
With the universalization of neoliberalism. Also, ours is a world where the function of the
global economy is assured by private armies that protect the interests of corporations in
hostile places. And liberal democracy has spread along with the imperatives of capitalism
by sheer economic force. Indeed, as a contemporary observer has put it: “Democracy [in
the American hyper-nation] is the contemporary equivalent of the old ‘civilization,’
which brought to the backward peoples of the world the European colonialism of the
nineteenth century, the humanitarian character of which has been largely forgotten. Then,
too, the colonialists were supposedly rescuing the oppressed from tyranny, slavery, and
fanaticism .” 156 Imperialism thus renders inoperative the prospects for actual democracy
and freedom in many parts of the world.
It is, then, hardly surprising the role of global violence in the contemporary world
- a world that is presently divided into “life-zones” and “death zones” that are often
found within the boundaries of a single city. In those zones of violence and terror it is the
suffering of naked human life that is at stake: human beings whose only political attribute
is their humanity but that in the triad of nation-state-territory humanity turns out to be
non-political - in what Hannah Arendt considered the “paradox of the rights of man,”
the right to have rights is thus denied . 1 ' 7 Naked life is the singular in which these
universal exclusions take a variety of particular forms: statelessness, refugees,
immigrants, political prisoners both at home and abroad (Guantanamo), the inner city
dispossessed, vilified minorities that are susceptible to violence with impunity, etc. One
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Of the forms that this might be taking in Europe is that of a new apartheid; in the USA it
consists in the triple jeopardy of what Mike Davis has called “the three borders .” 158
But to responsibly respond to this condition, as Balibar suggests, requires the
revitalization of a seemingly archaic discourse, the language of universalism, and of
democracy; a language that in turn rethinks the question of political collectivity and of
borders. The universal element resides in the notion of humanity, and its political stakes
are found in democracy - the latter emancipated from its subjugation to liberalism, as
well as striving to maintain a political understanding of collective action while
politicizing the borders and redrawing their boundaries politically. “Such a state, by
definition, cannot consist (or cannot only consist) of status and rights ascribed from
above, it requires the direct participation of the demos," thus making citizenship into “an
active and collective civil process, rather than a legal status.” In other words, making
citizenship a political category, which is the central category of democracy, the citizen as
actor. Democracy understood as people sharing in power to change their lot . 159 “Rights to
equality and liberty are indeed individual', only individuals can claim and support them.
But the abolition of both coercion and discrimination (which we call emancipation) is
always clearly a collective process, which can be achieved only if many individuals
(virtually all of them) unite and join forces against oppression and social inequality.” But
such a conception seems out of sync. For it to be possible, for the sake of responding to
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th,s specific suffering, of the naked life, the politics of difference and particularity has to
ironically yield to the politics of universalism, solidarity, and collectivity. Perhaps only
then a power that pretends to be universal can be equally matched.
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CHAPTER VI
UNIVERSAL HISTORY, HISTORICISM AND ETHICO-POLITICAL-
HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Universal history must be construed and denied. After
the catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the
catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a
plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites
it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity
that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered
moments and phases of history—the unity of the control
of nature, progressing to rule over men’s inner nature.
History is the unity of continuity and discontinuity
.
1
Theodor W. Adorno
One of the markers of our present is precisely the present-mindedness that saturates it; the
lack of historical memory, of historical consciousness. Cotemporary cultural critics have
referred to this as “the amnesia of the present.” For most of the eighties and nineties, the
debates about postmodernism - of which Fredric Jameson’s seminal essay,
“Postmodernism, or the Logic of Late Capitalism” constitutes the most eloquent, even if
highly contested, theorization - often dealt with this question in terms of the so-called
transition from the primacy of time and temporality in the nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century modernity, to the primacy of space, the spatialization, in
postmodemity. Out of this transition had emerged a postmodern culture that is “ill with
1
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amnesia.” Put slightly differently, a culture in which a strong historical-political
consciousness is everything but present.
Even so, this is also the era of the History Channel and commemorations in the
West. At least within the United States, there seems to be an insatiable thirst for sanitized
historical knowledge - what I shall call history without historicization - as a cursory
perusal in the shelves of giant bookstores like Barnes & Noble would attest. And during
the nineties ahistoncal history buttresses the increasingly abstract patriotic discourse
emerging alongside the increasing militarism of the American empire- just consider the
plethora of biographies and war-related books, Films, and TV series such as Stephen
Ambrose’s The Band of Brothers
,
Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan
,
and Ridley
Scott’s Black Hawk Down
,
the latter praised by George W. Bush in the post 11
September juncture. This, along with the series of commemorations that took place in
the eighties and nineties (bicentennials of the American and French revolutions;
commemorations on the armistice of the Great War; the famous and infamous fortieth
and fiftieth anniversaries of the Third Reich, Normandy, and the controversy of the Enola
Gay) contribute to this boom of history without historicism. Furthermore, one also found
a strong sense of triumphalism associated with the ending of communist rule in the East,
and thus the end of “history derailed,” and a memory boom in which both triumph and
trauma converged started to take hold in public discourse and in the humanities (a
memory boom that has yet to show signs of exhaustion).
Indeed, if in the eighties Pierre Nora articulated the need to reclaim memory and
liberate its insights from the yoke of “scientific” history - a laudable call from the
3 On the militarism of the United States, see the informative discussion in Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows
of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004),
especially chaps. 2, 4, 6.
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perspective of the “history wars” within French historiography, where one’s stance in
relation to the Revolution is taken as constitutive of one’s present political position -
nowadays we might be experiencing the opposite. But today the problematic that Nora
identified twenty years ago seems to be reversed as the drive towards memorialization
has overshadowed the interest in history. 4 Accordingly, in this chapter I would like to
suggest that an inversion of Nora’s formulation is called for: to liberate history from the
yoke of memorialization. (In the US, for instance, as commissions for the
memorialization of 11 September 2001 are appointed, an honest reckoning with the
history that can shed a light on the attacks is nowhere to be found.) Or, to state it
differently, to bring history back in order to historicize the memory boom, and thus
reclaim the ethical and political import of thinking the intersection of history and memory
speculatively. I shall return to this last question at the end.
The dilemma of thinking the historical dimension of the present is a paradoxical
one: on the one hand, as the end of the millennium approached, attempts to assess the
present from the perspective of the past were carried on in the hope of situating the
present in the course of historical time; on the other hand, what emerged out of these
assessments was a “sense of crisis often articulated in the reproach that our culture is
terminally ill with amnesia,” the later standing in the way of any attempts to think
historically about the present. 5 It seems that the same amnesia that pervades our epoch,
and limits the prospects for a reckoning with our recent history, is closely intertwined
See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire”, Representations 26 (Spring
1989), 13-15. This essay was the introduction to the monumental undertaking of reclaiming the “sites” of
memory in France. Nora’s articulation of the relationship between memory and history opened up a series
of important reflections on the intersection between history and memory.
5
See Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Making Time in a Culture ofAmnesia (New York and London:
Routledge, 1995), 2. Cf. Jameson, “The End of Temporality”, 695-718.
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With a lack of historical nuance in relation to the dreams and catastrophes of the past
century, especially in relation to processes that predated these dreams. Cultural critic
Andreas Huyssen represents an example of such thinking. According to Huyssen, the
short twentieth century “was simultaneously a century of indescriptible catastrophes and
of ferocious hopes, and often times the utopian ideals animating the hopes ended up
legitimizing some dictatorship of the future (the pure race, the classless society, the
pacified consumer paradise), turning a blind eye to persecution and mass destruction,
voracious exploitation of resources and the environment, migrations and dislocations of
whole populations to an extent the world had never witnessed before.”6 In his attempt to
think historically, Huyssen looks at recent history but what his gaze captures is a
complicity of utopian ideas in twentieth-century catastrophes. And not incidentally, the
tenor of his reflections leads him to a vindication of liberal democratic institutions. Yet
such vindication it also what truncates whatever political and ethical import the cultures
of memory might have. In his assessment, even if the discourse of “historical trauma” has
gained currency in our present, not only in the West but also in Latin America and South
Africa, “Human rights activism, truth commissions, and juridical proceedings are better
methods for dealing with historical trauma.”7
But Huyssen might be dispensing with this question too quickly by placing undue
faith on the discourses and mechanisms of liberal-capitalist democracy. For the
subsumption of the question of historical trauma in the institutional mechanisms that he
mentions presupposes that the conditions that led to the emergence of the traumatic
6
Huyssen, Twilight Memories, 2.
7
Andreas Huyssen, Presents Past: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 9.
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events in question are a thing of the past. But this is an unfounded assumption at best.
Stated somewhat differently, rather than reclaiming memory and trauma as part of a
public discourse in which both are critically historicized in order to ponder their weight
on the living - to cast the present conditions in a critical light and thus discern the
complicity of present-day institutional arrangements in the dynamics that served as
condition of possibility of the traumas - Huyssen winds up within the confines of a
colonizing liberalism that assumes that the way American liberals understand memory is
to be recommended to the rest of the world. Or at least to reflect on the conditions of the
present that allow for such a self-satisfied approach to the dispensation of memory, and
what that means in terms of its political and ethical import. Indeed, it seems that current
discourses of memorialization find their analogies in the discourse of historical apologies:
both have the effect of constituting a break between past and present, of claiming to
herald history while denying it. For as Michel-Rolph Trouillot suggestively puts it in
relation to historical apologies: “My apology sets a temporal marker between those things
- and the past to which they belong - and a present characterized by my new relation to
my interlocutor.” 8 Additionally, historical apologies, like most articulations of the
discourse of memory, suggest continuity between past actors and present ones, as they
also privileged the liberal understanding of the autonomous subject, thus depicting “a
particular kind of historicity” where “history is both denied and heralded.”9 Apologies are
thus doomed to fail, largely because the epistemological and political conditions that
make possible their enunciation at the same time constitute barriers for the transformation
8
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals: Historical Apologies in the Global Era” Interventions 2
(2000), 174
9
Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals”, 176, 181
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Of the structures of power and domination that historically constituted the catastrophe or
trauma that one is apologizing for, as well as their structural analogies in the present. Just
witness the US apology to Hawaii, or Clinton’s apology for slavery.
The same rhetoncal operation is performed by Huyssen’s displacement of the
import of historical trauma to the realm of liberal institutions. The past is not redeemed
by means of a discourse of memory that presents a break with the present. On the
contrary, to critically conjure the ghost of the past in the present involves bringing into
bear a challenge to present-day the crystallized forms of power, institutions, and practices
that not only served as conditions of possibility for the past trauma but that reinstate new
forms of suffering and domination. For the structures of power, privilege, and domination
that constituted the trauma are historically constituted and renewed in history. But their
representation in a historical narrative is a precondition to illustrate the relation between
the past and the present, even if that is not enough to alter them. After all, after
historicizing catastrophes like Auschwitz one can understand the forms of violence, and
the practices, policies, and ideological formations that enable it. Yet only vigilant and
meaningful political action in the present can prevent the emergence of new forms of
these structures. In Silencing the Past
,
Trouillot formulates the stakes of reclaiming the
political import of the past fort the present quite eloquently:
But the historicity of the human condition also requires that practices of power
and domination be renewed. It is that renewal that should concern us most, even if
in the name of our pasts. The so-called legacies of past horrors - slavery,
colonialism, or the holocaust - are possible only because of that renewal. And that
renewal occurs only in the present. Thus, even in relation to The Past our
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authenticity resides in the struggles of our present. Only in that present can we be
true or false to the past we choose to acknowledge. 10
Accordingly, the only responsible way to engage with the past is by avoiding exculpatory
rhetorical strategies for the present, or secluding the role of memory to institutional
juridical practices that carry a primarily exculpatory mission, and whose primary aim is
prudential: to deflate cycles of violence, which does not necessarily entail changing the
conditions that led to the cycle of violence to begin with. The task of thinking
responsibility politically entails reclaiming the discourse of memory from a historical
perspective in order to represent the past in ways conducive to act democratically in the
present.
* * *
At the beginning of the twenty- first century the antinomies and paradoxes of modem life
are far from being resolved, or settled. Even if one periodizes the twenty-first century as a
distinct epoch, it is still shaped by the political antinomies of the imaginary inaugurated
in 1789, and the way these unfolded in the twentieth century. And if one adds the neo-
idealist blank indictment of reason, or even humanism, that presents reason as
responsible for many of these catastrophes, with the effect of almost erasing human
agency, responsibility, and the complexities of the catastrophes themselves as political-
human-cultural-economic processes, the continuities and discontinuities of our present
with the recent past are obliterated. In fact, for many contemporaries it is easier to
conceive of something like a deviant “cunning of reason” responsible for historical
catastrophes of the century, or of a homogenous totality called modernity that posits a
10
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production ofHistory (Boston: Beacon Press,
1995 ), 151 .
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subject that with cold rationality dominates its other, and is responsible for sexual, racial,
cultural, and socio-political domination. Ironically, these theoretical constructions
demand a good deal of imagination; and yet, there does not seem to be enough impetus to
imagining, for instance, the possibility of the breakdown of capitalism, or even the
possibility of alternatively rendering the antinomies and aponas of the present in ways
that allow us to comprehend these catastrophes in their complexity
.
11
Or, politically, to
imaginatively reclaim the language of democracy, thus breaking with its present coupling
with liberal-capitalism, and immanently undoing the latter. Rather than comprehensively
reckoning with recent history, most reflections on history assume a melancholic and
bleak tone, or what Gillian Rose has appositely called “a despair rationalism without
reason,” one in which more often one feels that “the baby is thrown out with the
bathwater as there is very little tolerance for equivocation
,
and a thorough reflection on
the strengths and shortcomings of a concrete deployment of an idea or utopian principle
is replaced by unequivocal rejection
.
12
* * *
For the greater part of the second half of the twentieth century, with the exception of
Marxist historians and cultural critics, history and historicized thought have been largely
neglected, at a time in which “critical theory” as a publishing and scholarly label has been
in vogue. Out of the so-called post-structuralist tradition only Michel Foucault’s
reflections - along with some scholars inspired by his work - are infused with a strong
11
Cf. Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), xii, Iff. See
also F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
12
Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 1-14. Cf. Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishers, 1993), 1-24, 37-51, 225-57.
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historical sensibility. In contrast, theorizations based on other thinkers, such as the
Spinozism of Gilles Deleuze, or of Derridean deconstruction have proven allergic to
history.furthermore, most of the Anglo-American political theory of the last quarter of
the twentieth century hardly fares any better, largely due to the immense influence of the
neo-Kantianism of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas.
But this trend started to change in the last decade of the twentieth century. For in
the last couple of years, perhaps as an offspring of the fin de siecle mentality that
captured both public and lettered discourse, political and critical theorists have begun to
once again pay attention to the historical dimension of political theorizing, especially
from the perspective of critical theory. Recent reflections on the possibility for a critical
historical-political consciousness at “the end of history,” and the possibility for rescuing
the utopian idea of mass democracy animating twentieth-century dream worlds, by
Wendy Brown and Susan-Buck-Morss have reopened the question of the importance of a
historical dimension for critical theory. And it is Walter Benjamin — the most melancholic
of all critical theorists - who has served as the inspiration for these important reflections.
Indeed, Benjamin’s well-known critique of progressive-teleological history in the “The
Theses on the Concept of History,” and his historiographical reflections in his unfinished
Arcades Project
,
serve as the starting point for Brown’s retrieval of a historical-political
consciousness, and for Buck-Morss’ dialectical reconstruction of the dynamics of mass
utopia in East and West during the twentieth century.
Brown and Buck-Morss have posed the question of historical consciousness in
ways that provocatively point to the challenges and also to the importance of rethinking
our present in historical-ethico-political terms. Their reflections resonate with Rose’s
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aforementioned motto insofar as they theorize a predicament of losses in ways that are
sensitive to its historical dimensions, and are conducive to rendering some of the
shattered images and dreams of equality and freedom in their current brokenness to
reclaim the emancipatory promise these carried - they thus pose the question of history
and historical consciousness, and critically reckon with our recent history, in order to
reflect on how to politically apprehend the present.
Even so, their reflections are marred by some of the ambiguities that afflicted
Benjamin’s original formulations. For instance, like Benjamin, both Brown and Buck-
Morss assume a universal-comprehensive historical narrative that neither one theorizes,
or renders explicit. Benjamin’s were contextually bounded reflections seeking, almost
desperately, to contest the enemy, Fascism - in his words, an “enemy [that] has not
ceased to be victorious.” 1 ' Benjamin thus invoked theological figures and tropes such as
angels, and even a Messiah, as part of his constellation of concepts to apprehend the past
and his present. In order to comprehend the stakes in reclaiming the historical dimension
of critical theory from a Benjaminian perspective, in the remainder of this section I shall
assess both Brown and Buck-Morss’ appropriation of Benjamin.
In Politics Out of History
,
Brown extrapolates from Benjamin’s reflections and
combines these motifs with Derrida’s politics of “hauntology” in order to articulate “a
political consciousness that would mobilize and activate history rather than submitting to,
fulfilling, taming, or jettisoning it .” 14 By means of her retrieval of Benjamin, Brown
intimates ways of re-conceiving historical consciousness that are responsive to human
13
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations
,
ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1973), 255.
14
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suffenng, thereby resisting present-day tendencies to cynically retreat into what she,
again following Benjamin, has aptly called Left-Melancholia, or into a pernicious, and
equally conservative, political moralism. To her credit, Brown does so without positing
an ethico-pohtical imperative of passivity, and avoids positing abstract imperatives of
openness to Otherness that are often found in Derrida-inspired scholars. Rather, Brown
argues on behalf of a democratic retrieval of the collective emancipatory project of
equality and freedom, one responsive to claims of difference but critical of the current
fetishization of politicized cultural identities, especially when the latter are sometimes
forged out of contingently entrenched, and often resentment driven, “wounded
attachments. While pursuing this path Brown casts the present in a critical light. And
in doing so, she not only poses the question of reclaiming a historical-political
consciousness, but poses the need to conceive history in non-positivist, objectivist, or
teleological ways, as well.
In order to formulate her understanding of a reconceived historical consciousness
Brown conspicuously invokes Benjamin’s angel. Brown, writing at least 50 years after
Benjamin devised his celestial imagery, reclaims this context-bounded mournful image of
the angel as a metaphor for the present - albeit ostensibly resisting its melancholic
moment. Brown’s appropriation of Benjamin merits lengthy quotation:
Perhaps at no other historical moment has Benjamin’s angel been such a poignant
signifier of our predicament. Without vision or a strong sense of agency, we are
blown backward into the future as debris piles up in the single catastrophe that is
15 On “wounded attachments” see States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1995. There is continuity between her critique of identity politics inscripted in
the liberal discourse of rights and her most recent critique of political moralism and the way it plays out in
contemporary configurations of identity politics.
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history beyond and outside of human intervention, a history of both dramatic and
subtle unfreedom. We cannot close our wings against the storm, cannot not be
moved-that moment has been extinguished by contemporary history itself. Our
capacity to intervene in the trajectory and wide range of effects of capital (as the
most powerful moving force in modernity), to whatever extent it once existed,
appears exhausted. So history surges on, but with no promise that past suffering
will be redeemed, with no promise of eventual worldwide or even local
emancipation, well-being, wisdom, or reduction of suffering. Nihilistic seems far
too thin a term to describe such circumstances
.
16
By presenting Benjamin s angel as a signifier of our times, Brown seeks to spell out our
present condition. And the picture of the present that emerges is pretty bleak. But what is
more significant about this appropriation of Benjamin’s angel is how Brown winds up,
perhaps unwittingly, ascribing the impotency of the angel’s attempt to “make whole what
has been smashed” to us, humans, in our present predicament. By doing so, Brown
appropriates the epistemological vantage point reclaimed by the angel, and thus switches
roles, and in one stroke bestows us, humans, with both the epistemological perspective of
the angel and its helplessness. Thus, in this rendering, one of the most important
attributes of the present is the uncertainty of agency, the lack of control or mastery over
the world, the lack of assurance; or in a phrase that Stuart Hall made famous and Brown
is particularly fond of, the present predicament is more than ever one without guarantees.
However, historically, the absence of guarantees, at least since Niccolo Machiavelli, does
not lead to a depiction of impotence - and political theorizing without guarantees, critical
16
Brown, Politics Out ofHistory, 139.
261
thinking without banisters
,
is what Brown has endorsed elsewhere in the name of
democracy, the latter defined as sharing and participating in political power . 17 Still, this
transposition of the difficult agency of the angel, for whom history is one single
catastrophe, to our current human condition is intriguing at the very least. If, as Brown
suggests, “we cannot close our wings against the storm, cannot not be moved—that
moment has been extinguished by contemporary history itself,” how can it be, in such a
predicament, that “history itself emerges as both weightier and less deterministic than
ever before.
. Weightier indeed it is, in her account, but hardly less deterministic.
Brown offers a bleak picture of the present, which is one in which agency emerges as a
very precarious endeavor alongside the contention that history becomes “less
deterministic than ever before.” Yet, if history is a single catastrophe, one that blows
one s efforts away, one “with no promise that past suffering will be redeemed, with no
promise of eventual worldwide or even local emancipation, well-being, wisdom, or
reduction of suffering,” how can it be less deterministic?
One can ascribe this difficulty - conceiving agency once the perspective of the
angel has been endorsed - to a rhetorical sleight of hand in Brown’s part. But given the
rigor and vigilance found in Brown’s work, this is hardly the case. The roots he
elsewhere. Indeed, Brown’s bleak picture of the present emerges as part of Benjamin’s
deeply melancholic outlook - an unexpected turn from Brown, but not so unexpected for
those familiar with Benjamin. Stated somewhat differently, only if one accepts the
perspective of Benjamin’s angel on the singleness of the catastrophe can such claim be
17
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made. Brown is at pains to grapple with this question, due in part to her refusal to render
the oppositions at stake - contingency/necessity, whole/part, and universal/particular -
comprehensively and speculatively.
Even so, at one point Brown manages to grapple with this tension as she suggests
that in the midst of the facile proclamations of the end of history, it is not history per se
what has ended “but a certain concept of history, a concept that nonetheless continues to
grip political thinking and reaction even in its ghostly form, producing “amazement” and
literal dumbfounding.” 19 In this juxtaposition, Benjamin’s reflections figure “not so much
as a way (for historians) to do history”; instead, these are meant “as a way (for political
actors) to think historically, a way to develop political consciousness of the historically
inflicted construction of contemporary political life and to discern and fashion openings
and possibilities there .”20 Out of this, according to Brown, emerges a way of thinking
politically about the past, one that perhaps “offers modest new possibilities for the
practice of freedom .”21 Brown’s tone is cautionary here. Like Benjamin, she is at pains to
distance this latter formulation of freedom from the possibilism that at least in some
readings, have been ascribed to Benjamin
.
22
But somehow she still manages to instill a
chastened and very thin sense of transformatory agency in it. But this is hardly the sense
19
Brown, Politics Out of History, 163. For a critique of the juxtaposition of Benjamin with Derrida see
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Heat of the Moment: Benjamin’s actuality today,” New Formations 20 (Summer, 1993). Not incidentally
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of democratic practice, one that is collectivist and transformatory, that she has elsewhere
offered as antidote to the reproachful moralism often found in politicized identity politics.
A question thus remains: how can such a politics be carried on in a predicament of
impotence? Brown does not ponder this question
.
23
If the politics of fragmentation and difference are hardly a match for the awesome
new types of modem and late modem power, and Brown’s critique of the political
moralism sometimes found in contemporary articulations of leftist politics suggests an
acute awareness of this, then why does Brown posit such a ahistorical picture of the
present and its missed opportunities, in a rendering that places the possibilities of agency
beyond human reach? Despite her intimations on the contrary, Brown’s depiction of the
present might have inherited Benjamin’s melancholia. It is within this tension that Brown
presents a most pressing question: the feasibility, or effectiveness, of what she calls a
“empirical or materialist” history in addressing the intersection between present and past,
and how the different configurations of this intersection politically constitute our present
predicament.
The complex political problem of the relation between past and present, and both
to the future is resolved by neither facts nor truth. While scholars of postcolonial
orders understand this well, precisely because colonial histories discursively
suffuse the postcolonial present so overtly, it is no small irony that the hegemonic
historiography of the [metropolises] still holds our objectivity as a form of
historical and political salvation . 24
23
Brown, Politics Out ofHistory, 26.
24
Brown, Politics Out ofHistory, 141.
264
Brown invokes the postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism to suggest better ways in which
theorists can understand the politics of historiography for political actors, although not
necessarily for professional historians. But the invocation of postcolonial critics is
revealing. It poses a divide in the way history is perceived in the narratives of the West,
and how so-called subaltern critics conceive the same history (Histone) by means of
different narratives. This is a distinction that posits a divide that Brown passes by without
further questioning; namely, a radical divide between the so-called subaltern histories and
the metropolitans narratives, even though these are often bounded by the same events,
albeit emplotted in divergent historical narratives (history as Gechichte). But such a
divide further questions Brown’s usage of the perspective of the angel of history.
Besides, as already suggested, when Brown presents the existence of that “single
catastrophe that is history beyond and outside of human intervention, a history of both
dramatic and subtle unfreedom,” the possibility of a differentiated narrative in which
both dramatic and subtle unfreedom” are emplotted is presupposed but never theorized.
Brown surely invokes the figure of the angel in order to critically undermine the idea of
teleological progress. Then she translates this epistemological stand to a subject for the
narrative she presupposes but never acknowledges: the notion of an “us.” For Brown, “it
is not the task of the angel but of an ill defined “us” to interrupt this force [a “single
catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage”], to seize moments in the present
as possibilities for action.”" 5 But who is the “us” that occupies the position of the angel?
What is the collectivity invoked here? Does this collectivity transgress the postcolonial
divide in a more universal, or perhaps global, narrative appealing to a global-collective
subject?
25 Brown, Politics Out ofHistory, 156.
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Thus far I have been arguing that Brown might be invoking a thinker whose
formulations are too melancholic to fulfill the critical task her call for a historical
consciousness demands. Or as I shall argue momentarily, this reading of Benjamin not
only does not fully explore the ways Benjamin’s analysis might not easily coalesce with
the complexities of the present, especially in relation to the possibility of thinking the
present comprehensively and of rendering agency meaningful. But also, like Benjamin’s,
Brown’s reluctance to theorize a non-identitarian, albeit comprehensive, universal leads
her to a bleak depiction of the present, which in turn leads to a theoretical incongruence
between her account of the present and her call for democratic agency.
Yet, despite her bleak depiction of the present-day prospects for human agency,
Brown poses the need for devising critical ways to think about this predicament. Still, she
shies away from thinking the present comprehensively, to think possibilities that can only
come out of concerted human efforts, and to differentiate the catastrophe that Benjamin’s
angel impotently witnesses. Such thinking is possible only when the present predicament
is rendered comprehensively in its relation to the past; that is, in ways in which the
histories and moments of freedom are depicted alongside catastrophes.
In contrast to Brown, Buck-Morss’ articulation of the Benjaminian project
proceeds along different lines. In good Benjaminian fashion Buck-Morss seeks to present
an originary history of the twentieth century, one that relies heavily on Benjamin’s
Arcades Project, especially his dialectic of dream and awakening, his notion of ur-
history, and one that seeks to recover dialectical images in order to discern and rescue the
utopian dream that in the twentieth century miscarried. (Buck-Morss has recently come to
such theorization, but only in terms different from the more Benjaminian motifs
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informing her work - in order to do so she actually goes back to Hegel
.)
26
Furthermore,
also like Benjamin, both theorists are at pains in conceiving, and concretely defining, a
collective subject, a “we,” that witnesses the “piling of wreckage upon wreckage,” that
the current condition presumably imposes
.
27
If Brown, on one hand, assumes the content
of the historical-political consciousness that she seeks to retrieve, and the narrative in
which its contents are placed, and, like Benjamin, is unable to articulate a conception of
agency and resistance in correspondence with the diagnosis of the present; Buck-Morss,
on the other hand, offers a comprehensive history of the twentieth century gravitating
around the oppositions the cold war brought about - East and West - and geographically
places it in terms of the European continent and the United States.
Indeed, despite her nuanced account of recent history, Buck-Morss’s commitment
to a modernist dialectic of dream and awakening and the ambivalent role of the
dialectical materialists in the construction of dialectical images might limit the prospects
of her analysis. What is more relevant for my discussion, in all cases a universal is
presupposed in the form of a universal history or narrative, but never fully acknowledged,
or theoretically spelled out. The Benjaminian impasse of the collective is better discerned
in Buck-Morss’s effort to retrieve Benjamin’s philosophy in order to critically ponder the
recent history of the twentieth century - although this question comes up in a slightly
different form in her reflections. Rather than diagnosing the present, Buck-Morss
suggests the existence of a dynamic of dreamworlds and catastrophes in the twentieth
century.
26
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By means of her re-presentation of the concept of dreamworld, Buck-Morss seeks
to rework the intersection between memory and history, present and past, thus departing
from traditional Marxists-progressive teleological conceptions of history. Like Brown,
Buck-Morss faces a predicament of losses; for her, “‘History’ has failed us.” But for
Buck-Morss, out of this failure “there is no reason to believe that ... Utopians hopes
caused history to go wrong, and every reason, based on evidence of the abuses of power
that propelled history forward, to believe the opposite.”28 Following Benjamin’s
observation that “History,” in the aftermath of an era, “breaks down into images, not into
their stones,” Buck-Morss’s emphasis on rescuing the utopian moment is far from being
a call for a progressive-teleological understanding of history. Rather, situated in the
aftermath of “the short twentieth century,” Buck-Morss’s is a call for partial
interpretations of the images of the past, by seeing them as “dream images,” “wherein
past experience is rescued and perhaps redeemed.” Her representations of loss in is
presented in purely historical terms:
“History” has failed us. No new chronology will erase that fact. History’s betrayal
is so profound that it cannot be forgiven simply by tacking on a “post-” era to it
(post-modernism, post-Marxism). There is real tragedy in the shattering of the
dreams of modernity—of social utopia, historical progress, and material plenty for
all. But to submit to melancholy at this point would be to confer on the past a
wholeness that never did exist, confusing the loss of the dream with the loss of the
dream’s realization. [...] Rather than taking a self-ironizing distance from
history’s failure, we—the “we” who may have nothing more or less in common
28
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than sharing this time—would do well to bring the ruins up close and work our
way through the rubble in order to rescue the utopian dreams that modernity
engendered, because we cannot afford to let them disappear
.
29
Thus, instead of rejecting the utopia of mass culture, and the democratic ideal animating
this dreamworld and its catastrophes, Buck-Morss proposes a critique of these
catastrophes “in the name of the democratic, utopian hope to which the dream gave
expression”; the reason, “A world organized by global capital in which industrial
production continues to expand, but this time indifferent to the well-being of the masses
and unfettered by political constraints, is not a world in which catastrophes will
disappear.”30 By retrieving this utopian-democratic hope through constellations of
meaning, Buck-Morss, like Benjamin, ends up working within the realm of representation
and its politics. Hence the power and significance that Buck-Morss ascribes to the
constellations of meanings emerging from “[the] juxtaposition of these past fragments
with our present concerns might have the power to challenge the complacency of our
times, when history is said by its victors to have successfully completed its course, and
the new global capitalist hegemony claims to have run the competition off the field .”31
But Buck-Morss’ s articulation of a We is one that, like Brown, she presupposes
but never theorizes — although she presents its as a We that may only share this time.
Still, here Buck-Morss seems to be suggesting a universal time, one that regardless of
cultural differences is shared in common. In other words, not only does her account
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presuppose a universal historical narrative that she, in Dreamworld and Catastrophe
,
refuses to theonze, but also her account even presupposes a common time. Moreover,
like Benjamin she places a lot of emphasis on a modernist dialectic of dream and
awakening. The problem is that, in social collective terms, such dialectic can only be
deployed metaphorically, at best. Dream understood as aspiration, not as a collective
state: collectivities do not share a cerebral cortex, or a collective memory. Rather, one
can only talk about collected memories. 32 But even if the account of collective awakening
is strictly metaphorical, Buck-Morss still has to theorize a common narrative in which the
dreamworlds and catastrophes that her books so suggestively depict can be rendered
intelligible. Otherwise claims such as her statement on behalf of global rights in the
aftermath of September 11 th remain abstract: if “Humanity is the subject of the global
public sphere” there needs to be a comprehensive narrative of both continuities and
discontinuities, histories and memories, whose significance appeals to humanity at
large.
33
* * *
Ever since the news of Benjamin’s tragic suicide, his highly unique and often
idiosyncratic theoretical style and literary genius have influenced and informed
theoretical reflections ranging from Frankfurt School critical theory to literary studies,
architecture, and even the politics of deconstruction. By bringing together, among other
traditions, Marxism and surrealism, along with a strong presence of Jewish motifs, his
work has always defied classification. One of the major intellectual achievements - and
32
I take this to be the guiding contention of James E. Young’s work on memory. See, for instance, The
Texture ofMemory: Holocaust Memorials and Meanings (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), xi.
33
See Susan Buck-Morss, “A Global Public Sphere?” Radical Philosophy 1 1 1 (January/February 2002), 7.
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this is crucial for the purposes of the question at hand - of Benjamin’s melancholic mode
of theorizing consists in the way his reflections provide a provocative and critical way to
look at the present historically; one that appears to resist what are considered worn-out
ideas of universal history, or historicism, but is still able to articulate a critique of
progressive history that posits the need to redeem the present from the perspective of “the
image of enslaved ancestors.”34 In contrast with his younger friend, and interlocutor,
Theodor W. Adorno, Benjamin’s reflections on history and historical knowledge figure
prominently in his writings, and the presence of theological and Judaic motifs often
overshadow the Marxist ones
.
35
This is not incidental if one contrasts these two thinkers’
divergent tempers and styles, a contrast that has received ample scholarly attention in
highly suggestive ways, especially in relation to the debates these two had about
aesthetics and dialectical thinking
.
36
Yet, their differences in relation to historical
progress and historical knowledge have received scant attention, even if a consideration
of these might refreshingly reopen the terms of the debates between Benjamin and
Adorno
.
37
Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Concept of History,” 260. The complex and often paradoxical role of
melancholia in Benjamin’s critical ethos is suggestively developed in Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics:
Walter Benjamin and the Play ofMourning (Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1993).
35
See Irving Wohlfarth, “On Some Jewish Motifs in Benjamin,” in The Problems of Modernity: Adorno
and Benjamin, ed. Andrew Benjamin (London, UK: Routledge, 1989), 157-216.
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For instances see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics and Jameson’s Late Marxism
Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic (London and New York: Verso, 1991). See also Adorno and
Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence: 1928-1940, trans Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1999).
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The exception here is Gillian Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 207 . See also her review-essay “The Origin
of Negative Dialectics; The Frankfurt School: The Critical Theories of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W.
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Adorno, as already suggested, shared with Benjamin a strong critique of historical
progress. Adorno, like Benjamin before him, rejected the notion of a universal
teleological reason marching in history, or of any other form of historical teleology. But
contrary to Benjamin, in Negative Dialectic Adorno unequivocally stated, “Universal
history must be construed and denied.” Indeed, Benjamin conflated universal history and
histoncism while single-handedly rejecting both: “Historicism rightly culminates in
universal history,” towards the end of his life, he wrote
.
38 And when it comes to universal
history, Benjamin was also unequivocal: “Universal History has no theoretical armature.”
“Its method,” moreover, “mass a data to fill the homogenous, empty time.”39 In open
contrast with Adorno’s dialectical comprehension of the “double character” of concepts
in their equivocal historical articulations — a mode of reading and interpreting phenomena
that consists in the crafting of nuanced immanent readings that allow him to critically
discern the moment of truth of even the most reified concept or phenomena (which often
consisted in its negation) - Benjamin’s reflections on history took the form of a complex
and rich mixture of theological and politico-revolutionary motifs, highly informed not
only by Judaism and Marxism, but also by Blanquism, modernism, and surrealism. The
theoretically rich juxtapositions of all these motifs is perhaps nowhere more evident than
in Benjamin’s Theses. As Buck-Morss once observed, “In the theses on history, the
theological pole of Benjamin’s thinking was strongly evident, not so much alongside the
Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept From Lukacs to Habermas (Los Angeles and
Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984), 262-66.
38
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materialist pole as within it.”40 Or, as Perry Anderson has stated it, “Modernist alert and
millennial expectation intertwine in the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ without
exhausting the richness of these, at the end of the thirties .”41
Marxism, the Antichrist, the Messiah, and the historical materialist: these are all
motifs and metaphoric characters that figure largely in Benjamin’s reflections on history.
While interpreters agree that there is a critique of positivist historiography (Ranke), the
social democracy of his day, and historicist-progressive accounts of history, and that
these reflections are informed by all of the aforementioned traditions, the relative weight
of each motif in his reflections of history have been subject to controversy. Openly
contrasting with a historicist historiography that posits the past as a causally connected
sequence of events, when surely located within a continuum of what he calls “empty
time,” the historical materialist, Benjamin argues, is one who “must sacrifice the epic
dimension of history,” or what Nietzsche called monumental history. For the historical
materialist “the past ... becomes the subject of a construction whose locus is not empty
time, but the particular epoch... he breaks the epoch away from its reified historical
continuity....
”
4
^ It is the task of the historical materialist not only to “brush history
against the grain” but also “to blast open the continuum of history,” to break with
historicism’s dream of linearity and uninterrupted progress and posit “a time filled by the
presence of the now (Jetztzeit).”
43 To bring to bear the incompleteness of the past in the
40
Buck-Morss, The Origins ofNegative Dialectics, 169.
41
See Perry Anderson, A Zone ofEngagement (London and New York: Verso, 1992), 47
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present, with its broken promises of redemption, for the sake of redeeming it, that is
Benjamin’s project, one that sought to enact the cntical import of the historical
perspective associated with Marx, while resisting vulgar or mechanistic Marxism.
Out of Benjamin’s formulations of this thematic the one single reflection whose
interpretation elicits the most debate is, perhaps ironically, the most frequently invoked
image from Benjamin’s theses. In Thesis IX, Benjamin is depicting Paul Klee’s Angelus
Novus in order to starkly expound his critique of progress, while reflecting on history.
Here, indeed, is where his critique of progress is found in stark terms. This recurrent
image has been interpreted in a variety of often-contradictory ways, with the intersection
and relative theoretical importance of Jewish and materialist motifs being a source of
contention, even today
.
44
Lutz Niethammer has summarized the different traditions
interpreters have brought to bear on this image. “In attempting to decipher this passage
[Reflection IX of the Thesis],” Niethammer writes, “various interpreters have brought to
bear a wide range of materials and angles of vision from Benjamin’s own biography,
from Klee’s subjects and views on art, from the spread of the angelic allegory in
nineteenth-century cultural history, from Marxism, from the angelology of Kabbala, from
the Torah and the mythology of Antiquity, and from the science of thermodynamics .”4
Many interpreters share the view that Benjamin identified with the angel in the text 46
44
For an account of the different interpretations see Lutz Niethammer, Posthistorie: Has History Come to
an End trans., Patrick Camiller (London and New York: Verso, 1992). See also Gillian Rose’s essay
“Walter Benjamin—Out of the Sources of Modem Judaism,” in Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical
Essays. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993, pp. 175-210.
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This much one gathers from Benjamin’s own reflections in the fragment “Angesilaus Santander,” a text
probingly interpreted by Gershom Scholem, and where Benjamin writes “I came into the world under the
sign of Saturn—the star of the slowest revolution, the planet of detours and delays.” And the text where
according to Scholem is the only place where Benjamin “reveals his own melancholic character.”
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And Niethammer sides with a more theological reading. For him, the angel neither
represents Benjamin “fleeing from catastrophe into religion” nor does it represent
Benjamin himself; what the angel represents is a “divine messenger,” one that reclaims
“the hopes of redemption stored in the religious tradition" while introducing these hopes
as a meaning and yardstick into human contact with history.”47 Thus, the angel signifies
a religious motif that brings into play a transcendent standard for the politics of earth, and
thus constitutes a religious trope distinguishable from the historical materialist motifs.
Rolf Tiedemann makes the opposite case. In a thorough reading and
reconstruction of the thesis against the background of Benjamin’s earlier work and The
Arcades Project, Tiedemann suggests that the angel of the ninth thesis “by no means
represents the Messiah”; instead, he argues, “Benjamin indeed intended the angel to stand
for the historical materialist.”
48
This much is discemable once one juxtaposes Benjamin’s
1937 essay on Edward Fuchs, where he vividly depicts his brand of historical
materialism, with his reflections on the historical materialist in the thesis. Following
Marx’s rather unwitting integration of incompleteness in history, by means of his
invocation of an unredeemed past, in the Eighteenth Brumaire, Benjamin writes:
Niethammer, Posthistorie, 1 12. Lutzhammer rests his case on the strong religious overtones of the notion
of the angel and in framing the angel, and the actions Benjamin attributes to it, within the context of the
Hebraic religious tradition. Yet his textual case is fairly thin. Religious metaphors pervade western
conceptualization of history and of universalism and one can trace them back to Paul’s letter to the
Galanthians and to Augustine’s City of God. Moreover, nineteenth-century philosophies of history are part
of a dialectical relationship between secular, eschatological, and religious motifs. In any case, following his
own concluding reflections on “the dissolution of history,” Nietahmmer could have discerned that
Benjamin’s critique of “empty time” compellingly undermines Judeo-Christian eschatologies. For an
influential treatment of the intersection of religious and secular motifs in nineteenth-century historical
thought, see Karl Lo with, Meaning in History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956). The best
survey of the different historical and theoretical articulations of this notion of “the end of history” is found
in Perry Anderson’s essay “The Ends of History” in A Zone ofEngagement, 279-375.
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“Historical Materialism does not regard the work of the past as over and done with .”49 If
for Marx “Men make their own history, but ... they do not make it under self-selected
circumstances, but under circumstances
... given and transmitted from the past,” for
Benjamin, “The task of historical materialism is to set to work an engagement with
history original to every new present. It has recourse to a consciousness of the present
that shatters the continuum of history.”50 And where Marx refers to “the tradition of all
dead generations, one that “weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living,”
Benjamin invokes the notion of dialectical images, a concept that bears the relations of
the past to the present, in sum a flashing moment, “dialectics at a standstill .”51 And the
crafter of these images is the historical materialist.
Still, Tiedemann is too vigilant a reader to remain unambiguous in his depiction
of the angel as the historical materialist. Either he limits the possibilities for change from
the perspective of this materialist
,
or he chastens his previous claim on the angel’s
identity; he goes for the former, and in a dialectical twist to Marx’s formulation, while
posing the question of agency, Tiedemann writes: “The historical materialist who
disguises himself as the angel of history may not be one after all .”52 By presenting the
angel of history as the materialist historian, Tiedemann is forced to interpret the latter as
“totally unable to turn to the future.” And like the angel, he “remains entranced by the
mythical make-up of the world.”53
49
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But what neither Tiedemann nor Lutzhammer consider is that regardless of what
the angel stands for, the historical materialist or “the hopes of redemption stored in the
religious tradition,” what is taken for granted is the cognitive attributes ascribed to the
angel, and the relation of the critic to this epistemology of history. Stated somewhat
differently, for the angel to comprehend the pattern of history, there is a comprehensive
account of its development that informs the gaze of the angel. And Benjamin, to be sure,
rejected wholeheartedly the concept of universal history, even if the cogency of his
critique requires some form of it.
In order to fully grasp the significance and theoretical-political import of the
retrieval of Benjamin’s angel it is necessary to quote Reflection IX in its entirety:
A Klee painting named “Angelus Novus” shows an angel looking as though he is
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are
staring, his mouth is open, and his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of
events, he sees one single catastrophe that keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has
got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close
them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we
call progress .
54
54
Benjamin, Illuminations
,
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In this rendering of the angel of history there is no discontinuity or radical ruptures,
“where we see a chain of events, he [the angel of history] sees one single catastrophe.”
Thus, not only is the position of the angel inaccessible to humanity, who irremediably
seems to perceive history as a chain of events, even if seen in a temporal sequence of
continuity and discontinuity, remembrance and forgetfulness; the angel, on the contrary
sees an undifferentiated catastrophe. The angel therefore either possesses an
epistemological position that ordinary humanity does not share, or at least it conceives of
a comprehensive account of history that substitutes the empty-time of positivist
historicism with “time filled by the presence of the now [,Jetztzeit].’’ ’ Either way the angel
posits the critique of historical progress from a comprehensive universal narrative that is
never theorized; in fact, Benjamin rules out the possibility for such a history in advance.
Besides, by brushing aside the linearity implied by the notion of history as a chain of
events, even if it is reflected on in terms of periodically disrupted breaks and
discontinuities, the standpoint of the angel negates the modem experience of history
while, at that same tine, modem experience is what permeates and gives meaning to
Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit. In Perry Anderson’s apt formulation, “[Benjamin’s]
concept of Jetztzeit combines the continuous flow of the new that is the hallmark of the
modem, with the sudden transfiguring blast of the messianic into it, that is the sign of the
revolution, in the over-pitched versions of either.”55 In this way, and despite his valiant
effort to deploy this idea of an angel of history in order to undermine historicism and the
idea of progress it portends, Benjamin ends up reinstating an empty-time in the angel’s
perspective to the point of even betraying his efforts to rework historical materialism.
55
Anderson, A Zone ofEngagement, 47.
278
It is thus not without irony that while undermining progressive historiography and
historicism Benjamin posits history as “one single catastrophe.” Insofar as historicism
and universal history are conceived as positing history as a chain of events (let’s leave
aside for the moment the fact that the notion of a “chain of events” could easily be
emplotted in a narrative of decay, or as the Greek and Roman historiographical
experiments attest, as cyclical histories) - one that presumably is not only unable to
comprehend difference and discontinuity, but also silence historical experiences that may
question it - both end up imposing a homogenous historical narrative anchored in
positivist epistemology and a universal teleology. But Benjamin’s angel does the same
and equally reinstates this empty-time, as is evident in his critique of progress and in the
undifferentiated conception of history that informs it.
Interestingly, running along the same lines of his critique of progress, there is yet
another dimension in Benjamin’s formulation of his critique that most interpreters have
conspicuously left out: the angel discerns the totality and unity of the catastrophe history
is, and is thus able to comprehend that the “piling [of] wreckage upon wreckage” is not
only the result of a whole that once existed, but of one that “has been smashed.” Hence,
despite the single catastrophe that progress brings and hurls in front of Benjamin’s angel,
one whose “pile of debris grows skyward,” and despite his critique of the unreflective
nature of the ideology of progress - one that in Benjamin’s image of a storm keeps going
forward accumulating more and more debris - his reflections ultimately re-posit the same
linearity and are thus immersed in a narrative combining hopes, secularized or not, for
messianic intervention, or almost mythically hoping for a modernist notion of awakening
anchored in a questionable Jungian model of “collective consciousness.”
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Indeed, Benjamin’s angel resonates with one of Jorge Luis Borges’ ingenious
literary tropes: “Funes, el Memorioso ” Like Funes, Benjamin’s angel is overwhelmed
and unable to act, even if for the opposite reasons: history for Benjamin’s angel is an
undifferentiated catastrophe that it witnesses, and the magnitude of the catastrophe, its
mythical make-up, overwhelms the angel: the angel is no adversary, perhaps not even
historical materialism, for the weight the catastrophe that history is imposes on the living.
In contrast, Funes is the opposite of the angel: as his relation to the past is so thoroughly
differentiated and rich in detail that he cannot abstract from it. But this richness leads
Funes to an inability to experience the temporality of history and memory; his time is
perhaps empty-time, too.
In Borges’ narrative, Funes was incapable of abstraction, of general ideas, as he
could remember and seize every single moment he experienced, its surroundings, and
how he felt at the time, and how he’s felt every single time he’s thought about it in every
instance, etc., to the extent that a universal-comprehensive account of it was impossible.
Thus Funes experiences the present in such a differentiated and rich manner that it is
certainly overwhelming, even unbearable. His perception, so rich and differentiated,
capture the richness of the present as well as his most ancient and trivial memories; a
present that he cannot experience temporally: “it took him one day to remember
everything that happened the day before.” One might certainly argue that only a Borges
can call Funes’ preservation of the past memory. For memory is neither the opposite of
forgetting, which consists in the disappearance of the past, nor of the exact preservation
of it; “Memory” in Tzvetan Todorov’s phrase, “is always and necessarily an interaction
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of these two .”56 And yet, the “accident” that bestowed on Funes a prodigious memory left
Funes physically immobile. And Borges suggests that he might be mentally immobile,
too:
I suspect, nonetheless, he was not capable of thinking. Thinking is forgetting
differences, to generalize, to abstract. In Funes’ cramped world there weren’t
anything but details.
. ,
57
Funes’ “memory” renders him incapable of acting, or even thinking, in ways
conducive to bringing about any creative deed or act. Like Benjamin’s angel, he is
overwhelmed by the weight of memory, even if not of history: “The angel would like to
stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed,” and yet “... a storm is
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel
can no longer close them.” While the angel is overwhelmed by the single storm, Funes is
overwhelmed by the opposite, the manifoldness of his remembrances cannot account for
singleness, for unity. Benjamin’s is the perspective of a melancholic angel that wants to
redeem the past but it is not able to do so. Ironically, the same melancholia that partially
inspired Benjamin’s cognitive genius and informed his critical vision end ups curtailing
the critical potential of his historical reflections, at least from the perspective of the
present predicament.
All in all, despite his rejection of the idea of universal history, Benjamin’s
historical reflections presupposed a universal comprehensive narrative. And, as I
56
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mentioned earlier, by entangling universal history with historicism, Benjamin shied away
from offering a more nuanced account of his critique of progressive-teleological history,
and of articulating a comprehensive account of universal history in which his diagnosis of
the present can be emplotted and apprehended. Because of his reluctance to give up
comprehensiveness, Adorno emerges as one of the most relevant thinker in the present
.
58
And in his critique of progress Adorno deploys his very own mode of immanent reading,
in which the continuities and discontinuities, as much as the progressive and regressive
elements, in the history of a concept are aporetically discerned, and rendered
.
59
It is along
these lines that the debate between Benjamin and Adorno might be more fruitfully
reopened.
* * *
What is the political and cognitive import of the idea of Universal history? Is universal
history yet another concept of a bygone, modem, era? Does the Eurocentric impulse
behind its different theorizations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exhaust
the political import of this concept? In what follows, I explore the possibility of recasting
the concept of universal history and render it responsive to the political and ethical
challenges the post-Auschwitz predicament imposes. My contention is that the present
ethico-political challenges need to be thought out comprehensively and politically in both
their local and global dimensions. By reworking the concept of universal history
politically, from Adorno’s negative dialectical perspective, this concept can be
immanently read in its equivocal formulations in order to disentangle it from the
58
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Eurocentrism of the Hegelian formulation, even if within Hegel - as a rigorous exposition
of his concept of historical knowledge suggests - there are important conceptual insights
that need not be entirely discarded
.
60
Indeed, a rereading of Hegel’s conception of
universal history, as well as of his reflections on historical knowledge, provides the basis
for Adorno’s retrieval of universal history.
From the early nineteenth century on, Hegel’s philosophy of history set the terms
of most discussions not only on the nature of historical knowledge, and its conditions of
possibility, but also of its political and philosophical import
.
61
Not only did Hegel
creatively rework the reflections on historical knowledge posited by some of his
predecessors, including towering figures such as Giambattista Vico, David Hume, and
Immanuel Kant, but the imprint of his reflections on historical knowledge is also found -
albeit often left unacknowledged - in contemporary debates on what, after Dilthey, has
come to be known as the relationship between “explanation” and “interpretation” in
historical and cultural knowledge. 6" But nowadays Hegel has become synonymous with
another, still infamous, influence. This is nowhere more evident than in the way in which
philosophical conceptions and ideas of universal history and dialectical thinking are often
assessed today. Indeed, these are hard times for Hegelianism, and perhaps rightly so.
60
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Hegel’s Eurocentrism, and the moment of domination that feminists and critical theorists
have discerned in his philosophical system, taint his notion of universal history and
immanently undo and reopen his philosophical system
.
63
So entangled has the idea of
universal history been with progressive teleologies, or with historicism, that the term is
presented as intrinsically entangled with Eurocentric domination, and is accordingly
emplotted in these narratives.
Although his formulations are marred by strong Eurocentric sentiments, as well as
guided by a philosophical-redemptive narrative of sacrifice (this could be traced to the
centrality of Christ in the structure of the argument of the Phenomenology), his
speculative attempt to expound the universal and the particular in the singular need not be
discarded. Stated somewhat differently, it is in Hegel’s effort to speculatively cognize the
identity and lack of identity between universal and particular, identity and difference,
comprehensively that the epistemological import of his comprehensive account of history
can be found. Hegel’s increasingly Eurocentric motifs marred this conception. And yet,
this could be immanently criticized in order to transcend its limitations in the name of the
concept of Freedom that it invokes. In important ways, that’s precisely Adorno’s task in
the often-neglected section of Negative Dialectics, “World Spirit and Natural History”.
Still, Hegel, by positing the centrality of a comprehensive, and speculative,
understanding of the whole in order to apprehend it from the perspective of the present,
sought to acquire a higher historical knowledge. Yet there is a lot here of what Michael
63
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Andre Bernstein has aptly called a logic of back-shadowing, as the past is not only
justified and given a logical order from the perspective of the outcomes of decisions
individuals in that past could not have foreseen, but is also, in this way, despoiled of its
ambiguity and contingency
.
64
Moreover, perhaps attesting to the strong influence a
Christian version of eschatology bears in Hegel, there is a redemptive moment in this
narrative that further despoils the particular of its singularity
.
65
It is this redemptive narrative that is at work in Hegel’s conception of universal
history, one of the aspects of his thought that Adorno most vehemently criticized. For
instance, in Minima Moralia, Adorno writes: “Had Hegel’s philosophy of history
embraced this age, Hitler’s robot-bombs would have found their place besides the early
death of Alexander and similar images, as one of the selected empirical facts by which
the state of world-spirit manifests itself directly in symbols. [...] ‘I have seen the world
spirit’, not on horseback, but on wings and without a head, and that refutes, at the same
stroke, Hegel s philosophy of history.”66 Adorno takes what he perceives as the
pernicious combination of a redemptive narrative, with its strong totalizing bent, to task
here. More importantly this redemptive narrative is predicated on the logic of sacrifice
that pervades his system - sacrifices that are supposedly made for the emergence of a
higher form of consciousness. And the totalizing tendencies of Hegel’s dialectical
64
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rendering of universal history are criticized accordingly. For as Adorno put it, “If
Benjamin said that history hitherto had been written from the standpoint of the victor, and
needed to be rewritten from that of the vanquished, we might add that knowledge indeed
presents the fatally rectilinear succession of victory and defeat, but should also address
itself to those things which were not embraced by this dynamic, which fell by the
wayside—what might be called the waste products and blind spots that have escaped the
dialectic .”
67 And it is precisely these blind spots that Adorno’s negative dialectic, with its
emphasis on non-identity, seeks to illuminate through constellations. Blind spots that are
illuminated in what in the first chapter of this study I formulated as the Other Scene : the
space in which non-identity is illuminated, and its suffering is fleshed out concretely, as
part of a comprehensive constellations of concepts. In terms of historiography, to
illuminate these blind spots by means of constellational critique, a universal historical
narrative that renders these comprehensively and concretely is needed. In other words, a
constellational critique that seeks to break with the silencing of history but one that
paradoxically may lend voice to the suffering of the nameless others by representing their
silence rather than pretending to either speak for them or impose a voice . 68 Indeed, by
apprehending the “blind spots that have escaped the dialectic,” Adorno seeks to
comprehend history from the perspective of non-identity. Even so, he refuses to give up
the idea that there are continuities. As the aforementioned passages suggest, victory and
failure, actions and reactions, are entangled in structural process that is nevertheless
contingent; namely, not part of a teleology.
67 Adomo, Minima Moralia, 151.
68
Cf. Elizabeth Wyschogrod, An Ethics of Remembering: History, Heterology, and the Nameless Others
(Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1998).
286
Thus, as Adorno immanently criticizes the concept of progress, he preserves the
notion of universal history. As in his discussion of progress, Adorno clings to the
principle that is constitutive of his philosophy: the need to immanently analyze the
history of a concept in its equivocations, which often lead to a more adequate
understanding of both its utopian content and its possible complicity with present-day
domination. “Like every philosophical term, progress has its equivocations; and every
such term’s equivocations also register a commonality.”69 From this Adorno proceeds to
explore these equivocations in order to flesh out the commonality in the equivocations of
the concept, and how in its equivocations, its true content emerges.
Progress means: a coming out of the spell, even out of the spell of progress which
is itself nature, when human mankind becomes aware of its own indigenousness
to nature and halts the mastery which it exerts over nature through which mastery
by nature continues. In this respect it could be said that progress only properly
occurs where it ends.
Then, progress would become transformed into resistance against the perpetual
danger of relapse
.
70
Adorno thus challenges the modem idea of progress, an idea that in Marx’s critical
reflections on capitalism is both significantly shattered and preserved; shattered, insofar
as capitalism has not brought about concrete emancipation, and preserved for similar
reasons as the condition of being part of the proletariat is securely superior vis-a-vis
mediaeval serfdom, and as orthodox Marxists have long sustained, capitalism is an
69
See Adorno, “Progress” in Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History
,
84.
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intrinsic stage in history’s path. The latter view is reinforced by Marx’s reliance on a
secularized version of eschatological narrative. It is precisely this last view that Adorno
vehemently rejects, while seeking to preserve the epistemological power of a
comprehensive understanding history. In contrast, to other Hegelian-Marxists, Adorno
reclaims the critical import universal history as it allows for a comprehensive totality in
which the concrete intersection between universal and particular elements can be
discerned (one cannot not think a historical totality however contingent his historical
articulation might be). In the modernity, capitalism emerges as a universalizing force to
be reckoned with, but its market imperatives manifest in different ways in specific
locations and social formations. It is precisely this intersection, I shall argue, that
Adorno’s conception seeks to capture . 71
To better see the point of departure that Adorno’s position represents vis-a-vis
Marx, one needs to look at the latter’s critique to the ahistorical nature of classical
political economy. I would like to suggest that what can be retrieved from Marx is the
critical historicism that emerges from his critique of the categories of the political
economy—its other component, that pertaining to the transitions from one mode of
production to another, has been pondered and problematize by Marxist such as Anderson,
Mayer, and Jameson. It is, indeed, in Jameson’s reformulation of these questions where a
more nuanced position can be found.
With the advent of the French revolution the concept of progress gained salience
in Western social and political thought and thus provided the narrative structure through
which the increasing changing in politics, culture, and the political economy began to be
71
Cf. Osborne, The Politics of Time, especially chaps. 1-2
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framed. From Thomas Malthus to John Stuart Mill the political economy discourse
started to conjecture the possibility of historical progress and to frame within it the idea
of social progress by means of education, or in the case of Mill, also by means of an
impenahst-civihzational imperative
.
73
In doing so, the categories of the new political
economy of Adam Smith and David Ricardo became reified, as these were presented as
universal laws, thus brushing aside their social and historical nature. In Marx’s view, by
the mid nineteenth-century both “Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the
shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-
century individual - the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of
society, on the other side of the new forms of production developed since the sixteenth-
century - appears as an ideal, whose existence theory projects into the past. Not as a
historic result but as history’s point of departure .” 74 Or as Marx presented it later on,
although this time in terms of the larger canvas of human history: “World history has not
always existed; history as world history [is] a result.”75
By means of his critique of capitalism, Marx consistently deployed a “critical
historicism” to criticize the false universalization of complex, and by no means linear,
7
" In relation to the questions of abundance and scarcity, Nicholas Xenos writes: “Once the concept of
scarcity took hold in modernity, abundance took shape as an ideal negation of the present order, appearing
in this guise in David Hume’s reflections on justice. Eventually, the concept of progress provided a
narrative structure within which scarcity and abundance could be accommodated in a single linear frame.”
See Scarcity and Modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 35. See also chapter IV of this
dissertation.
73 On the civilizational imperative in Mills, along with his historicism, see Uday S. Metha, Liberalism and
Empire (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).
74
Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus
(London, UK: Penguin Books, 1993), 83. cf. Marx’s discussion of the attempt of classic political
economists to naturalize their conception of production in p. 87
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Marx, Grundrisse, 109.
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particular-historical processes. A critical historicism that Adorno would later on endorse
as a way to avoid the erasure of memory that the reification of categories have brought
about. Furthermore, this critical historicism seeks to also comprehensively explore the
intersection between capitalism, as the newly prevalent mode of production, with
different modes of production that preceded it. Stated differently, how capitalist
imperatives bnng under capitalism non-capitalist relations, as well as pre-capitalist
relations; and how these, in turn, become at once constitutive of the process of
accumulation of capitalism as well as reconstituted by this system of power and its
imperatives.
Marx continued towards the end of his life reconsidering some of these questions.
After 1871, while facing the situation in Russia, in the famous letter to Vera Zasulich,
Marx ended up suggesting “the idea of a concrete multiplicity of paths to historical
development and acknowledged that his well-known model of transition from different
modes of production was based on the experience of Western Europe. But Marx never
fully articulated the implications of this shift, as he only hinted at them in another letter
dated from 1881. Here Marx objects to the use of his “historical sketch of the genesis of
capitalism in Western Europe into a philosophical theory of general development...”
From this Etienne Balibar derives the following conclusion: “Just as there is no
capitalism ‘in general’, but only a ‘historical capitalism’, comprising the encounter of-
76
In a letter to Benjamin, on 29 February 1940, he writes: “For all reification is a forgetting: objects
become purely thing-like the moment they are retained for us without the continued presence of their other
aspects: when something of them has been forgotten.” Benjamin and Adorno, The Complete
Correspondence
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and conflict between - many capitalisms, so there is no universal history only singular
historicities .”77
Marx’s formulation, however, hints at a different possibility: one that
speculatively reads the universal and the particular always in reference to the concrete. In
the same letter quoted by Balibar, Marx adds: “Thus events strikingly analogous, but
occurring in different historical milieu, led to unique disparate results. By studying each
of these evolutions on its own, and then comparing them, one will easily discover the key
to the phenomenon, but it will never be arrived at by employing the all-purpose formula
of a general historical-philosophical whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-
historical.”
Yet, Marx s formulations in Capital and in the Grundrisse are marred by his share
of what Michael Andre-Bemstein calls “back-shadowing” (retrospectively adding a
linearity to an otherwise process of structured contingencies) which, along with a
teleological and linear conception of history, comes to the fore and ultimately undermines
his critical historicizing. For instance, in the Grundrisse Marx wrote:
The categories which express [bourgeois society’s] relations, the comprehension
of its structure, thereby also allow insights into the structure and the relations of
production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements
it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along with it,
whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human
anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape . 78
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See Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy ofMarx, trans. Chris Turner (London and New York: Verso, 1995),
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Marx thus tnes to extend his comprehensive knowledge of bourgeois society to its
antecedents. As the analogy with the ape suggests, there is an evolutionary assumption at
work here, one that not only resonates with Hegel’s invocation of the moment of
recollection of Geist, but that also evidently constitutes its equivalent in Marx.
His critical historicism notwithstanding, Marx inherited from Hegel a teleological
conception of history that ultimately swallows the critical historicism found in his
critique of classical political economy. Indeed, the strong teleological bent of his
philosophy of history oftentimes takes the best of his critical historicism. Despite his
trenchant critique of the bourgeois conception of progress, the basic conceptual elements
of teleological history are left unaltered in his analysis - a progression, that in Marx’s
case, as in Mill’s reflections, is based on three stages is thus expounded: history,
revolution, and the emancipated society of true humanity
.
79
In addition to the promise of
comprehensive historical knowledge of both the universal and the particular aspects of
historical capitalism, Marx also inherited from Hegel, who in turn inherited from the
Scottish enlightenment, a conception of historical “development” that informed both
thinkers’ Eurocentric moments. Indeed, in the nineteenth century there is also a
redemptive narrative at work in both Marx and Mill. It is in the latter’s historicism, as
expounded in Considerations on Representative Government
,
where a teleological and
developmental approach to historicism is articulated, one that, as the work of Uday S.
Metha and others have shown, was entangled with British imperialism. Or stated
differently, liberal historicism is the one implicated in the justification of imperialism.
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It is against these formulations that Adorno’s insistence on the double character of
the notion of progress needs to be understood. In both the essay “Progress” and in his
joint authorship with Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, he tnes to critically
histoncize the idea of progress, along with an immanent exploration of the conceptual
tensions within it. A critique by means of which Adorno is able to present a critique of
progress that, although it resists any abstract negation of the experiential and utopian
connotations of the term, does not revert into a teleological understanding of history that
redeems past suffering for a quasi-eschatological end. “Each advance in civilization has
renewed not only mastery but also the prospect of its alleviation. However, while real
history is woven from real suffering, which certainly does not diminish in proportion to
the increase in means of abolishing it, the fulfillment of that prospect depends on the
concept.” It is along similar lines that Adorno seeks to retrieve the notion of universal
history.
Adorno’s retrieval of universal history is found in the Hegelian model of Negative
Dialectics. But, contrary to the lengthy treatment that philosophy of history receives in
Hegel’s system, and the emphasis the latter places on its method, object, and even in the
way of writing it, Adorno’s retrieval of the critical import of universal history is done
from the perspective of theoretical philosophy. Thus he does not offer the Marxist entry-
point of Hegel as an apologist of the Prussian state, nor Hegel’s specific formulations of
universal history. As the opening quote of this chapter reads:
Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have
happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that
80 Adomo and Horkheimer, Dialectic ofEnlightenment,32.
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a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for
that reason, however, is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically
splintered moments and phases of history—the unity of the control of nature,
progressing to rule over men’s inner nature
.
81
Both the cynicism surrounding abstract ideas of progress and the subjugation of nature by
humans are part of the moments that Adorno sees contained in this notion. In the same
vein, he seeks to retrieve the possibility of a comprehensive narrative in which both
aspects can be critically discerned. Hence, the insistence on the unity that cements the
discontinuous moments. And humanity - as a whole - is what is depicted by means of
this concept.
Although this assertion has not received sufficient attention two accounts stand
out as offering probing readings of it: Gillian Rose’s and Fredric Jameson’s. In Rose’s
reading, universal history must be construed “in order to comprehend social formation
and deformation” (namely, capitalist relations of production and other socio-cultural
dynamics of continuity and/or domination) and denied, insofar as it has historically been
presented either in terms of the Kantian guiding Providence, or the rational unfolding of a
Hegelian World-Spirit. 8" Jameson, on the other hand, sees this assertion as another
instance of Adorno arguing for the need to apprehend a concept not only by means of its
dual-attributes, but also from the perspective of constellational thinking: the way to
handle “the impossible yet indispensable concept.” Or, stated differently, handling this
81
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concept from the comprehensive perspective of “constellative critique.”83 For Jameson,
“what is argued in effect is the ultimate objectivity of that absent and invisible totality
that is history...”84 It is, after all, the primacy of the object that is one of the things
Adorno most vehemently presents in his negative dialectic. And it is from this
perspective that this notion of universal history maintains its validity - and, as such,
reclaims Marx’s attempt to comprehensively render the social process that is history, not
as something ontologically posited, but as a social and political process.
Thus, Adorno goes on to affirm, “History is the unity of continuity and
discontinuity.”85 But out of this assertion an important difference with Marx is discerned:
the break with the teleological bent of his conception, and its retrospective recollection.
One need not dispute Marx’s influence in Adorno to disagree with Jameson’s contention
that this model presents a “‘defense’ of the Marxian view of history.”86 Adorno’s
immanent critique and retrieval of the notion of universal history might be similar to
Marx s insofar as it is socially bounded, and is thought-out from the perspective of
objectivity; but unlike Marx’s, it resists the progressivist evolutionism that is sometimes
found in Marx’s formulations. Besides, as part of his immanent critique of universal
history, Adorno draws on Marx’s contention, in The German Ideology, about the
relationship between nature and history, and approvingly quotes the following passage:
“History can be considered from two sides, divided into the history of nature and the
history of mankind. Yet there is no separating the two sides; as long as men exist, natural
83
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and human history will qualify each other ”87 Adorno draws on this account of the
mediation of nature and history, and argues the impossibility of separating these aspects,
or presenting nature as an ontological base for society, or as a second nature. In Adorno’s
view, “Human history, the history of the progressing mastery of nature, continues the
unconscious history of nature.”88 But despite his debt to Marx in articulating his
conception of natural history, or perhaps because of it, he transforms Marx’s critical
histoncism from the perspective of the dynamics of late capitalism, and the process of
exchange. For Adorno, “Ideology is not superimposed as a detachable layer on the being
of society; it is inherent in that being. It rests upon abstraction, which is the essence of the
exchange process.”89
According to Adorno, “No universal history leads from the wild animal to the
human being, but one indubitably leads from the slingshot to the megaton bomb .”99 But
instead of simply opposing necessity with contingency, Adorno reformulates the binary
in terms of an aporetic stance in which both are rendered comprehensively. Indeed, as in
his account of the interpenetration of culture and society, contingent historical events can
inaugurate patterns of domination that structurally perpetuate their existence. Suffering
due to the increasing domination of non-identity is an instance of this, “The world spirit,
a worthy object of definition, would have to be defined as a permanent catastrophe.
Under the all-subjugating identity principle, whatever eludes rational planning in the
realm of means, turns into frightening retribution for the calamity which identity brought
87 As quoted in Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 358.
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on the non-identical,*' a calamity that can take the form of “the totality of historic
suffering
... the One and All that keeps rolling on to this day ... would teleologically be
the absolute of suffering.”
Universal history thus contains both moments: the moment of contingency cuts
through notions of necessary progress or evolution; the necessary allows for socio-
histoncal relations of domination (even if from contingent origins) to be discerned in
their continuity. Thus both moments are comprehensively rendered, but never reconciled,
or even claim to be comprehended in all their determinations. This is Adorno’s
constellational critique at its best, thus opening the space for a comprehensive narrative
that allows for the non-identity of the universal and the particular, one infused with a
critical historicism that seeks to historicize particular histories in their concrete local
manifestations without dispensing of the universal comprehensive moment in the
cognitive experience of apprehending and representing these. Indeed, if there is any basis
for universal history in Adorno, it is the continuation of human suffering, even if the
concrete manifestations have varied historically.
* * *
In “Hegel and Haiti” Susan Buck-Morss provocatively writes: “Why is ending the silence
on Hegel and Haiti important? Given Hegel’s ultimate concession to slavery’s
continuance—moreover, given the fact that Hegel’s philosophy has provided for two
centuries a justification for the most complacent forms of Eurocentrism (Hegel was
perhaps always a cultural racist if not a biological one)—why is it more than arcane
interest to retrieve from oblivion this fragment of history, the truth of which has managed
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to slip away from us? Thus Buck-Morss begins the last section of her path-breaking
essay on the historical relationship between the Haitian Revolution and Hegel’s
master/slave dialectic; the latter being a key paradigm in the account of the development
of human subjectivity, and of the emergence of freedom in world history, within the
Hegelian system. For Buck-Morss, this is a relationship that not only Hegel silenced, but
also his best commentators share responsibility for such silencing
.
92
After documenting
the significance and ample coverage the Haitian Revolution had in the newspapers and
journals of the time, especially the journal Minerva, one that according to Buck-Morss
Hegel daily read, Buck-Morss articulates her contention, “Either Hegel was the blindest
of all the blind philosophers of freedom in Enlightenment Europe, surpassing Locke and
Rousseau by far in his ability to block out reality in front of his nose (the print right in
front of his nose at the breakfast table); or Hegel knew—knew about real slaves
successfully revolting against real masters, and he elaborated his dialectic of lordship and
bondage deliberately within this contemporary context.”93
In this vein, Buck-Morss takes issue not only with these silences she discerns in
Hegel and his commentators but also with the Eurocentric frame of reference that
disavows an understanding of this historical event. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has
convincingly shown, in the western European imagination the Haitian revolution was a
non-event, it “was unthinkable in its time,” “even as it happened,” insofar as “it
challenged the very framework within which proponents and opponents had examined
91
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race, colonialism, and slavery in the Americas .”94 It represented the first Atlantic
revolution whose outcome was the establishment of the first black-nation-state in the
hemisphere - albeit one neglected by Western historiography, to the extent that even the
best work that seeks to sympathetically reconstruct the “Age of Revolutions” neglects its
significance
.
95
But according to Trouillot this neglect is hardly the offspring of the racist
attitudes of its contemporaries in Europe, and less so a reflection of attitudinal racism on
the part of posterior histonans - it was ingrained in the official discourse of the Imperial
West. Each and every one of the steps—leading up to and culminating in the emergence
of a modem black state,’ still largely part of the unthinkable until the twentieth
century—challenged further the ontological order of the West and the global order of
colonialism .”96
In light of slavery’s role as root metaphor in modem western political thought
from Locke to Hegel, ending the silences of the Haitian revolution, and of Hegel’s
relation to it, seem to be crucial for Buck-Morss not only for the sake of scholarly
soundness, but also politically
.
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In her concluding remarks Buck-Morss links her
concern with ending Hegel’s part in silencing the Haitian revolution, and with “ending
the silence on Hegel and Haiti,” with the question of Eurocentrism, and with the need to
See Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 82, 73, 82-3. Buck-Morss’ account is indebted to this text.
As Trouillot points out, even in the work of Eric Hobsbawm, the foremost Marxist historian of the Age
of Revolution, the silencing is astonishing. See Silencing the Past, 99, 173n. The text in question is Eric
Hobsbawm’ s The Age ofRevolutions, 1789-1843 (New York: Vintage, 1994).
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fact that slavery is present even in Plato’s Republic, and that Aristotle suggests the possibility of friendship
between a slave and a master. Thus, the imagery of slavery has been present in western political thought
since its ancient Greek origins. My point here, following Buck-Morss, is to suggest that its significance in
modem political thought is closely related to the Imperial adventures of Europeans. See my discussion in
chapters IV and V of the present study.
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theoretically and politically undo it by means of “rescuing the idea of universal human
history from the uses to which white domination has put it.” In doing so, it is not only
universal history that is retrieved but in the same gesture the promise of freedom and
emancipation can be retrieved by offering a narrative that by challenging these silences
articulates the equivocations of universalism and reason concretely. “If the historical facts
about freedom can be ripped out of the narratives told by its victors and salvaged for our
own time, then the project of universal freedom does not need to be discarded but, rather
redeemed and reconstituted on a different basis.”98 Buck-Morss makes this point
forcefully when she challenges enlightenment, liberal narratives of the ending of slavery:
“It took years of bloodshed before slavery - really-existing slavery, not merely its
metaphorical analogy - was abolished in the French colonies, and even then the gains
were only temporary. Although abolition of slavery was the only possible logical
outcome of the ideal of universal freedom, it did not come about through the
revolutionary ideas or even the revolutionary actions of the French; it came about
through the actions of the slaves themselves .”99 Slavery ended because the universal
discourse allowed for soon-to-be free slaves to appropriate its universalism for their own
freedom by means of their own actions, oftentimes by means of violent actions, as slave-
owners did not concede too easily to the demands of enlightenment.
Buck-Morss thereby calls for a retrieval of the ideal of universal freedom emplotted in a
reworked conception of universal history, presumably one whose basis partially resides in
forging narratives that undo the silencing impulse in western historiography, and one that
98
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Will also make room for the silence of the nameless other of history. In concluding her
essay, Buck-Morss rhetorically asks, “What if every time that the consciousness of
individuals surpassed the confines of present constellations of power in perceiving the
concrete meaning of freedom, this were valued as a moment, however transitory, of the
realization of absolute spirit? What other silences would need to be broken? What
undisciplined stories would be told?” 100 Hence, one of the challenges facing a
reconstituted idea of universal history is breaking with the silences of the past, with the
ways predominant and hegemonic discourses, in order to reclaim concealed histories,
displaced individuals and their stories, and retrieving “undisciplined stories” constituting
the utopian dream of freedom. And a crucial step in this direction is “rescuing the idea of
universal human history from its complicity with white Eurocentrism: conceiving
universal history on a different basis,” in non-teleological terms, and breaking with the
racist and Eurocentric bias that has historically participated in the production of history.
As Buck-Morss’ attempt to end the silence of Hegel and Haiti - within the context of
breaking the Eurocentric impulse in western political thought - attests, out of what could
be considered a plethora of unreflective criticisms, the strongest critique one can level
against the Hegelian system and its dialectic is, ironically, the one that is posed the least
from the camps of contemporary political theory: the question of Hegel’s Eurocentrism,
and how this bears in his reflections.
* * *
Yet stem challenges to notions of universal and world history have come from thinkers
whose reflections are informed by the post-colonial critique of Western historiography,
100
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and its imperial ambitions. Here I cannot go into the details of the accuracy of the
portrayal of the West - there are different levels of sophistication here, from Robert
Young’s rather superficial White Mythologies to the more sophisticated and nuanced
accounts of Chakrabarty, Guha, Spivak, and, from a Latin American perspective, Enrique
Dussel and Walter Mignolo. So to illustrate my point, without claiming to be exhaustive,
I will limit myself to comment on the critiques put forth by Chakrabarty and Dussel.
In his proposal to provincialize Europe, one predicated on an alliance between
dominant metropolitan histories and post-colonial accounts of the former colonies, thus
thinking of Europe as a province rather than as a universal entity, Chakrabarty affirms
that concepts such as citizenship, state, civil society, the individual, public sphere, etc.,
are concepts that are intrinsic to political modernity, even though these are of a European
provenance
.
101 He further acknowledges that “Modem social critiques of caste,
oppressions of women, lack of rights for labor and subaltern classes in India, and so on -
and, in fact, the very critique of colonialism itself — are unthinkable except as a legacy,
partially, of how Enlightenment Europe was appropriated in the subcontinent.” Still, as
with the aforementioned example of slavery, this appropriation was also informed by a
critique of the concrete manifestations of Western modernity in that part of the world.
More precisely, there are, according to Chakrabarty, two central categories of modernity
that are challenged by the spread of western modernity to the non-western world:
historicism and the political. On one hand, “Historicism enabled European domination of
the world in the nineteenth century.” 102 On the other hand, Western constructions of the
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political, according to Chakrabarty, are constituted on the basis of its contrasts with non-
western subjects and that it considers “pre-political.” Here Chakrabarty has in mind the
kind of histoncism that entails a conception of history based on the progression from one
“stage” to another that is commonly associated with Hegel but that in reality resides in
the British tradition, from the Scottish enlightenment to John Stuart Mill.
In other words, as the preceding discussion of Marx intimated, this is a rather one-
sided and simplified view of historicism. Historicism can be understood in a variety of
ways: (1) as a set of conventions and norms by means of which history is approached
scientifically; (2) a way of thinking that is opposed to systematic, or structuralist
knowledge - an approach that may lead to the contextualization and relativization of
epistemological and moral claims, especially those that claim trans-historical validity; (3)
or as the capacity to understand the historical dimension of human phenomena. 103 Or as
Fredric Jameson presents the question of historicism: “The dilemma of any ‘historicism’
can then be dramatized by the peculiar unavoidable, yet seemingly unresolvable
alternating between Identity and Difference. This dilemma also entails a periodization
that allows for both a sense of continuity and discontinuity to emerge, along with the
Spanish philosopher Manuel Cruz has formulated a concept of historicism that can be best understood in
relation to the epistemological split between human and nature, and it is informed by an anthropological
understanding of human societies. And it is informed by the following precepts: (1) human history is
change
; (2) there are no trans-historical, or eternal, truths; (3) every historical process has its own
individuality, even though a comprehensive comparative framework is allowed to explore those (indeed, it
is a necessary aspect of it); (4) there is no such as thing as an unchanging human essence; (5) humans as
social individuals are historical beings (recall Appadurai’s claim on the past as a scarce resource); (6) social
and cultural objects are historical, and history is the sum of human existence; (7) each epoch is understood
as a unity with its own antecedents; (8) and a historical account of the world substitutes theological and
philosophical conceptions. It is this formulation of historicism that Chakrabarty identifies with modernity
and the one that he resists the most. See Filosofia de la Historia (Barcelona: Paidos, 1995).
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1-81. Yet I take distance from
some of Jameson’s formulations where he reads a logic of necessity in history that is hardly tenable from a
non-identitarian dialectics.
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cntical import discerned by Mane’s critique of political economy. Histoncism is thus
entwined with periodizations. And both are not only consonant but also indispensable for
a non-identitarian formulation of universal history that seeks to break the silencing of
history to respond responsibly in the present.
Interestingly, a universal narrative of capital underlines Chakrabarty’s project,
even if one that interrupts but is also interrupted by a narrative of human belonging
.
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And this seems in tune with Adorno’s formulation. Moreover, in order to provincialize
Europe, a global historical narrative is called for, one that from the perspective of non-
identity seeks to comprehend the both the universal and the particular in these historical
processes, without seeking to mend them, or to impose identity between Europe and the
non-European. That is, the task of critical theory is epistemological. And as such, it seeks
to undo the displacement of particular histories but also their reification for the sake of an
effort of representing the intersection between both moments in specific historical
configurations. In an important way, the agenda for a critical notion of world history from
the perspective of non-identity follows the path of Eric Wolfs Europe and the People
Without History and Michel-Rolph Troulliof s Silencing the Past. But this is not the path
taken by Chakrabarty. Instead, he falls back into Heidegger, and thus introduces an ideal
of authenticity and unmediated experience that rehearses some of the most dangerous
pitfalls of Heidegger’s “philosophy of origins; an stand that is untenable in light of his
own analysis of capitalism.
Enrique Dussel, on the other hand, represents perhaps the most ambitious project
coming from a Latin American perspective to offer a reconceived conception of
105
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 70.
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universal-world history from a non-European perspective
.
106
Dussel does so by
reclaiming a narrative of world history, from the perspective of “world-systems theory”
in order to offer a more comprehensive account of the emergence of modernity, without
considering how an account of universal history anchored in systemic understanding of
capitalist development might reproduce the partiality he criticizes. For Dussel, European
accounts of modernity are partial and provincial; hence, his concern with a more
comprehensive picture. Thus at first it might seem that the perspective I have been
arguing for resonates with Dussel’s project, and in its critical spirit it might do so. Yet,
there are important differences. Dussel, for instance, invokes a world-systemic approach
to historical capitalism, and so his reflections turn out to reproduce the systemic impulse
of Hegel’s without considering the epistemological critique of Hegel from the perspective
of critical theory and sharing the functionalism inherent to this systemic approach. The
first point can be seen in Dussel’s infatuation with the Aztecs and his dismissal of the
Caribbean
.
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This contributes to many silences of particular historical instances that were
constitutive of the total process of colonization. The second aspect is seen by the primacy
on the long duree to the detriment of individual particular processes - the latter can only
be apprehended in both their particular and universal moments by reference to a
dialectical conception of modes of production and social formations - notions that the
world-systemic approach has often found expendable . 108
106
See, for instance, “Eurocentrism and Modernity,” Boundary 2 20 (Autumn 1993): 65-76.
107
Here I am indebted to a conversation with a friend and colleague Gabriel de la Luz. His own work on
the Encomienda system argues on the centrality of the Caribbean for any understanding of the conquest of
America.
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At this stage an important question emerges, what is the understanding of Capitalism more adequate for
this conception? The most productive way to think about capitalism is in terms of the expansion of market
imperatives. This allows for a comprehensive understanding of capitalism, one in which both the universal
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* * *
The idea of universal history that Buek-Morss alludes to, I shall suggest, needs to be one
in which particular demands for freedom are given an emplotment in a universal narrative
in which their often subversive and particular content, with its contradictoriness and
ambiguities, are rendered but never reconciled or mended; a universal history that
represents the particular and the universal, the seemingly permanent and the seemingly
contingent, both the deep memory of a witness and the distance of the archivist; one that
expounds and presents the past in its brokenness, its contingency, and fragmentariness
along with its moments of unity. Thus, an account of the past in both its unity and
discontinuity could be comprehensively articulated, albeit never reconciled or mended.
The realm of historical representation is a contested one, and instead of throwing
away the possibility of a comprehensive understanding of our past with its continuities
and breaks, one needs rather to undo its silences, its hidden stories, the stories that are
constitutive of hegemonic discourses, and are part of their cultural capital. Still, there is
more to it, especially if one seeks to recast the idea of universal history in order to deploy
it as part of forging an ethico-political historical consciousness, one responsive to the
suffering of naked human life. Not only does a reconstitution of the idea of universal
history need to break with the silencing of the past hegemonic powers, but it also needs to
restore the silences constitutive of the past. It need not regress to mythical notions in
order to do so; on the contrary, as much as breaking with the silencing tendency of
dimension of this mode of production is apprehended, without sacrificing one for the sake of the other. It
also avoids subsuming particular concrete manifestations of capitalism in a universalist-systemic-
functionalist narrative. There’s nothing teleological about this. On the contrary, this approach avoids the
mercantilization model of capitalism by opening room for the contingent amidst the structural and
sometimes systemic forms it takes.
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current historical narratives is crucial to rethink universal human history on a different
basts, it is equally crucial to affirm the discontinuities and the silences that constitute
such a history. In terms of the experience of the Auschwitz, this translates into preserving
what Saul Friedlander has called the “deep memory of the survivor” not only as a
disruptive force that fleshes out the contingency and continuity of the historical narratives
on the Judeocide, but also the constitution of such memory and the silences often
partaking in it. These voices also fulfill a crucial role in any attempt to historicize the
Judeocide from the perspective of world history as they provide controls to the ways it
could be represented.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUDING REMARKS
History promises no salvation and offers the
possibility of hope only to the concept whose
movement follows history’s path to the very
extreme.
Theodor W. Adorno
Shortly after I embarked in the writing of this dissertation, the attacks to the Pentagon and
the World Trade Center took place. At the time, I was focused only in pondering the
lessons of Auschwitz, for any critical theory worth its name, by means of the question of
responsibility. In other words, the main theme of the dissertation consisted in
conceptualizing a critical theory of responsibility responsive to the challenges the post-
Auschwitz predicament presents. A large part of the task entailed the elucidation of the
conceptual underpinnings of such theory, and then examining the question of
representation as a coda. But an event of such proportions forced me to digress from the
boundaries of my chosen topic. Still, rather than making 11 September 2001 into my
focus, and thus disregard all the work I had already done, I tried to ponder the question of
violence and its representation from the perspective of critical theory this dissertation
advances. One of the things the aftermath of 1 1 September made abundantly clear was
the centrality of this question in the discussions, or sometimes lack thereof, of the
political dimensions of this event. I was dismayed at, for instance, the way certain critical
perspectives on the events that were still unfolding were fiercely rejected, while being
replaced by nativist and self-satisfied narrative emplotments. 1 So given the initial focus
1
Like historian Amo J. Mayer’s remarks, originally only published by Le Monde. See “Untimely
Meditations,” Theory & Event 5 (2002) <http: www.ihu.edu7muse/theory & event>. Among other things,
Mayer wrote: “Until now, in modem times, acts of individual terror have been the weapon of the weak and
the poor, while acts of state and economic terror have been the weapon of the strong. In both types of terror
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of the dissertation to theoretical consider the representation of vtolence did not seem too
far fetch. It actually added to my topic an important dimension that otherwise would
probably have not been addressed. Writing these remarks retrospectively, I can further
assert that it was the relative lack of a political reflection on these events - meaning
apprehending the events comprehensively from the perspective of American collective
identity, its power, and its historical uses - as well as the chain of events they ensued,
what really prompted me, not so much to digress from my chosen focus, but to explore
another aspect of my guiding question. The result: a study in which the violence that
undoubtedly found immense inhuman proportions in Auschwitz became the occasion to
rethink the axioms of critical theory and to ponder the centrality of violence in any
account of political responsibility in light of the catastrophes of the previous century.
Thus, alongside the Judeocide, a political preoccupation with our present emerged as yet
another guiding historical event.
An implication of this shift of perspective is that a discussion of Auschwitz itself,
and its representations, remained as the horizon to which this study never fully achieved.
It remained an unachieved horizon but a guiding horizon nonetheless. Yet, I felt then, as I
do now, that the discussion that indeed took center stage in these pages is a precondition
to a future engagement with the specific debates surrounding the representation of
Auschwitz in the twentieth- and twentieth-first centuries. This is a topic perhaps worth a
book of its own. Still, in what follows, I would like to suggest some lines of inquiry into
it is, of course, important to distinguish between target and victim. This distinction is crystal-clear in the
fatal hit on the World Trade Center: the target is a prominent symbol and hub of globalizing corporate
financial and economic power; the victim the hapless and partly subaltern work force. Such a distinction
does not apply to the strike on the Pentagon: it houses the supreme military command - the ultima ratio
regnum - of capitalist globalization, even is it entailed, the Pentagon’s own language, “collateral” damage
to human life.”
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this future project. Then, I would like to return to the question of its bearing in the post 1
1
September 2001 predicament we all navigate.
Why is the representation of Auschwitz so central for the concept of responsibility
here, admittedly spartanly, formulated? By the end of the twentieth-century, the centrality
of the Judeoctde as a catastrophe pertaining to humanity at large was hardly disputed. 2
The Judeocide had become a crucial component in the rhetoric of condemning, as well as
le8itimizinS. uses and abuses of power. It had also become a central component in the
public rhetoric denouncing genocide everywhere, thus raising awareness about genocidal
politics at a global scale. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon. The Judeocide, in its
multiple representations and narrative plots, has been deployed as part of strategies of
political contestation since its aftermath, even if it not always possessed the widespread
recognition it nowadays commands. These representations have been mediated by
different contexts and disparate agendas, as well as by the way in which its significance is
represented in different national settings.
Even so, the range of experiences for which it is invoked seems to attest to its
universal, or perhaps global, dimension. Subsequent genocides are often measured up
against it. Meanwhile, Israel s officials, and Jewish politicians, instrumentalize it; but
they are hardly alone as American liberals often deploy the Judeocide as a universal trope
to legitimize “humanitarian interventions”; meanwhile, leftists both condemn such
instrumentalizations, even if they often advanced them in a different disguise, or
2 One the question of naming the catastrophe of the extermination of European Jews, see James E. Young,
Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), especially chap. 5.
See also more recent discussions, which combine the question of naming of the holocaust with the debates
on how to define genocide, in Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (London and
New York: Verso, 2003), especially chap. 2; and Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and
Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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sometimes, or worst still, challenge the centrality of the Judeocide for its Occidentals
bias. Better still, their sometimes radically divergent overtones notwithstanding, such
instrumentations by JeWS and non-Jews allke
’
** often deployed in ways that
disguise the reproduction of practices that served as condition of possibility for the
Judeocide to come about
.
3
The discourses around the Judeocide have evolved into the
establishment of an almost universally recognized imperative, or global standard, as it is
often deployed in order to help avoiding its repetition, regardless of what instance, or
incarnation, of naked human life is at stake. Namely, the avoidance of its repetition in any
other context, locality, as well as in any configuration of victims, perpetrators, and
bystanders has increasingly become part of the Western ethico-political consciousness.
The Judeocide, both in its universality and particularity, has thus become a global
symbol for genocide. It has also become an emblem of loss. Like other losses it is one
that requires a process of working through, and in the specific case of this catastrophe, a
process of mourning, however vicarious, conducive to confronting and facing the loss;
and to render it comprehensively in order to learn from it, and thus hope for the
emergence of an ethico-political consciousness to prevent such catastrophes from
happening again. It is my conviction that the lessons derivable from such working
through are indeed critical and pertain to all of humanity insofar as these could lead
towards instilling a sense of responsibility to naked human life, in whatever shape it
3
See Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), iv-xvi. For other
critical accounts on the revival of the holocaust at the end of the twentieth century see Peter Novick’s The
Holocaust in American Political Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999) and Norman G. Finkelsntein’s The
Holocaust Industry: Reflecting on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (London and New York: Verso,
2000).
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takes
.
4
However, sueh working through presupposes, and relies, on the need to weave
Auschwitz in a counter-narrative that critically captures the interplay between universal
and particular, in its singular manifestations. A narrative that renders our present
historical memory in ways that brings about both its universality and its particularity, and
thus avoids privileging one at the expense of the other. Yet, it is one that does justice to
what is particular to Auschwitz without silencing previous instances of violence,
brutality, and genocide. Indeed, as I suggested in chapters four and five, to break with the
silencing of the brutality of imperialism that, in a way, contributed to the violent
constellation of practices associated with Auschwitz, hardly banalizes this particular
catastrophe; such procedure rather increases our awareness and historical comprehension
of the Judeocide, therefore allowing one to assert those elements that are particular to it . 5
Following the discussion of Adorno in chapter two of this dissertation, I would like to
argue that in order to derive ethical and political lessons from the Judeocide, particularly
in ways that force one to rethink even the most basic epistemological assumptions of
critical theory, hardly represents its redemption or instrumentalizations. But to argue for
The process of ‘working through” I have in mind here is political insofar as it entails collective
deliberation by means of society’s “collected” memories. A Collectivity, as James E. Young has rightly
suggested, does not share a brain cortex. I thus believe that any account of collective memories and identity
is sociological not psychological. My usage of this metaphor cannot be taken as an endorsement of the
psychoanalytic language of trauma to refer to the Judeocide. See James E. Young, The Texture ofMemory:
Holocaust Memorials and Meanings (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), xi. For a critique of this
perspective on the grounds that it partakes in an “ideological individualism” see Dominick La Capra,
History and Reading: Tocqueville, Foucault, French Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000),
63n. Needless to say, LaCapra’s criticism seems to me off mark.
One of the most important debates emerging from the German Historikerstreit was the debate between
Martin Broszat and Saul Friedlander on the possibility of historicizing the Judeocide. Unfortunately, I
cannot elaborate on it in these pages. Needless to say, I plan to do so in the future. For a discussion of this
debate that takes into account both the strengths and the shortcomings of different attempts to historicize
the Judeocide, see Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence
,
trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New
Press, 2003), 1-20.
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the ethical and critical import of Auschwitz demands an elucidation, however bnef, of the
import of this approach in relation to others.
In Israel, for example, the logic of nation-state building has significantly shaped
the way the Judeocide is represented. Israeli national identity is almost a textbook
example of what Ernst Renan, writing in the nineteenth-century, referred to as “the
essence of a nation”: “all individuals have many things in common but they have
forgotten many things .”6 Memory is crucial in nation building, especially because
memory is a combination of remembering and forgetting (if we remember everything we
might be as immobile as Jorge Luis Borges’ Funes), and the constitution of a national
identity precisely requires the same mechanism of selective remembrance as well as
forgetfulness. Still, what Renan referred to as forgetting oftentimes takes the form of
silencing. One only forgets things that were already considered suitable candidates for
remembrance. But when a particular history is silenced it cannot be ever forgotten
because no one bothered to remember it in the first place. Take, for instance, the suffering
of Palestinian dispossession in relation to Israel. It is a non-event.
James E. Young has described the official discourse on the work of memory in
Israel in relation to the Judeocide in the following terms: “At times ambivalent, at times
shrill, the official approach to Holocaust memory in Israel has long been tom between the
simultaneous need to remember and to forget, between the early founders’ enormous
state-building task and the reasons such a state was necessary, between the survivors’
Ernst Renan, “What is a Nation?,” trans. Martin Thom, in Nation and Narration
,
ed. Homi K. Bhabha
(London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 11.
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memory of victims and the fighter’s memory of resistance.” 7 Yet the dialectic of
remembering and forgetting that Young alludes to is only in relation to what stones are
going to be told in relation to the Judeocide. In other words, the tensions are confined
within the bounds of Jewish identity. For the question “How to remember the Holocaust
without allowing it to constitute the center of one’s Jewish identity?” is the nghtful
concern of a Jew. It is precisely along these lines that the memory and forgetting Young
referred to unfolded in Israel. The central concern being how to reconcile “the Jews’
traditional self-image as victim” with “Zionist ideals of strength and self-determination .”8
Thus the Judeocide could be emplotted as the end of Jewish life in exile, not solely in
reference to the extermination of the European Jewry, and the establishment of Israel as a
source of strength, security, and renewal. Its function resides in helping to forge a strong
sense of national identity. Its lessons are accordingly confined by this national imaginary.
During world war two, and its immediate aftermath, a link was made “between Holocaust
and statelessness” but it was the link “between rehabilitation and national rebirth” the one
that proved to be the stronger of the two. Even if an argument can be made that
statelessness tout de court, or being a vulnerable minority within a foreign nation, has
been oftentimes a one of the common elements in the different genocides of the
twentieth-century (Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, Cambodians, Kurds, and Tutsi), as well as
of Apartheid regimes such as South Africa, and pseudo apartheid colonial societies like
Israel, the link between statelessness and genocide was emplotted solely in reference to
Jewish identity. Only by casting the Judeocide in Zionist terms, a state can at once found
7
Young, The Texture ofMemory, 211. For more on the role of the Judoecide in Israel, see Tom Segev, The
Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
8
Young, The Texture ofMemory, 212-13.
314
its identity by reference to the Judeoctde and reproduce some of the dynamics assoc, a,ed
with its histoncal experience
.
5
Ye, there is a lo, of sense in Petty Anderson’s warning
against ascribing too much exceptionalism to the Zionist colon,al venture and its cadres.
To be sure, Israel colonial occupation of Palestine represents a unique combination of
features associated with past colonial enterprises: like the imperialisms of old, it is a
settler society, but unlike those older powers there is no metropolis to respond to.
Conversely, once compared to other instances of the construction of an ethnically defined
nation-state, Zionist cadres emerge as “ordinary cleansers .” 10 These are the elements of
the dialectic of remembrance and forgetfulness in Israel’s ambivalent relation to the
Judeocide.
As already suggested, Palestinian dispossession does not figure in this dialectic,
even when the sites of memory, les lieux de memoire
,
cannot entirely erase it. State it
somewhat differently, the memory of dispossession is part of the sites of memory,
although these hardly fit within the tradition of holocaust remembrance in Israel, however
they do partake in the tradition of Palestinian national identity. Pierre Nora reminds us
that memory is bound with tradition. For it is within a national tradition that its main
qualities can be discerned: Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name.
It remains a permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting,
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and
g An argument can be made on how the present divisions and partitions within the Palestinian zones in
Israel, mostly the offspring of Olso, contributes to a new form of apartheid that frightfully resembles the
creation of Jewish ghettos under Nazi rule. See Edward Said, “Palestinians Under Siege,” London Review
ofBooks, 14 December 2000. Also see, by Said, The End ofthe Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York:
Vintage, 2001). For an informative treatment of the complicity of architecture in the occupation and
colonization of Palestine, especially after 1967, see A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli
Architecture
,
ed. Raft Segal and Eyal Weizman (London and New York: Verso, 2003).
10
Perry Anderson, “Scurrying Towards Bethlehem,” New Left Review 10 (July/August 2001), 13.
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appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. [...] Memory,
insofar as it is affective and magical, only accommodates those facts that suit it...” 11
Hence, some might argue, its malleability in each side of the divide: Israel and Palestine,
two national identities seeking the establishment of a state in the same territory. Yet it is a
malleability constrained by the imperatives of nation-state building, or the aspiration to
build one. Thus, there seems to be little to none space for Palestinian suffering within
official Jewish national identity. Moreover, to criticize this national imaginary from the
perspective of its victims is an even more arduous exercise in the US, where to criticize
Israel is a taboo that, once broken, elicits bogus charges of anti-semitism
.
12
There is thus validity in Amo Mayer’s suggestion that “the memory of Auschwitz
has become overly static, inflexible” in ways that “the social, economic, and cultural
mainsprings of the horrors of Auschwitz have been lost from sight.” 13 If Nora sees
history devouring memory, Mayer sees the opposite. Official memonalizations of
Auschwitz within Israel have lead not to a greater understanding of the Judeocide in its
universal, singular, and particular aspects. Instead, it has further contributed to the myth-
making process that only recently a new generation of Israeli historians, such as Tom
Segev, Benny Morris, Avi Shalim, and Gershom Shafir, have begun to unveil by means
of sobering accounts of the foundation of Israel that include the violence of Palestinian
dispossession. It seems that memory rather than history is static and acritical. Or as I
Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989),
8 .
See Edward W. Said, “America’s Last Taboo,” New Left Review 6 (Nov/Dec 2000), 45-53. See also
Judith Butler, “No, it’s not Anti-Semitic,” London Review ofBooks , 21 August 2003.
13 Amo J. Mayer, “Memory and History: On the Poverty of Remembering and Forgetting the Judeocide,”
Radical History Review 56 (Spring 1993), 7.
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suggested in the previous chapter, the era of memorization is at once the era of
remembrance and historical ignorance. Here one might be tempted to place undue faith
on the critical faculties of history vis-a-vis the perils of memory. Yet this same group of
terrific historians provides the best control case for such an assertion. Their histories
include the violence of Palestinian dispossession and fully display the multifarious nature
of Israeli colonialism. Their positions on the present, however, are much more tamed and
chastened than their revisions of the past. Their boldness in the archive does not find a
political correlate
.
14
Yet the break with the silencing practices of Israeli memory
transcends the political choices of its emissaries. History, like national stories, is also a
narrative, but one with specific constraints not available to literary narratives. For as soon
as one’s narrative is presented as a novel, its author enjoys a creative freedom the
historian does not. Regardless of whether or not modernist techniques of representation
are deployed by means of what Terry Eagleton has referred to as the irony of modernism
- the effort of representing and pointing to the limits of your representation in the same
gestures - or by means of Hayden White’s vindication of modernist “middle
voicedness,” there are limits to the representation of historical events like the Judeocide
.
15
Historians are constrained by the available evidence and comparative controls as much as
by rules, however contingent these are, something that imposes constraints on narrative
strategies. The latter can easily present constraints to what evidence is admitted, and what
14
This discussion is indebted to Perry Anderson’s editorial, “Scurrying Towards Bethlehem,” especially
pp. 24-28.
15
Terry Eagleton, “Pork Chops and Pineapples,” London Review of Books
,
23 October 2003; and Hayden
White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” in Probing the Limits of Representation:
Nazism and the Final Solution, ” ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 37-
53. For a subtle defense and elaboration of White’s position, see James E. Young, “Toward a Received
History of the Holocaust,” History and Theory 36 (December 1997), 21-43. I think that when Young is
formulating White’s arguments he adds a nuance that is not always found in the original versions.
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is allowed to bear in it, but such limits can be reversed by the narrative's ability, or lack
thereof, to comprehensively account for the phenomena under study
.
16
However, the seclusion of the lessons of Judeocide to Israeli borders has not gone
unchallenged. One of the most eloquent and yet problematic expositions ofwhat could be
considered the universal dimension of the holocaust is the one offered by Yehuda Bauer,
a prominent Jewish historian, in a speech given on the Holocaust Memorial Day to the
German House of Representatives,
The book of which I spoke earlier contains the Ten Commandments. Maybe we
should add three additional ones: ‘You, your children, and your children’s
children shall never become perpetrators’; ‘You, your children, and your
children s children shall never, ever allow yourselves to become victims’; ‘You,
your children, and your children’s children shall never, never, be passive
onlookers to mass murder, genocide, or (may it never be repeated) a holocaust-
like tragedy.
17
Bauer anchors his imperatives of non-repetition in the Bible - a founding and canonical
text whose resonance resides in the Judeo-Christian tradition - while insisting that the
avoidance of the holocaust is predicated from an understanding of the holocaust as a
Jewish tragedy. He then distinguishes between the genocidal practices against Gypsies
Here I am following Perry Anderson’s critique of White’s reflections on narrative and history. See the
essay On Emplotment: Two Kinds of Ruins,” in Probing the Limits ofRepresentation, 54-65. For another
critique to the rejection of “realism” by White and other proponents of the “linguistic turn” in history, see
Berel Lang, “Is it Possible to Misrepresent the Holocaust?,” History and Theory 34 (February 1995), 84-89.
For accounts that do justice to the role of narrative and literary metaphors in historical writing while
reclaiming a notion of historical truth, see Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conly
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), especially chaps. 1-2; Roger Chartier^ On the Edge of the
Cliff: History, Language, and Practices, trans. Lydia G. Cochrone (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997); and Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text
in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 65 (January 1990), 59-86.
17
The speech appears as an appendix to Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, pp. 261-273.
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and other groups, and the extreme extermination of European Jewry
.
18
Bauer’s careful
distinctions, he agues, are meant to offer a balanced account of the universality and the
particularity of the Judeocide. In so doing, his argument seeks to reconfigure the
universal moment of Auschwitz with its particularities, without privileging 0 priori one at
the expense of the other. Surely, the mass murders perpetrated by the Nazis against
different groups are all instances of genocides of naked human life, either as stateless
individuals, or as designated “zones of exception.” Insofar as Bauer suggests that the
holocaust represents an extreme form of genocide, Auschwitz has become to symbolize
one the worst forms of suffering and extermination we have thus far witnessed, one with
repercussions that both transcend its specificity and also instill a strong sense of its
situatedness.
Bauer s reflections illustrate a productive tension between the particular and
universal attributes of the holocaust, one discemable significantly in his depiction of this
extreme genocide in a context-bounded, yet historicized perspective. According to Bauer,
The Holocaust was a genocide, but of a special and unprecedented type.” Insofar as it
was a genocide, it demands comparison and thus acquires certain universality. In Bauer’s
estimation, its universal dimension of comparability should concern everyone, from
Kamchatka to Tasmania and from Patagonia to the Hudson Bay.” And yet “it is [still] a
unique genocide, with unprecedented—and, so far, unrepeated—characteristics .” 19 In this
account, part of the context-bounded uniqueness of the Holocaust resides in the state-
centeredness of its implementation, and, following Saul Friedlander, in the extremeness
1
8
On the genocidal policies against Gypsies see Gunter Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
19
Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, x-xi, 39-48, 55, 66, 264-267
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of the redemptive anti-Semitism driving the Nazi desire for a total extermination of the
Jews. Once these aspects of the Judeocide. in their particular h.storical configuration, are
rendered comprehensively in a larger historical narrative, the singularity and uniqueness
of the Holocaust are discemable
.
20
Even so, for Bauer would not compromise for less
than this, although “the holocaust was unprecedented,” he adds, “human civilization is
prone to make Holocausts possible when conditions are ripe”; namely, “the holocaust can
be repeated, not to be sure in exactly the same way, not by Germans, not towards Jews,
but by anyone towards anyone.”21 Therefore, the centrality Bauer ascribes to the
representation and apprehension of its universality, along with its particularity, and how
both are intermingled within the singularity of these events.
In this way Bauer seeks to avoid circumscribing the political and ethical import of
a catastrophe like Auschwitz. This, in order to render it comprehensively in ways that
illustrate its centrality not only for Jews, Europeans, and Westerners: the lessons of the
Judeocide extend to the rest of the globe, to the whole of humanity. Contra Elie Wiesel
and others, the Judeocide can neither be rendered as an unexplainable tragedy, nor can it
be emplotted exclusively in terms of the archetypical catastrophes afflicting Jews ever
since the destruction of the first Temple, or presented as the unthinkable, and thus
impossible to represent. On the contrary, “the Holocaust is a human event,” and it
happened because we are human, perhaps “all too human.” Sill, this affirmation of the
human basis for the holocaust need not lead to its representation as the logical outcome,
or consequence of modernity. One need not sacrifice its particular historical experiences
20
Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 50, 112-18. See also Saul Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews:
Volume I, The Years ofPersecution, 1933-1939 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997).
21
Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 50.
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and concreteness, while presenting it in a narrative in which one is able to discern its
universality, even if merely a contingent and political one. Towards the end of his
reflections Bauer formulates the latter point in the following severe terms:
It is the lack of a precedent for the Holocaust that is beginning to be understood
all over the world. A very special case of genocide took place here—total, global,
purely ideological. It might be repeated—certainly not in the exact same form, but
possibly in a similar, maybe even very similar manner, and we have no way of
determining who will be the Jews and who might be the Germans the next time.
This menace is universal and at the same time—because it is founded on the
experience of the Holocaust—very specifically connected with the Jews. The
specific and the universal cannot be separated. It is the extreme character of the
Holocaust that allows it to be compared with other cases of genocide and to be
presented as a warning. It has in fact, been already copied, though not exactly.
Should the warning be ignored? Should the Holocaust serve as a precedent for
others who would like to inflict the same onto yet others?22
There are, however, several problems with Bauer’s arguments. First, through his
reflections, Bauer assumes the existence of a universal humanist discourse in which his
depiction of the universal ethical and political import of the holocaust can be rendered
intelligibly. Still, as we move away from its particular and context-bounded emplotment,
it seems that one moves to a more abstract, and less credible plane, especially given the
widespread suspicion the positing of a universal narrative elicits. Can we, then, find an
idiom to avoid its non-identical repetition regardless of cultural context? Or by offering
an emplotment of these new three commands, is Bauer defeating the universality of the
22
Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust, 267-68.
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holocaust insofar as these three commandments are anchored in the western Judeo-
Chnstian tradition? In a world in which notions of universality are constantly under fire,
and are assumed largely discredited, how can one emplot the Holocaust in a universal, or
global narrative? Is it possible to devise such narrative in non-Eurocentnc terms, as a
truly universal narrative? Is it possible to devise a histoncal narrative that posits a
universal history in its different configurations of particular histories playing out within
the realm of singular events? In a way, the previous chapter offers my tentative answers
to this question, but a second set of problems remains in relation to the division of the
universal and particular dimensions of the Judeocide: What is the universal aspect of the
Judeocide that should serve as a warning to humanity? What are its universal lessons?
What are the particular aspects of the Judeocide that makes its lessons the sole concern of
Jews? Any critical conception of responsibility needs to address these questions in both
its universal and the particular aspects. The commitment of responding to the suffering of
naked human life cannot overshadow the responsibility of representation and critical
theory s concern with non-subsuming the particular in the universal.
At this point I can only venture to offer very tentative answers to these questions.
Their elucidation was the last part of the dissertation that remained undone. Still, one can
suggest that a vigilant attitude towards imperialism, old and new, race thinking, and the
homogenizing imperatives of the triad nation-state-territory perhaps constitute the most
universal lesson to be derived. Some of the roots of the violence of the Judeocide can be
traced to the violence of imperialism and the race-thinking that informed it, even if the
racialization of its victims is something that this genocide shares with otherwise
dissimilar genocides like that of Rwanda. The same could be said in relation to the drive
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towards the creation of a homogenous population; an attribute also shared by instances of
ethnic cleansing that could hardly be called genocides of the scale of Auschwitz or
Rwanda
.
23
Similarly both Auschwitz and Rwanda pose a crucial dilemma to historians
and observers. In both genocides, massive mobilization and participation were required,
although with significantly different degrees of coordination
.
24
Also, these two are the
legitimate offspring of modernity: Auschwitz was a child of the instrumental rationality
stemming from the dialectic of enlightenment within, while Rwanda constituted one of
the legacies of this dialectic turned outwards by means of the legacy of European
imperialism in post-colonial Africa. Yet what is distinctive about Auschwitz was the
industrialization of death in the concentration camps and “the redemptive anti-semitism”
that informed it . 25 (Both make up for its unique significance for Jews, as the temi
Judeocide also suggests.) But the only way to make these analytical connections is by
historicizing the Judeocide from a global perspective and by subjecting it to the critical
histoncism defended in the previous chapter without reducing it to it. Only then can its
uniqueness be apprehended. Still, in relation to both Auschwitz and Rwanda, there is a
core that remains incomprehensible, their moment of non-identity that triggers further
reflection not in order to mend the gap between concept and object, but to comprehend it
without colonizing it.
23
For helpful discussions see Weitz, A Century of Genocide ; Enzo Traverso, The Origins ofNazi Violence
,
trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 2003); Michael Mann’s forthcoming work The Darker Side
°f Democracy, and Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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The best treatment of this last point is found in Friedlander. Nazi Germany and the Jews, especially chap.
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Politically, the significance of the language that the Judeocide brought into
Western political and ethical consciousness seems to demand awareness to its universal
dimension. Perhaps its most lasting global legacy was to force the West to find a name,
genocide, for “the crime without a name ” In the short twentieth-century, the idiom of
genocide has been used to undo some of the most painful silences of history in relation to
what could be considered genocidal practices, even if not genocide as such as it is
debatable to the extent that there was an explicit intent to destroy
,
such as the
enslavement and eventual extermination of indigenous populations during the conquest of
America. The term genocide, even though it was coined out of the genocidal politics of
the twentieth century, has served to name these experiences of human extermination and
suffering that traditional Western historiography had silenced, but with the raise in
awareness, other instrumentalizations came to the fore. In addition to its
intrumentahzation for the sake of nation-building, nowadays, the language of genocide is
invoked in relation to what the western liberal intelligentsia perceive as the need to break
with the overwhelming inaction bordering in indifference on the part of western powers,
mostly the USA. Even if there is some similarity between this call and the perspective
advanced here (i.e. the need for a notion of responsibility that entails breaking with the
spell of indifference in relation to the suffering of naked human life; of human beings that
are presumably guaranteed human rights solely by virtue of their humanity) the
differences are as sharp, perhaps even more so. The critical theory of responsibility that I
have tried to defend throughout these pages needs to be responsive to not only the
suffering of human life that is perpetrated at the hands of genocidal politics, but also to
'6
This is the position of Samantha Power, ‘A Problem from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide (New
York: Basic Books, 2002).
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the suffering that is the outcome of neoliberal market imperatives, and discourses of
development. In an impassioned essay, historian Vinay Lai reproached discussions on
genocide for precisely leaving these forms of violence nameless as long as these are not
considered worth the label “genocide.”27 Although I sympathize with Lai’s general claim
on behalf of breaking with the silencing of neoliberal and developmentalist violence, as
well as with his call for a critical epistemology that breaks with the silencing of history
that makes certain events unthinkable, even when they unfold in front of our noses, I
strongly disagree with the extension of the term “genocide” to that form of violence
.
28
In
this form of violence there is no “intent to destroy” a specific ethnic or national group. At
its worst, one can accuse certain policies to have genocidal implications, but even this
judgment needs to be in relation to individual cases and based on concrete evidence.
There is no hierarchy of human suffering. To claim one is tasteless at best and
unethical at worst. Although historically the West has insisted on some form of it, it need
not be invoked, or reinstated. Perhaps, the urgent task remains to rethink the connections
between (national) development and genocide, or between genocide and progress,
historically. To do so requires breaking with the silences of history, as well as with the
contemporary silencing of certain forms of violence. This is constitutive of a critical
account of responsibility and its task in the important realm of representation. Alongside
with that, comes a newly found sense of responsibility that requires reflection on the uses
" 7
Vinay Lai, “Genocide, Barbaric Others, and the Violence of Categories: A Response to Omer Bartov,”
American Historical Review 103 (October 1998), 1 187-1 190. Lai’s essay is part of a forum on an essay by
genocide historian Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,”
American Historical Review 103 (June 1998), 771-816. See Bartov’s reply in the same issue, pp. 1191-
1194.
28
The best account of a critical epistemology of history is Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past:
Power and the Production ofHistory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).
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and abuses of the actions done in one’s name, and with the power one generates as a
collectivity. Instead of rapidly embarking in “humanitarian interventions,” as some within
the liberal camp demand, whose outcome has been to further reinstate the imperial power
that is oftentimes the root of the problem, or to create more problems than those that are
“solved,” what acting responsibly might require is turning the eye inwards, while
demanding stronger accountability and reclaiming a democratic political identity. And
yet, this also requires that events such as 11 September are historicized from the
perspective of their imperial background. Such background not only partly explains them,
but it is also crucial to understanding how the events themselves served as a catalyst for
the strengthening of the imperial adventure. 29 What was attacked on 11 September was
not “our pluralism,” “our prosperity,” or “our way of life.”30 Any memorial that is solely
based on those assumptions is bound to confine the work of memory for this recent
human loss within the imperatives of the imperialist nation-state, and thus perpetuate the
indifference of our imperial post-citizens, as well as their unwitting complicity.
On how 1 1 September became such a catalyst for a larger agenda in East Asia and the Middle East, see
the discussion by Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, 84-85, 226ff. Still, Johnson suggestion that
the turning point from republic to empire took place after this date is historically inaccurate. See p. 4.
30
These are some of the constitutive elements of the emplotment given by James Young to the attacks on
1 1 September in his proposal for a “living memorial” for its victims. See James E. Young, “Remember Life
with Life: The New World Trade Center as Living Memorial,” Presentation for Between Expedience and
Deliberation: A Symposium at the Steven L. Newman Real Estate Institute, Baruch College, 8 February
2002. 1 am grateful to James Young for generously providing me with a written copy of his presentation.
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